Kontrakt
0x617620cabf90b3ceabe00d8fb83626bdf55e3bd9
- Adresa
- 0x617620cabf90b3ceabe00d8fb83626bdf55e3bd9
- Druh
- ověřený kontrakt FinalStateTrees
- Zůstatek
- 0 vETH
- Nonce
- 1
- Kód
- 26,167 bajtů codehash 0x3c52c60717e521f4668716598930f107f1044b714513773e8fdc6c501f5710f0
strom účtů
- Strom
- 1 · účty
- Přítomen
- žádný list
- Klíč
- 0x734012e428963ccf4efad199b95cd90fd918fc8addc13847c8b2a78207e25cd6
- Živý kořen
- 0xe7eb646dfe4cfe9c975fd970c7c565c8d96e5c1edae4440e5f6a2560325fb328
Tato adresa nemá ve stromu účtů list. Každý Final Wallet — včetně servisních identit — ho má, takže chybějící list znamená běžný účet, ne peněženku.
zdroj ověřeno
- Kontrakt
- FinalStateTrees přesná shoda · immutables maskovány
- Kompilátor
- v0.8.33+commit.64118f21
- Optimalizátor
- zapnut · 200 průchodů
- Verze EVM
- prague
- Ověřeno
- 2026-09-07T05:00:39.580Z
- Původ
- preverify-final-chain (forge artifact, bytecode compared against live code)
contracts/finalchain/FinalCertificate.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {FinalChainPrecompiles} from "./FinalChainPrecompiles.sol";
import {FinalChainTime} from "./FinalChainTime.sol";
/**
* @title FinalCertificate
* @notice Reads a Final Certificate (`.fcert`, schema v3) on chain.
*
* @dev Final Chain only — it needs the SHA3-256 precompile, because the schema
* hashes with FIPS-202 SHA3 and the EVM has `keccak256`, which is a different
* function.
*
* ## Why the chain parses this at all
*
* `FinalIdentityRegistry.registerWithCertificate` used to take the TBS bytes
* AND the public keys as separate arguments. It derived `certHash` from the
* bytes, which sounds like verification and is not: nothing compared the keys
* to the certificate, so a registrar could bind any certificate to any keypair.
* The registry would then hold a key the certificate does not contain, and every
* signature that key produced would verify against a certificate that never
* authorised it.
*
* So the keys are read OUT of the certificate. There is one input and no way for
* two arguments to disagree.
*
* ## The SubjectKeyId check
*
* The schema defines `SubjectKeyId` as SHA3-256 of the `PublicKeyBlock`. Having
* parsed the block, this recomputes that digest and compares. The field is
* inside the TBS, so it is covered by the CA's signatures — which makes the
* check a statement about what the CA attested, not merely about internal
* consistency of bytes the caller supplied.
*
* ## What this does NOT do
*
* It does not verify the CA's signatures over the TBS, and it does not walk the
* chain to the root. Both are possible here — the precompiles verify ML-DSA-87
* and SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s — and both are deliberately out of scope for the
* registry's bootstrap path, where the registrar is the party that issued the
* certificate in the first place. `verifyIssuerSignatures` below is provided for
* callers that need it, and the identity registry uses it once a CA is itself
* registered.
*/
library FinalCertificate {
/// `"PQCF"`.
uint32 internal constant MAGIC = 0x50514346;
/// The current wire generation — v5's `Version = 2` (chain-attested
/// issuance; ruled 2026-09-01). The v4 wire (`Version = 1`) stays
/// PARSEABLE so pre-cutover artifacts still read; encoders write 2.
/// fails to parse rather than being reinterpreted: `pqKeysHash` and every
/// wallet address derive from this exact layout.
uint32 internal constant VERSION = 2;
/// The v4 generation, accepted on parse for pre-cutover artifacts.
uint32 internal constant VERSION_V4 = 1;
/// @notice The 0x0102 Institution identity extension (issuer profile).
uint16 internal constant EXT_INSTITUTION = 0x0102;
/// Algorithm ids ARE the FIPS numbers, in one space for signatures and KEMs
/// — the same ids the quorum wire format and the backend registry use, and
/// the numbers the precompile addresses end in.
/// ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203), the lattice half of the encapsulation pair.
uint16 internal constant ALG_ML_KEM_1024 = 0x0003;
/// ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204). Transaction class.
uint16 internal constant ALG_ML_DSA_87 = 0x0004;
/// SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s (FIPS 205). Access class, and the seal.
uint16 internal constant ALG_SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S = 0x0005;
/// FN-DSA (FIPS 206). Reserved: no implementation, never accepted.
uint16 internal constant ALG_FN_DSA = 0x0006;
/// HQC-5 (FIPS 207), the code-based half of the encapsulation pair.
uint16 internal constant ALG_HQC_5 = 0x0007;
/// Certificate signing. Says which key to verify WITH; it grants nothing —
/// that comes from `Depth` and `MaxDelegationDepth`.
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_CERT_SIGNING = 0x0004;
/// The wallet's four slots, in two stages of two.
///
/// A certificate carries ONE stage, never all four. The stage is what gets
/// issued, rotated and revoked as a unit, and a holder presenting a live
/// certificate presents both of that stage's keys or neither — splitting
/// them per slot would let half a stage be presented as if it were whole.
///
/// This applies to services exactly as it applies to a user's wallet.
/// A co-signer is a Final Wallet: same four slots, same split, same
/// algorithms. There is no second kind of identity in this system.
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_ACTIVE_TX = 0x0010;
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_ACTIVE_ACCESS = 0x0011;
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_RECOVERY_TX = 0x0012;
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_RECOVERY_ACCESS = 0x0013;
/// @dev v4's encapsulation purposes. Parsed, and each stage's pair is
/// resolved alongside its signing pair — `FinalIdentityRegistry` then
/// stores them so a sender can encapsulate to a registered party
/// without a second lookup somewhere less authoritative.
///
/// They were declared and skipped for one release, which is how the
/// registry's four encapsulation-key mappings ended up read in three
/// places and written in none: `kemCommitments` hashed the empty
/// string for every account and `kemKeysOf` returned nothing.
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_ACTIVE_KEM = 0x0014;
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_RECOVERY_KEM = 0x0015;
/// @dev The seal: a second SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s key, distinct from the access
/// key, that co-signs execution-class quorum decisions. Carried by
/// SERVICE certificates only — a user's wallet never seals — and
/// optional in the schema, so a certificate without it parses
/// unchanged. Outside `keysHash`: a seal is operational, rotated by
/// issuing a new live certificate, and it must not move a wallet
/// address it plays no part in.
uint16 internal constant PURPOSE_ACTIVE_SEAL = 0x0016;
/// @dev A purpose no certificate can carry, so `parse` can be told "this
/// stage has no encapsulation slot" without a second boolean. `0xffff`
/// is outside the registry and reserved by being used here.
uint16 internal constant NO_KEM_PURPOSE = 0xffff;
/// Nanoseconds per second. The schema's validity fields are nanoseconds and
/// `block.timestamp` is seconds; a comparison across the two units is a bug
/// waiting for the first certificate anybody actually checks.
/// @dev The schema stamps validity in NANOseconds and this chain's clock is
/// MILLIseconds, so a certificate converts down by 1e6 rather than by
/// 1e9. It was 1e9 — seconds — which made every `notBefore` look 1000x
/// too small against `block.timestamp` and every certificate
/// permanently "already valid", including one issued for the future.
uint64 internal constant NS_PER_MILLISECOND = FinalChainTime.NS_PER_MILLISECOND;
/// @notice What the chain keeps out of one certificate.
struct Parsed {
bytes32 certHash;
bytes32 serial;
/// keccak256 of the IssuerDN bytes, for the chain-issuer pin: a
/// chain-attested certificate carries the ruled constant DN and the
/// registry compares hashes rather than strings.
bytes32 issuerDnHash;
/// The SubjectDN bytes verbatim — the jurisdiction rule reads its
/// `C=` component at issuer registration.
bytes subjectDn;
/// The 0x0102 Institution extension VALUE, when present; empty
/// otherwise. Issuer registration parses jurisdiction out of it.
bytes institutionExt;
/// SHA3-256 of the ISSUER's public key block. Zero-length — and so
/// `bytes32(0)` here — for exactly one certificate in the hierarchy,
/// which is what terminates chain validation.
bytes32 authorityKeyId;
/// SHA3-256 of this certificate's own public key block. The child's
/// `authorityKeyId` must equal it, which is what links the two.
bytes32 subjectKeyId;
uint8 depth;
uint8 maxDelegationDepth;
/// MILLISECONDS, converted from the schema's nanoseconds — this chain's clock.
uint64 notBefore;
/// Milliseconds. Zero means never expires, which the schema allows.
uint64 notAfter;
/// The stage's transaction-class key. ML-DSA-87 — spending, and every
/// high-cadence protocol action.
bytes transactionKey;
/// The stage's access-class key. SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s — identity,
/// rotation, recovery-pair promotion. A different hardness assumption,
/// so a lattice break leaves the key that governs identity standing.
bytes accessKey;
/// The stage's ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation key. Empty on a CA, which has
/// no encapsulation stage, and on any v4 certificate issued without
/// one — see `parse` for why that is tolerated rather than refused.
bytes kemMlKem;
/// The stage's HQC-5 encapsulation key. Carried under the SAME purpose
/// as the lattice half and distinguished only by algorithm, which is
/// why the parser matches on the `(purpose, algorithm)` pair.
bytes kemHqc;
/// The service's seal key (`PURPOSE_ACTIVE_SEAL`, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s).
/// Empty on every certificate that does not carry one — a user wallet,
/// a recovery stage, a CA.
bytes sealKey;
/// Where the TBS ends, so a caller holding the whole certificate can
/// find the `SignatureBlock` without parsing forward again.
uint256 tbsLength;
}
error BadMagic(uint32 got);
error BadVersion(uint32 got);
error Truncated(uint256 needed, uint256 got);
error SubjectKeyIdMismatch(bytes32 derived, bytes32 declared);
error MissingSlot(uint16 purpose);
error WrongAlgorithmForSlot(uint16 purpose, uint16 algorithm);
error DuplicateKey(uint16 purpose, uint16 algorithm);
error KeysNotSorted();
error BadKeyLength(uint16 algorithm, uint256 length);
error InvalidDepth(uint8 depth, uint8 maxDelegationDepth);
error ValidityInverted(uint64 notBefore, uint64 notAfter);
/**
* @notice Parse and self-check a `TBSCertificate`.
* @param tbs the TBS bytes, verbatim. Not the whole certificate.
* @param txPurpose the transaction-class purpose this stage should carry.
* @param accessPurpose the access-class purpose for the same stage.
*
* @dev Checking for a CAPABILITY rather than a type is the schema's own
* rule, and the reason there is no type field to check instead. Passing the
* LIVE purposes to a recovery certificate finds neither key and reverts —
* which is what stops a recovery certificate being registered as a live one
* and handing the recovery pair everyday authority.
*/
function parse(bytes calldata tbs, uint16 txPurpose, uint16 accessPurpose, uint16 kemPurpose)
internal
view
returns (Parsed memory out)
{
_need(tbs, 58);
if (uint32(bytes4(tbs[0:4])) != MAGIC) revert BadMagic(uint32(bytes4(tbs[0:4])));
// Both live generations. v4 artifacts predate chain-attested issuance
// and still parse — supersession is handled at admission (PoP and the
// chain-issuer pins), not by refusing to read history.
uint32 wireVersion = uint32(bytes4(tbs[4:8]));
if (wireVersion != VERSION && wireVersion != VERSION_V4) revert BadVersion(wireVersion);
out.certHash = FinalChainPrecompiles.sha3_256(tbs);
out.serial = bytes32(tbs[8:40]);
out.depth = uint8(tbs[40]);
out.maxDelegationDepth = uint8(tbs[41]);
uint64 notBeforeNs = uint64(bytes8(tbs[42:50]));
uint64 notAfterNs = uint64(bytes8(tbs[50:58]));
if (out.maxDelegationDepth < out.depth) {
revert InvalidDepth(out.depth, out.maxDelegationDepth);
}
if (notAfterNs != 0 && notAfterNs <= notBeforeNs) {
revert ValidityInverted(notBeforeNs, notAfterNs);
}
out.notBefore = notBeforeNs / NS_PER_MILLISECOND;
out.notAfter = notAfterNs == 0 ? 0 : notAfterNs / NS_PER_MILLISECOND;
// Four length-prefixed fields: IssuerDN, SubjectDN, AuthorityKeyId,
// SubjectKeyId. Every field before them is fixed width, which is the
// whole reason the schema orders them this way.
uint256 p = 58;
uint256 issuerDnLen;
(p, issuerDnLen) = _skipLengthPrefixed(tbs, p);
out.issuerDnHash = keccak256(tbs[p - issuerDnLen:p]);
uint256 subjectDnLen;
(p, subjectDnLen) = _skipLengthPrefixed(tbs, p);
out.subjectDn = tbs[p - subjectDnLen:p];
uint256 akidLen;
(p, akidLen) = _skipLengthPrefixed(tbs, p);
out.authorityKeyId = _bytes32At(tbs, p - akidLen, akidLen);
uint256 skidLen;
(p, skidLen) = _skipLengthPrefixed(tbs, p);
uint256 skidStart = p - skidLen;
_need(tbs, p + 2);
uint16 keyCount = uint16(bytes2(tbs[p:p + 2]));
p += 2;
// AFTER the count word. `SubjectKeyId` is SHA3-256 of the KeyEntry
// array alone — `encodeTbs` writes `PublicKeyCount` as its own field and
// `encodePublicKeyBlock` returns only the entries. Hashing the count in
// produces a digest that is self-consistent and matches no certificate
// any issuer ever wrote.
uint256 blockStart = p;
uint32 previousSort = 0;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < keyCount; i++) {
_need(tbs, p + 8);
uint16 alg = uint16(bytes2(tbs[p:p + 2]));
uint16 purpose = uint16(bytes2(tbs[p + 2:p + 4]));
uint32 keyLen = uint32(bytes4(tbs[p + 4:p + 8]));
p += 8;
_need(tbs, p + keyLen);
// Ascending by (purpose, algorithm), duplicates invalid. The schema
// requires the order so `certHash` is reproducible across
// implementations; enforcing it here also means a second entry for
// one slot cannot quietly shadow the first.
uint32 sortKey = (uint32(purpose) << 16) | uint32(alg);
if (i > 0) {
if (sortKey == previousSort) revert DuplicateKey(purpose, alg);
if (sortKey < previousSort) revert KeysNotSorted();
}
previousSort = sortKey;
// The algorithm is pinned per CLASS, not merely recorded. A
// transaction slot carrying an access-class key would verify
// cryptographically and mean something entirely different — an
// identity key must never authorize a transaction, or splitting the
// classes buys nothing.
// Matched on the PAIR, not on the purpose alone. A CA carries two
// keys under one purpose (`0x0004`) distinguished only by
// algorithm, so matching on purpose first would find the first of
// them twice and the second never.
if (purpose == txPurpose && alg == ALG_ML_DSA_87) {
if (keyLen != FinalChainPrecompiles.ML_DSA_87_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) {
revert BadKeyLength(alg, keyLen);
}
out.transactionKey = tbs[p:p + keyLen];
} else if (purpose == accessPurpose && alg == ALG_SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S) {
if (keyLen != FinalChainPrecompiles.SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) {
revert BadKeyLength(alg, keyLen);
}
out.accessKey = tbs[p:p + keyLen];
} else if (purpose == kemPurpose && alg == ALG_ML_KEM_1024) {
out.kemMlKem = tbs[p:p + keyLen];
} else if (purpose == kemPurpose && alg == ALG_HQC_5) {
out.kemHqc = tbs[p:p + keyLen];
} else if (purpose == PURPOSE_ACTIVE_SEAL && alg == ALG_SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S) {
if (keyLen != FinalChainPrecompiles.SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) {
revert BadKeyLength(alg, keyLen);
}
out.sealKey = tbs[p:p + keyLen];
} else if (purpose == PURPOSE_ACTIVE_SEAL) {
// The seal is hash-based by definition — it exists to stand on
// the OTHER assumption from the transaction key it co-signs
// with. A lattice seal would be two signatures on one bet.
revert WrongAlgorithmForSlot(purpose, alg);
} else if (purpose == txPurpose || purpose == accessPurpose) {
// A slot the caller asked for, carrying the wrong scheme. It
// would verify cryptographically and mean something else
// entirely — an identity key must never authorize a
// transaction, or splitting the classes buys nothing.
revert WrongAlgorithmForSlot(purpose, alg);
} else if (purpose == kemPurpose) {
// Same rule for the encapsulation slot. A third KEM appearing
// under this purpose is a hybrid whose second family nobody
// agreed on, and admitting it silently is how a pair becomes a
// trio that one reader honours and another ignores.
revert WrongAlgorithmForSlot(purpose, alg);
}
// NO length check on the KEM keys here, and that is deliberate.
// The signing slots are checked against a constant because the
// parser's own callers depend on the length; an encapsulation key
// is checked by `0x0203` / `0x0207` at the moment it is REGISTERED,
// where the answer is a well-formedness verdict rather than a
// parse failure. Two checks of the same thing in two shapes is how
// one of them ends up weaker and nobody notices which.
p += keyLen;
}
// `SubjectKeyId` is SHA3-256 of the KeyEntry array, count word
// EXCLUDED — `blockStart` is taken after the count is consumed, for the
// reason given where it is set. Recomputing it is what turns "these
// bytes decode" into "the CA signed these exact keys"; the field is
// inside the TBS, so it is covered by the signatures.
out.subjectKeyId = FinalChainPrecompiles.sha3_256(tbs[blockStart:p]);
bytes32 declared = _bytes32At(tbs, skidStart, skidLen);
if (out.subjectKeyId != declared) revert SubjectKeyIdMismatch(out.subjectKeyId, declared);
// Both or neither. A stage is issued as a unit, so a certificate
// carrying one of its two keys is not a partial certificate — it is a
// certificate for a stage that does not exist.
if (out.transactionKey.length == 0) revert MissingSlot(txPurpose);
if (out.accessKey.length == 0) revert MissingSlot(accessPurpose);
// The encapsulation pair is both-or-neither for the same reason, and
// the reason is louder here: a hybrid quietly reduced to one family is
// identical on the wire, so a certificate carrying only the lattice
// half would seal successfully and silently drop the code-based hedge.
// Neither is the CA case and the pre-v4 case, both legitimate.
if ((out.kemMlKem.length == 0) != (out.kemHqc.length == 0)) {
revert MissingSlot(kemPurpose);
}
_need(tbs, p + 2);
uint16 extCount = uint16(bytes2(tbs[p:p + 2]));
p += 2;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < extCount; i++) {
_need(tbs, p + 7);
uint16 extType = uint16(bytes2(tbs[p:p + 2]));
uint32 valueLen = uint32(bytes4(tbs[p + 3:p + 7]));
p += 7;
_need(tbs, p + valueLen);
// The Institution extension's VALUE, kept for the issuer
// profile's jurisdiction rule. Everything else is skipped as
// before — extensions are structural to certHash, semantic to
// whichever consumer knows them.
if (extType == EXT_INSTITUTION) out.institutionExt = tbs[p:p + valueLen];
p += valueLen;
}
out.tbsLength = p;
}
/// @notice Parse a LIVE-stage certificate: `activeTransaction` + `activeAccess`.
/// @dev `external`, like the other three entry points below: the registry
/// sits against the EIP-170 ceiling and the TBS parser is its single
/// largest inlined dependency, so the four doors it actually calls are
/// DEPLOY-LINKED — the library is one more contract in the plane's fixed
/// nonce-0 deploy order (doctrine §2 of `arch/final-chain-regenesis.md`),
/// its address baked immutably into the registry's bytecode. A linked
/// library is code, not a key: nothing can repoint it after deployment.
function parseLive(bytes calldata tbs) external view returns (Parsed memory) {
return parse(tbs, PURPOSE_ACTIVE_TX, PURPOSE_ACTIVE_ACCESS, PURPOSE_ACTIVE_KEM);
}
/// @notice Parse a RECOVERY-stage certificate.
/// @dev The recovery pair authorizes rotating the wallet's own credentials
/// and NOTHING else — acting as a guardian, an ordinary action for that
/// account, uses the live access key. Keeping the two stages in separate
/// certificates is what makes that boundary something a verifier can see.
function parseRecovery(bytes calldata tbs) external view returns (Parsed memory) {
return parse(tbs, PURPOSE_RECOVERY_TX, PURPOSE_RECOVERY_ACCESS, PURPOSE_RECOVERY_KEM);
}
/// @notice Parse a CA certificate, whose two keys are both cert-signing.
/// @dev No encapsulation purpose: a CA signs and is never sealed to, so
/// `PURPOSE_ACTIVE_KEM` is passed as a value the loop can never match. A
/// CA certificate carrying encapsulation keys would parse them into slots
/// `_write` then discards, which is a shape worth refusing to have.
function parseCa(bytes calldata tbs) external view returns (Parsed memory) {
return parse(tbs, PURPOSE_CERT_SIGNING, PURPOSE_CERT_SIGNING, NO_KEM_PURPOSE);
}
/**
* @notice Verify a CA's dual signature over `tbs`.
* @dev Both must verify, not either. Two signatures under two different
* hardness assumptions is the entire reason the schema carries two, and
* accepting one would collapse that to whichever family breaks first.
*/
function verifyIssuerSignatures(
bytes memory tbs,
bytes memory issuerMlDsaKey,
bytes memory issuerSlhDsaKey,
bytes memory mlDsaSignature,
bytes memory slhDsaSignature
) external view returns (bool) {
return FinalChainPrecompiles.verifyMlDsa87(issuerMlDsaKey, tbs, mlDsaSignature)
&& FinalChainPrecompiles.verifySlhDsa(issuerSlhDsaKey, tbs, slhDsaSignature);
}
function _need(bytes calldata tbs, uint256 upto) private pure {
if (tbs.length < upto) revert Truncated(upto, tbs.length);
}
function _skipLengthPrefixed(bytes calldata tbs, uint256 p)
private
pure
returns (uint256 next, uint256 length)
{
_need(tbs, p + 4);
length = uint32(bytes4(tbs[p:p + 4]));
next = p + 4 + length;
_need(tbs, next);
}
function _bytes32At(bytes calldata tbs, uint256 start, uint256 length)
private
pure
returns (bytes32)
{
// A SubjectKeyId that is not 32 bytes is not a SHA3-256 digest, so it
// cannot match and the comparison will fail — which is the correct
// outcome and needs no separate error.
if (length != 32) return bytes32(0);
return bytes32(tbs[start:start + 32]);
}
}
contracts/finalchain/FinalChainPrecompiles.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
/**
* @title FinalChainPrecompiles
* @notice The three primitives Final Chain adds to the EVM, and the only
* supported way to reach them.
*
* @dev **These exist ONLY on Final Chain (chain id 48359).** They are provided
* by `final-reth`, the node binary in `FinalBackend/vendor/reth/final/`, and
* nothing at these addresses on Ethereum, Optimism or any other chain will
* answer. A contract that calls them must be one that only ever runs here;
* `assertAvailable` below is the cheap way to fail loudly rather than treat an
* empty return as a verified signature.
*
* The addresses are the FIPS numbers, which is the whole allocation rule —
* there is no local registry to consult and no way for two implementations to
* disagree about where a primitive lives:
*
* | address | primitive | FIPS |
* |---|---|---|
* | `0x…0202` | SHA3-256 | 202 |
* | `0x…0203` | ML-KEM-1024 key validation | 203 |
* | `0x…0204` | ML-DSA-87 verify | 204 |
* | `0x…0205` | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s verify | 205 |
* | `0x…0207` | HQC-5 key validation | 207 |
*
* The two KEM addresses VALIDATE keys and do nothing else, for one reason:
* encapsulation is a SENDER operation and decapsulation needs the secret key,
* so neither belongs on a chain at all. Checking that a registered public key
* is well-formed is hardening rather than a dependency, and nothing in this
* system waits on it.
*
* HQC's number is 207. It had none when the KEM pair was chosen, which was the
* one thing separating it from ML-KEM here — a primitive with no standard
* number has no address under this rule, and inventing one would have been a
* local convention masquerading as the global one.
*
* **No AEAD precompile, at any number.** The chain must never be able to
* decrypt an intent, and checking a revealed body against its commitment is a
* hash compare that `0x0202` already serves.
*
* ## Why this library refuses to take a public key from its caller
*
* It does take one — the primitives are pure functions and cannot do otherwise.
* The rule lives one level up, in `FinalPqQuorum`: a key passed as an argument
* proves nothing, because anyone holding a keypair can produce a valid
* signature under it. Only a key read from `FinalIdentityRegistry` is evidence
* about WHO signed. Every call site here must be able to answer "where did this
* key come from" with "storage", never "calldata".
*
* ## `success` is not the answer
*
* A `staticcall` to a verifier returns two things and both matter. `success`
* false means the call was malformed — usually a length bug in the caller — and
* `success` true with a zero word means the signature did not verify. The
* helpers below collapse both to `false` for the caller's convenience, which is
* safe in that direction and only in that direction: treating a failed call as
* a valid signature would be the whole security of the system.
*/
library FinalChainPrecompiles {
/// @notice SHA3-256 (FIPS 202). NOT `keccak256`, which is the
/// pre-standardisation padding and produces a different digest.
address internal constant SHA3_256 = address(0x0202);
/// @notice ML-DSA-87 verification (FIPS 204). Transaction-class keys.
address internal constant ML_DSA_87 = address(0x0204);
/// @notice SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s verification (FIPS 205). Access-class keys.
address internal constant SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S = address(0x0205);
/// @notice ML-KEM-1024 encapsulation-key validation (FIPS 203).
/// @dev VALIDATES; it does not encapsulate. Runs FIPS 203 §7.2's own
/// encapsulation-key check — the type check and the modulus check — and
/// nothing else. Encapsulation is a sender operation and decapsulation
/// needs the secret key, so neither belongs on a chain.
address internal constant ML_KEM_1024 = address(0x0203);
/// @notice HQC-5 public-key validation (FIPS 207).
/// @dev Structural only: the length, and the three padding bits the
/// encoding leaves beyond `n = 57637`. HQC has no cheap key-validity
/// predicate and this does not pretend to one.
address internal constant HQC_5 = address(0x0207);
/// @notice ML-DSA-87 public key length. Round-3 Dilithium5 shares it.
uint256 internal constant ML_DSA_87_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN = 2592;
/// @notice ML-DSA-87 signature length. Round-3 Dilithium5 is 4595.
uint256 internal constant ML_DSA_87_SIGNATURE_LEN = 4627;
/// @notice SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s public key length (`PK.seed ‖ PK.root`).
uint256 internal constant SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN = 64;
/// @notice SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s signature length. The `f` set is 49,856.
uint256 internal constant SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S_SIGNATURE_LEN = 29792;
/// @notice Thrown when a precompile is absent, i.e. this is not Final Chain
/// or the node is stock reth rather than `final-reth`.
error PrecompileUnavailable(address precompile);
/**
* @notice Reverts unless all five precompiles answer.
* @dev Call this from a constructor. A contract whose security rests on PQ
* verification must not deploy onto a chain that cannot perform it — the
* failure mode otherwise is a quorum that reaches threshold with zero valid
* signatures, discovered at the worst possible moment.
*
* The probe is SHA3-256 of the empty string, whose value is a published
* FIPS 202 constant. It cannot be produced by an address with no code
* (which returns empty) nor by `keccak256` (which gives a different digest
* for the same input), so it distinguishes "the right precompile" from both
* "nothing here" and "the wrong hash function".
*/
function assertAvailable() internal view {
bytes32 expected = 0xa7ffc6f8bf1ed76651c14756a061d662f580ff4de43b49fa82d80a4b80f8434a;
(bool ok, bytes memory out) = SHA3_256.staticcall("");
if (!ok || out.length != 32 || bytes32(out) != expected) {
revert PrecompileUnavailable(SHA3_256);
}
// The two signature verifiers are probed by shape rather than by a
// known-answer vector: a KAT here would put a 29,792-byte signature in
// this contract's bytecode. A deliberately short input is a
// *precompile error* by contract, so a FAILED call is the pass and a
// silent success would mean something else is answering at the address.
_probeRejectsShortInput(ML_DSA_87);
_probeRejectsShortInput(SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S);
// The two KEM validators are probed the other way round, because they
// are total by contract: a wrong length is a malformed KEY, which is
// the question being asked, so they ANSWER rather than error. A
// one-byte input must therefore come back as a well-formed `false`, and
// a failed call means nothing is there.
_probeAnswersFalse(ML_KEM_1024);
_probeAnswersFalse(HQC_5);
}
/**
* @dev A short input must make the precompile ERROR. The gas budget is the
* whole subtlety.
*
* A reverting CONTRACT refunds the gas it did not use. A precompile that
* returns an error consumes **everything forwarded to it** — and Solidity
* forwards 63/64 of what is left by default. Two such probes in a
* constructor therefore burn all but 1/4096 of the deployment's gas, and
* the deploy fails with no revert data at all.
*
* That is not hypothetical: it is what happened the first time this ran
* against a real `final-reth`, and no Foundry test could have caught it.
* A mocked precompile is a contract, and a contract's `require` hands the
* gas back.
*
* 5,000 is generous for a call that fails on a length check before any
* cryptography runs, and small enough that both probes together are noise
* against a deployment.
*/
function _probeRejectsShortInput(address precompile) private view {
bool ok;
assembly ("memory-safe") {
let ptr := mload(0x40)
mstore8(ptr, 0x00)
ok := staticcall(5000, precompile, ptr, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00)
}
if (ok) revert PrecompileUnavailable(precompile);
}
/**
* @dev A one-byte input must come back as a well-formed zero word.
*
* The inverse of `_probeRejectsShortInput`, and the inversion is the point:
* these two precompiles are TOTAL. Every byte string has an answer to "is
* this a well-formed key", and for one byte the answer is no. A precompile
* that errored here would be one that treats a malformed key as a caller
* bug, which is the opposite of what a registry wants.
*
* Gas is bounded for the same reason as the other probe — an erroring
* precompile consumes everything forwarded — even though the pass case
* returns normally and refunds.
*/
function _probeAnswersFalse(address precompile) private view {
bool ok;
bytes32 answer;
assembly ("memory-safe") {
let ptr := mload(0x40)
mstore8(ptr, 0x00)
ok := staticcall(5000, precompile, ptr, 0x01, ptr, 0x20)
answer := mload(ptr)
}
if (!ok || answer != bytes32(0)) revert PrecompileUnavailable(precompile);
}
/**
* @notice Is `encapsulationKey` a well-formed ML-KEM-1024 key?
*
* @dev The check a registry owes a sender. A malformed encapsulation key
* stored on chain is an account whose intents cannot be sealed, and the
* discovery happens at the first attempt to seal one — on the hybrid path,
* as a pair silently reduced to one family, which is the failure with no
* error attached.
*
* False rather than reverting on any shape, including the wrong length,
* because the caller is asking a question and every input has an answer.
*/
function isWellFormedMlKem1024(bytes memory encapsulationKey) internal view returns (bool) {
return _validatesKey(ML_KEM_1024, encapsulationKey);
}
/// @notice Is `publicKey` a well-formed HQC-5 key?
/// @dev Structural, and honestly partial — see the precompile. It catches a
/// truncated key, a key from the wrong parameter set, and a tail carrying
/// smuggled bytes, which are the three ways this goes wrong in practice.
function isWellFormedHqc5(bytes memory publicKey) internal view returns (bool) {
return _validatesKey(HQC_5, publicKey);
}
/// @dev A failed CALL is not a false answer. It means nothing is at the
/// address — this is not Final Chain, or the node is stock reth — and
/// reading it as "the key is malformed" would silently disable the check on
/// exactly the deployment where it cannot run.
function _validatesKey(address precompile, bytes memory key) private view returns (bool) {
(bool ok, bytes memory out) = precompile.staticcall(key);
if (!ok || out.length != 32) revert PrecompileUnavailable(precompile);
return bytes32(out) != bytes32(0);
}
/// @notice FIPS 202 SHA3-256 over `data`.
/// @dev The certificate schema hashes `TBSCertificate`, `SubjectKeyId` and
/// `AuthorityKeyId` with this, so it is the only function that can check a
/// `certHash` against the bytes it claims to summarise.
function sha3_256(bytes memory data) internal view returns (bytes32 digest) {
(bool ok, bytes memory out) = SHA3_256.staticcall(data);
if (!ok || out.length != 32) revert PrecompileUnavailable(SHA3_256);
digest = bytes32(out);
}
/// @notice Verify an ML-DSA-87 signature. False on any failure, including
/// a malformed call.
function verifyMlDsa87(bytes memory publicKey, bytes memory message, bytes memory signature)
internal
view
returns (bool)
{
if (
publicKey.length != ML_DSA_87_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
|| signature.length != ML_DSA_87_SIGNATURE_LEN
) return false;
return _verify(ML_DSA_87, publicKey, signature, message);
}
/// @notice Verify an SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s signature. False on any failure.
function verifySlhDsa(bytes memory publicKey, bytes memory message, bytes memory signature)
internal
view
returns (bool)
{
if (
publicKey.length != SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN
|| signature.length != SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S_SIGNATURE_LEN
) return false;
return _verify(SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S, publicKey, signature, message);
}
/// @dev `publicKey ‖ signature ‖ message`, in that order. Both fixed-length
/// fields come first so the message is unambiguously the remainder — the
/// same reason the precompile takes no length prefix.
function _verify(
address precompile,
bytes memory publicKey,
bytes memory signature,
bytes memory message
) private view returns (bool) {
(bool ok, bytes memory out) =
precompile.staticcall(abi.encodePacked(publicKey, signature, message));
return ok && out.length == 32 && bytes32(out) != bytes32(0);
}
}
contracts/finalchain/FinalChainTime.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
/**
* @title FinalChainTime
* @notice **On Final Chain, `block.timestamp` is MILLISECONDS.**
*
* @dev Every other EVM chain stamps seconds. This one cannot: it mints a block
* every 100 ms and Ethereum requires block timestamps to strictly increase, so
* a second-denominated clock would run out of distinct values ten times over
* per second. Milliseconds is the deliberate choice, and it is a property of
* the CHAIN — `final-reth` — not of any contract here.
*
* Every duration on this chain is therefore in milliseconds, and this library
* exists so that is stated in one place instead of assumed in fifteen.
*
* ## How this was found, which is the reason for the naming rules below
*
* It was not found by the test suite. Foundry's `block.timestamp` is seconds,
* so all 1249 tests agreed with the contracts and every one of them was wrong
* about the chain they deploy to. It was found the first time anything
* exercised a deadline against the real chain — a posted intent, which reverted
* `DeadlinePassed` against a header whose deadline had been computed from wall
* time.
*
* What was actually broken was worse than a posting. `rotationInitiatedAt` is
* written from `block.timestamp` and compared against `rotationInitiatedAt +
* delaySeconds`: a millisecond clock plus a second-denominated delay. The
* 24-hour default recovery delay elapsed in **86 seconds**, and the two-year
* dormancy threshold in about seventeen hours. That delay is the thing standing
* between a stolen recovery key and an account.
*
* Nothing had noticed because nothing time-dependent had ever run: `walletCount`
* is 0, `FinalBundleLog.size` is 0, and no intent had been posted.
*
* ## The naming rule
*
* A field or constant carrying a duration or an instant on this chain ends in
* `Ms`. Not decoration — the bug was a field named `delaySeconds` that held
* milliseconds, and a name that lies is how the next reader reintroduces it.
* `SECONDS` names are gone from `contracts/finalchain/` and must not come back.
*
* Solidity's `hours` / `days` suffixes are still the clearest way to write a
* duration, so they are written as `24 hours * MS_PER_SECOND` rather than as a
* literal: the intent stays readable and the unit stays explicit.
*/
library FinalChainTime {
/// @notice Milliseconds per second. The whole conversion, named once.
uint64 internal constant MS_PER_SECOND = 1_000;
/// @notice Milliseconds per nanosecond divisor — the certificate schema
/// stamps validity in NANOseconds, so a certificate converts down to this
/// chain's clock rather than up.
uint64 internal constant NS_PER_MILLISECOND = 1_000_000;
/// @notice This chain's clock, stated as a function so a caller reads the
/// unit rather than remembering it.
/// @dev No arithmetic. It exists to make `FinalChainTime.nowMs()` the thing
/// people write, which is self-describing where `block.timestamp` is not.
function nowMs() internal view returns (uint64) {
return uint64(block.timestamp);
}
}
contracts/finalchain/FinalIdentityRegistry.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {FinalCertificate} from "./FinalCertificate.sol";
import {FinalChainTime} from "./FinalChainTime.sol";
import {FinalChainPrecompiles} from "./FinalChainPrecompiles.sol";
import {FinalPqQuorum} from "./FinalPqQuorum.sol";
/**
* @title FinalIdentityRegistry
* @notice Who every party in the system IS, on chain, with its certificate.
*
* @dev Final Chain only. Every service, every co-signer, every certificate
* authority and every operator has one record here, and that record carries the
* party's actual public keys — not commitments to them.
*
* ## Why the full key and not a hash
*
* A commitment would be a quarter of the storage and would be enough to *check*
* a key someone hands you. It is not enough to VERIFY A SIGNATURE, because
* verification needs the key itself, and a key that arrives in calldata proves
* nothing: anyone holding a keypair can produce a valid signature under it. A
* quorum built on caller-supplied keys is a quorum of one — whoever built the
* calldata.
*
* So the keys live here in full, `FinalPqQuorum` reads them from storage, and
* "which key is co-signer 3" has exactly one answer. That question previously
* had three: an environment variable, an on-chain roster, and a Secret Manager
* entry, with nothing comparing them. Every configuration failure in this
* program has been those three disagreeing.
*
* ## The certificate is the record, not a pointer to one
*
* `certHash` is `SHA3-256(TBSCertificate)` — the certificate's own identity per
* the v3 schema, and the handle revocation is keyed on. The schema says
* revocation exists "on Final Chain only"; this is that place.
*
`registerWithCertificate` takes the TBS bytes and **reads everything out of
* them**: the digest, the serial, the key identifiers, the depth pair, the
* validity window and both public keys. It takes no key arguments at all.
*
* That is a correction, and the version it replaces is worth naming because it
* looked right. It took the TBS *and* the keys, derived `certHash` from the
* TBS, and never compared the two — so a registrar could bind any certificate
* to any keypair, and the registry would hold a key the certificate does not
* contain. Every signature that key produced would then verify against a
* certificate that never authorised it.
*
* ## The root is the first record on this chain, not a file somewhere
*
* The schema says Final Chain is the only root CA and that "the root is pinned,
* not distributed" — chain validation terminates at Final Chain **by identity**,
* never by finding a self-signed certificate in a local store.
*
* `registerRoot` is that pin, and it is the only entry point that accepts a
* certificate without checking an issuer's signature. It takes a depth-0,
* self-issued certificate from the bootstrap admin, once. Everything after it
* is `registerWithCertificate`, which **verifies the issuer's ML-DSA and
* SLH-DSA signatures on chain, through the precompiles**, against the issuer's
* own registered keys, and checks that the child's `AuthorityKeyId` is the
* issuer's `SubjectKeyId` and that the issuer's depth admits it.
*
* So there is no path by which a key enters this registry unattested. Not
* "a registrar should only register certified keys" — a registrar *cannot*
* register anything else.
*
* ## Roles are a bitmask
*
* One party is legitimately several things — a co-signer that is also a
* publisher, an operator that is also a guardian. A single enum would force
* either duplicate records for one key (two sources of truth about one party)
* or a role hierarchy nobody agrees on. A mask has neither problem, and a
* quorum asks "does this account carry ROLE_X" rather than "is this account an
* X", which is the same distinction the certificate schema draws when it says
* verifiers check for capabilities and never for types.
*
* ## Membership is hybrid-gated
*
* Who is in this registry, and with which roles, is the root of every quorum on
* the chain — so it is the one thing no single key may decide. Once bootstrap
* is sealed, every membership mutation (register, roles, revoke, an LMS key,
* the registrar threshold itself) and every state-plane configuration change
* that routes through {requireRegistrarQuorum} takes a `ROLE_REGISTRAR` quorum
* whose approvals carry BOTH families: the ML-DSA-87 vote and the SLH-DSA
* seal. A lattice break cannot then rewrite the roster, and neither can a
* hash-function break; only both at once.
*
* The bootstrap window is the exception, and it is the only one: while it is
* open the bootstrap admin writes alone, because every roster has to be
* installed by someone before it can install itself.
*
* ## The sender is not the account
*
* Final Chain transactions are type 0x46, signed by ML-DSA-87, and the node
* derives `msg.sender` from the key: `keccak256(0x04 ‖ publicKey)[12:]`. That
* address pays gas and holds no authority. {accountOfSender} binds it to the
* identity whose `activeTransaction` key it derives from, so a `msg.sender`
* gate anywhere on this chain asks {senderHasRole} and resolves to the
* identity — and a key rotation moves the binding rather than the roster.
*/
/// @dev Domain for a stage's encapsulation commitment. Byte-equal to
/// `FinalWalletFactory.DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE` and to `DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE_PREIMAGE` in
/// the issuer; three derivations of one word, and a mismatch in any of them is a
/// certificate that verifies nowhere.
bytes32 constant DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE = keccak256("FINAL_KEM_BUNDLE_v01");
/// @dev Tree 8's leaf domain — byte-equal to
/// `IdentityRootModule.DOMAIN_IDENTITY_LEAF` on every execution chain.
/// Restated rather than imported because the module lives on other chains and
/// there is no import that would make them one value; the cross-contract
/// parity test pins the pair. The `_PQ_` spelling is historical and FROZEN:
/// the premined vanity certificates were mined against this exact constant,
/// and the leaf it derives is the `certHash` inside every wallet's CREATE2
/// derivation.
bytes32 constant DOMAIN_IDENTITY_LEAF = keccak256("FINAL_IDENTITY_LEAF_PQ_v01");
/// @dev D7 (ruled 2026-09-01): ISSUER records project into tree 8 under their
/// own domain — `DOMAIN_ISSUER_LEAF ‖ certHash ‖ version ‖ issuerTreeRoot` —
/// so an issuer is stapleable for offline licence verification while the
/// distinct domain keeps its leaf out of wallet admission (the gateway folds
/// with the wallet domain, so an issuer leaf can never satisfy
/// `verifyIdentityCert`). `issuerTreeRoot` is a RESERVED word, zero until an
/// issuer's own certificate-tree anchor is wired — the only clean path to
/// offline licence revocation, since the fixed-depth insertion-ordered state
/// trees cannot prove non-inclusion.
bytes32 constant DOMAIN_ISSUER_LEAF = keccak256("FINAL_ISSUER_LEAF_v01");
/// @dev Chain-issuer constants (ruled 2026-09-01, amended same day: C-less).
/// The chain is the issuer but holds no keypair, so every chain-attested
/// certificate carries these two NAMED values in its issuer fields — required
/// by the wire format, verifying nothing, covered by `certHash`. The DN is
/// deliberately env-agnostic AND jurisdiction-silent: the issuer is the
/// worldwide network, not a legal entity, and an env-specific DN would fork
/// `certHash` per environment. Reference implementation:
/// `dashboard/public/fcert.js` (`CHAIN_ISSUER_DN`, `CHAIN_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID`);
/// `docs/developers/certificate-schema.md` § Chain-issuer constants.
bytes32 constant CHAIN_ISSUER_DN_HASH = keccak256("CN=Final Chain,O=Final DeFi");
/// @dev `SHA3-256(utf8("FINAL_CHAIN_AUTHORITY_v01"))` — a DOMAIN constant, not
/// a key digest (the chain has no PublicKeyBlock). Precomputed because the
/// mock SHA3 precompile under Foundry is deliberately not the real function;
/// pinned against `hashlib.sha3_256` and the dashboard's value by test.
/// Zero-length AuthorityKeyId stays reserved for the retired genesis root
/// alone and is admitted nowhere.
bytes32 constant CHAIN_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID =
0x9a6a5d8139ad2d28957698330aaa691017dba7dc80eb7cbec585239fb680bbab;
/// @notice The identity tree's projection door on `FinalStateTrees`. A narrow
/// interface rather than an import, because the trees contract imports this
/// file — the dependency runs that way and this is the one call that runs the
/// other. Same pattern as `IChainSource` on the trees side.
interface IIdentityLeafSink {
function syncIdentityLeaves(address[] calldata accounts) external;
}
/// @notice `FinalRevocationLog`'s recording door, same narrow-interface
/// reasoning. `recorded` is read first so a fingerprint someone already
/// recorded permissionlessly cannot revert the registry mutation feeding it.
interface IRevocationRecorder {
function record(bytes32 signerId) external;
function recorded(bytes32 signerId) external view returns (bool);
}
contract FinalIdentityRegistry {
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- roles
/// @notice May co-sign account-state rounds (tree 1).
uint256 public constant ROLE_ACCOUNT_COSIGNER = 1 << 0;
/// @notice May co-sign MMR / bundle-log advances.
uint256 public constant ROLE_MMR_COSIGNER = 1 << 1;
/// @notice May publish PHI ledger state (tree 2).
uint256 public constant ROLE_PHI_PUBLISHER = 1 << 2;
/// @notice May publish vAsset state (tree 3).
uint256 public constant ROLE_VASSET_PUBLISHER = 1 << 3;
/// @notice May publish oracle data (tree 4).
uint256 public constant ROLE_ORACLE_PUBLISHER = 1 << 4;
/// @notice May publish settlement / asset registry roots (trees 5 and 6).
uint256 public constant ROLE_REGISTRY_PUBLISHER = 1 << 5;
/// @notice May act as a wallet guardian.
uint256 public constant ROLE_GUARDIAN = 1 << 6;
/// @notice May submit transactions on behalf of the protocol.
uint256 public constant ROLE_RELAYER = 1 << 7;
/// @notice May register and revoke identities once bootstrap is sealed.
uint256 public constant ROLE_REGISTRAR = 1 << 8;
/// @notice A certificate authority — the root, or an intermediate under it.
uint256 public constant ROLE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITY = 1 << 9;
/// @notice May co-sign `FinalSettlementLog` appends — the cross-chain
/// settlement quorum, the same members whose LMS keys satisfy the
/// execution chains' settlement set. A role of its own rather than a
/// second use of `ROLE_REGISTRY_PUBLISHER`: the registries (trees 5/6)
/// change on listing cadence and settlement leaves release custody, and
/// one role for both would put the value plane behind the listing roster.
uint256 public constant ROLE_SETTLEMENT_COSIGNER = 1 << 10;
// ----------------------------------------------------- action domains
/// @dev One per membership mutation, so an approval to grant a role can
/// never be replayed as one to revoke. The registry is its own verifying
/// contract for these.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_REGISTER_WALLET = keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_REGISTER_WALLET_v01");
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_REGISTER_ISSUER = keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_REGISTER_ISSUER_v01");
/// @notice The admission proof-of-possession digest domain (schema §v5).
/// The HOLDER signs `keccak256(abi.encode(domain, chainid, registry,
/// certHash, recoveryCertHash, gateNonce))` with the live transaction key
/// (ML-DSA-87) AND the live access key (SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s) — both
/// families, in the admission transaction, verified by the precompiles.
/// Possession lives in the TRANSACTION, never in the artifact.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_IDENTITY_ADMISSION = keccak256("FINAL_IDENTITY_ADMISSION_v01");
/// @notice Root-plane global certificate revocation (D5).
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_REVOKE_CERTIFICATE =
keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_REVOKE_CERTIFICATE_v01");
/// @notice The ISSUING identity's certificate-revocation digest domain.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_ISSUER_CERT_REVOCATION =
keccak256("FINAL_ISSUER_CERT_REVOCATION_v01");
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_REGISTER_LMS_KEY = keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_REGISTER_LMS_KEY_v01");
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_SET_ROLES = keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_SET_ROLES_v01");
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_REVOKE = keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_REVOKE_v01");
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_SET_REGISTRAR_THRESHOLD =
keccak256("FINAL_REGISTRY_SET_REGISTRAR_THRESHOLD_v01");
/// @dev The algorithm id the sender derivation is domain-separated by:
/// ML-DSA-87, FIPS 204, the only algorithm the transaction envelope admits.
uint8 private constant ENVELOPE_ALG_ML_DSA_87 = 4;
// ------------------------------------------------------------- storage
/**
* @notice One party's on-chain identity.
* @dev `version` increments on every mutation and is what a rotation is:
* the record is replaced, not appended to, and the version is how a reader
* on another chain knows which of two copies it saw is newer.
*/
struct Identity {
/// SHA3-256 of the LIVE certificate's TBS bytes. The revocation handle.
bytes32 certHash;
/// SHA3-256 of the RECOVERY certificate's TBS bytes.
bytes32 recoveryCertHash;
/// The certificate's 32-byte serial, `16 B entropy ‖ 16 B counter`.
bytes32 serial;
/// SHA3-256 of this certificate's public key block. A child names it in
/// its own `AuthorityKeyId`, which is how the chain links the two.
bytes32 subjectKeyId;
/// Capability bitmask. Zero for a registered-but-idle party.
uint256 roles;
/// Position on the delegation axis; 0 is the Final Chain root.
uint8 depth;
/// Deepest level this key may issue to. `== depth` means it signs no
/// certificates at all, which is every end entity.
uint8 maxDelegationDepth;
/// Seconds since epoch. The schema's TBS is nanoseconds; the conversion
/// happens off chain because block timestamps are seconds and a
/// comparison across units is a bug waiting for a leap.
/// @dev MILLISECONDS — this chain's clock. See `FinalChainTime`.
uint64 notBefore;
/// Seconds since epoch, or 0 for "never expires" — which the schema
/// allows and personal identity certificates use.
uint64 notAfter;
/// Monotonic. A rotation that does not advance it is refused.
uint64 version;
/// Set by `revoke`. Never unset: a revoked certificate is finished, and
/// an un-revoke would make every past verification re-openable.
bool revoked;
/// Distinguishes "no record" from "a record whose fields are all zero".
bool registered;
}
/**
* @notice A hash-based (LMS) signing key held by a registered account.
*
* The protocol plane's quorums verify LMS, not ML-DSA: an execution chain
* has no PQ precompiles, so `FinalRootAuthority` checks a keccak hash loop
* instead (`arch/hash-based-authority.md`). Those keys are the authority
* over `masterRoot`, and therefore over PQ execution — which makes "who
* holds signer 0x39bb…?" a question the state plane has to be able to
* answer, exactly as it answers it for every other key.
*
* Recorded against an account that is ALREADY registered, so an LMS key is
* a capability of a known identity rather than a standalone credential. It
* inherits that identity's revocation: a revoked account's signer is a
* revoked signer, with nothing extra to remember to do.
*/
struct LmsKey {
/// `I`, hashed into every step of the signature.
bytes16 keyId;
/// Merkle tree height. Bound into the fingerprint, because the leaf
/// commits to node `2^h + q` and a signer who could vary it could vary
/// the numbering.
uint8 height;
/// `T[1]`, the LMS public key.
bytes32 root;
/// Monotonic. A rotation that does not advance it is refused, so a
/// replayed registration cannot reinstate a superseded key.
uint64 version;
/// Distinguishes "no key" from "a key whose fields are all zero".
bool registered;
}
/// @notice The LMS signing key for an account, if it holds one.
/// @dev One slot per (account, chain) — LMS-01. `nextLeaf` on an
/// authority is a complete single-use counter only while the key it names
/// signs for ONE chain, so the roster is stored the way it is armed:
/// the same operator is a different signer on every chain.
mapping(address account => mapping(uint64 chainId => LmsKey)) private _lmsKey;
/// @notice Which account a signer fingerprint belongs to. This is the
/// lookup the whole record exists for: a gateway roster names fingerprints
/// and nothing else, so without it the keys are unattributable.
/// @dev What a fingerprint is bound to: the account that holds it and the
/// chain it signs for — one slot, written once at registration and left in
/// place when superseded (attribution is history). The chain names the
/// (account, chain) slot `lmsSignerIsLive` resolves against.
// NOTE: this contract sits ~13 bytes under EIP-170 (24,563 of 24,576 at
// the pinned optimizer settings). The next feature here pays for itself
// in bytecode first — see the LMS-binding merge and the off-chain
// zero-chain check for what that looks like.
struct LmsBinding {
address account;
uint64 chainId;
}
mapping(bytes32 signerId => LmsBinding) private _lmsBinding;
/// @notice The identity record for an account.
mapping(address account => Identity) private _identity;
/// The four slots, verbatim. All four are stored in full because the
/// precompiles verify against a KEY, not a commitment — and a key that
/// arrived in calldata proves nothing about who signed.
///
/// A CA has two keys, not four, and they live in the two ACTIVE slots. One
/// storage shape rather than two, because every reader would otherwise have
/// to know which kind of party it was looking at before it could look.
mapping(address account => bytes) private _activeTransactionKey;
mapping(address account => bytes) private _activeAccessKey;
mapping(address account => bytes) private _recoveryTransactionKey;
mapping(address account => bytes) private _recoveryAccessKey;
/// @notice The seal key — a service's second SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s key, which
/// co-signs execution-class quorum decisions. Empty for every identity
/// whose certificate carries no `PURPOSE_ACTIVE_SEAL` entry: users, CAs.
mapping(address account => bytes) private _activeSealKey;
/// @notice Encapsulation keys, per stage. Two algorithms each — ML-KEM-1024
/// (lattice) and HQC-5 (code-based) — so a break in either family leaves the
/// other standing, the same reasoning that pairs ML-DSA with SLH-DSA above.
/// @dev Stored as the RAW keys, like the signing keys, because a registry
/// that held only commitments could not answer "encapsulate to this party"
/// without a second lookup somewhere less authoritative.
mapping(address account => bytes) private _activeKemMlKem;
mapping(address account => bytes) private _activeKemHqc;
mapping(address account => bytes) private _recoveryKemMlKem;
mapping(address account => bytes) private _recoveryKemHqc;
/// @notice Reverse index. A certificate identifies exactly one account, so
/// presenting a `certHash` is enough to find who it belongs to.
mapping(bytes32 certHash => address account) public accountOfCertificate;
/// @notice Revocation by certificate, independent of the account record.
/// A certificate stays revoked even if its account is later re-registered
/// under a new one.
mapping(bytes32 certHash => bool) public certificateRevoked;
/// @notice Who revoked a certificate through the ISSUER half of the lane.
/// Scoped by the verifier: the entry binds only when the recorded revoker
/// is the certificate's own issuer. Never gates registration.
mapping(bytes32 certHash => address) public certificateRevokedBy;
/// @notice Every registered account, in registration order. Small by
/// construction — this is services and co-signers, not wallets.
address[] private _accounts;
/// @notice Bootstrap authority. Zero once `sealBootstrap` has run.
address public bootstrapAdmin;
/// @notice Whether registration still accepts the bootstrap admin.
bool public bootstrapSealed;
/// @notice Where identity mutations project the tree-8 leaf, same-tx.
/// Zero only before {wireStatePlane} — the deploy tooling wires it before
/// the first registration, and the projection is skipped while unset so
/// the wiring transaction itself can be ordered freely in the bootstrap
/// window.
address public stateTrees;
/// @notice Where the PERMANENT standing losses — revocation and LMS-key
/// supersession — are recorded, same-tx. Zero only before {wireStatePlane}.
address public revocationLog;
/// @notice Sealed `ROLE_REGISTRAR` approvals a membership mutation needs.
/// @dev Zero until set, and bootstrap cannot be sealed while it is zero or
/// unreachable: a registry sealed behind a threshold nobody can meet is a
/// registry nobody can ever write to again.
uint256 public registrarThreshold;
/// @notice Replay counter per verifying contract — this registry for its
/// own mutations, each state-plane contract for its configuration. Bound
/// into every registrar digest, so an approval is for exactly one action.
mapping(address caller => uint64) private _gateNonce;
/// @notice The identity a Final Chain sender belongs to. See the contract
/// notes: a sender is derived from the `activeTransaction` key and is not
/// the account.
mapping(address sender => address account) public accountOfSender;
// -------------------------------------------------------------- events
event IdentityRegistered(
address indexed account, bytes32 indexed certHash, uint256 roles, uint64 version
);
event IdentityRolesChanged(address indexed account, uint256 previousRoles, uint256 newRoles);
event LmsKeyRegistered(
address indexed account,
bytes32 indexed signerId,
uint64 indexed chainId,
bytes16 keyId,
uint8 height,
bytes32 root,
uint64 version
);
event IdentityRevoked(address indexed account, bytes32 indexed certHash);
/// @notice One revocation-lane entry: `revoker` is `address(0)` for the
/// root plane, the issuing identity otherwise.
event CertificateRevoked(bytes32 indexed certHash, address indexed revoker);
event BootstrapSealed(address indexed sealedBy);
/// @notice The one-shot state-plane wiring landed.
event StatePlaneWired(address stateTrees, address revocationLog);
event RegistrarThresholdSet(uint256 threshold);
/// @notice A registrar quorum authorized an action. `nonce` is the value
/// the approvals were made over; the next action needs the next one.
event RegistrarQuorumApproved(
address indexed verifyingContract, bytes32 indexed actionDomain, uint64 nonce, uint256 valid
);
// -------------------------------------------------------------- errors
error NotAuthorized(address caller);
error BootstrapAlreadySealed();
error UnknownAccount(address account);
/// @notice A certificate's encapsulation key failed the chain's own
/// well-formedness check. Names the algorithm, because the pair is stored
/// together and "one of these two" is not an actionable answer.
error MalformedEncapsulationKey(address account, uint16 algorithmId);
error CertificateAlreadyBound(bytes32 certHash, address boundTo);
error CertificateIsRevoked(bytes32 certHash);
error VersionNotNewer(uint64 current, uint64 offered);
error IssuerNotACertificateAuthority(address issuer);
error IssuerMayNotSign(address issuer, uint8 depth, uint8 maxDelegationDepth);
error WrongDepth(uint8 got, uint8 want);
error DelegationWidened(uint8 child, uint8 issuer);
error AuthorityKeyIdMismatch(bytes32 got, bytes32 want);
error StagesDisagree(bytes32 liveSerial, bytes32 recoverySerial);
/// @notice `height` outside 1..24. See `FinalLms.MAX_HEIGHT`.
error LmsHeightOutOfRange(uint8 height);
/// @notice A zero root commits to no tree.
error LmsRootIsZero();
/// @notice This fingerprint already belongs to a different account.
error LmsKeyAlreadyBound(bytes32 signerId, address boundTo);
/// @notice Two identities cannot share a transaction key: the sender it
/// derives would be attributable to both.
error SenderAlreadyBound(address sender, address boundTo);
/// @notice Fewer registrars able to seal than the threshold asks for.
error RegistrarThresholdUnreachable(uint256 sealable, uint256 threshold);
error RegistrarThresholdIsZero();
/// @notice {wireStatePlane} ran already, or was handed a zero address.
error StatePlaneAlreadyWired();
error ZeroStatePlane();
/// @notice The holder's admission proof of possession did not verify —
/// one family failed, or the digest was built over the wrong nonce.
error AdmissionProofInvalid(address account);
/// @notice The certificate does not carry the ruled chain-issuer
/// AuthorityKeyId — it is not a chain-attested certificate.
error NotChainAttested(bytes32 authorityKeyId);
/// @notice The certificate's IssuerDN is not the ruled constant.
error WrongIssuerDn(bytes32 issuerDnHash);
/// @notice A chain-attested end entity sits at depth 1 with
/// `maxDelegationDepth == depth`; anything else is not an end entity.
error NotAnEndEntity(uint8 depth, uint8 maxDelegationDepth);
/// @notice An issuer that cannot sign is an end entity wearing a profile.
error IssuerCannotSign(uint8 depth, uint8 maxDelegationDepth);
/// @notice Third-party issuers carry a real `NotAfter` (ruling 3) —
/// expiry is the passive half of their lifecycle.
error IssuerMustExpire();
/// @notice An issuer validity window past the ~2-year ceiling (ruling 3).
error IssuerValidityTooLong(uint64 notBefore, uint64 notAfter);
/// @notice An institution registration without a real ISO 3166 `C=` in
/// its subject DN, or with a jurisdiction that does not match its
/// Institution extension. Only the trust root is jurisdiction-silent.
error JurisdictionMissing();
error JurisdictionMismatch();
// --------------------------------------------------------- constructor
/**
* @param admin The bootstrap registrar. Genesis names the chain deployer.
* @dev The precompile probe is the point of the constructor. This contract
* is meaningless on a chain that cannot verify PQ signatures, and deploying
* it there would produce a registry full of keys nothing can check.
*/
constructor(address admin) {
FinalChainPrecompiles.assertAvailable();
bootstrapAdmin = admin;
}
// ----------------------------------------------------------- authority
/**
* @dev Bootstrap is a real window, not a formality: every roster in this
* system has to be installed by someone before it can install itself, and
* pretending otherwise produced the one roster that could not be
* bootstrapped in `FinalRootAuthority`. It is closed by
* `sealBootstrap`, which is irreversible.
*
* While it is open the admin writes alone. Once it is closed there is no
* single-caller path left — not for a registrar, not for anyone — and
* every mutation goes through the sealed registrar quorum.
*/
function _requireMembershipAuthority(
bytes32 actionDomain,
bytes32 payloadDigest,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) private {
if (!bootstrapSealed && msg.sender == bootstrapAdmin) return;
_requireRegistrarQuorum(address(this), actionDomain, payloadDigest, anchorBlock, approvals);
}
/**
* @notice The sealed registrar quorum, for the other state-plane contracts.
* @dev `msg.sender` — the calling contract — is the verifying contract the
* digest binds and the counter it burns, so an approval collected for the
* trees' configuration cannot be spent on the bundle log's. The caller
* decides its own bootstrap exemption before calling; this function knows
* no caller's admin and applies none.
*
* Anyone may SUBMIT such a transaction. Authority is the approvals, not the
* sender, which is the whole point of the quorum.
*/
function requireRegistrarQuorum(
bytes32 actionDomain,
bytes32 payloadDigest,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireRegistrarQuorum(msg.sender, actionDomain, payloadDigest, anchorBlock, approvals);
}
/// @dev The digest is `FinalPqQuorum.digest(verifyingContract, actionDomain,
/// anchorBlock, keccak256(abi.encode(nonce, payloadDigest)))`; the seal is
/// required — membership is the hybrid class.
function _requireRegistrarQuorum(
address verifyingContract,
bytes32 actionDomain,
bytes32 payloadDigest,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) private {
if (registrarThreshold == 0) revert RegistrarThresholdIsZero();
uint64 nonce = _gateNonce[verifyingContract];
_gateNonce[verifyingContract] = nonce + 1;
bytes32 quorumDigest = FinalPqQuorum.digest(
verifyingContract, actionDomain, anchorBlock, keccak256(abi.encode(nonce, payloadDigest))
);
uint256 valid = FinalPqQuorum.require_(
this,
approvals,
quorumDigest,
ROLE_REGISTRAR,
registrarThreshold,
FinalPqQuorum.ALG_ML_DSA_87,
anchorBlock,
true
);
emit RegistrarQuorumApproved(verifyingContract, actionDomain, nonce, valid);
}
/**
* @notice Set how many sealed registrar approvals a membership mutation needs.
* @dev Bootstrap admin while the window is open; the current registrar
* quorum afterwards, so a registrar set that grows or shrinks can move it.
* Refuses a threshold the sealable registrars cannot meet, and refuses zero:
* both are a registry that can never be written to again.
*/
function setRegistrarThreshold(
uint256 threshold,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_SET_REGISTRAR_THRESHOLD, keccak256(abi.encode(threshold)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
if (threshold == 0) revert RegistrarThresholdIsZero();
uint256 sealable = sealableMemberCount(ROLE_REGISTRAR);
if (sealable < threshold) revert RegistrarThresholdUnreachable(sealable, threshold);
registrarThreshold = threshold;
emit RegistrarThresholdSet(threshold);
}
/// @notice The replay counter the next registrar approval for `caller`
/// must be made over.
function gateNonceOf(address caller) external view returns (uint64) {
return _gateNonce[caller];
}
// -------------------------------------------------------- LMS signers
/**
* @notice The roster identity of an LMS public key.
* @dev Byte-identical to `FinalRootAuthority.signerId`. Restated rather
* than imported because the two live on different chains and there is no
* import that would make them one value — which is precisely why a test
* pins them together. A drift here would make every lookup miss while
* looking perfectly well-formed.
*/
function lmsSignerId(bytes16 keyId, uint8 height, bytes32 root) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(keyId, height, root));
}
/**
* @notice Record the LMS signing key an already-registered account holds.
* @dev Membership-gated, same as every other write here.
*
* Deliberately NOT a certificate: an LMS key is a capability of an existing
* identity, not an identity of its own. Binding it to an account means it
* inherits that account's revocation, so retiring a compromised operator is
* one action rather than one-per-key-they-hold.
*
* @param account Must already be registered and not revoked.
* @param version Strictly increasing. A rotation that does not advance it
* is refused, so a replayed registration cannot reinstate a key the
* operator has moved off.
* @param anchorBlock The block the registrars read the roster at; see
* `FinalPqQuorum`. Ignored while bootstrap is open.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty while bootstrap is open.
*/
function registerLmsKey(
address account,
uint64 chainId,
bytes16 keyId,
uint8 height,
bytes32 root,
uint64 version,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_REGISTER_LMS_KEY,
keccak256(abi.encode(account, chainId, keyId, height, root, version)),
anchorBlock,
approvals
);
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
if (!id.registered) revert UnknownAccount(account);
if (id.revoked) revert CertificateIsRevoked(id.certHash);
// A zero chain id is a tooling mistake, not an attack: the slot it
// would occupy is self-consistent and no authority consults it. The
// publisher refuses it; EIP-170 pressure keeps the check off-chain.
if (height == 0 || height > 24) revert LmsHeightOutOfRange(height);
if (root == bytes32(0)) revert LmsRootIsZero();
// Version lineage is PER (account, chain) — LMS-01 made the same
// operator a different signer on every chain, so chain B starting at
// version 1 says nothing about chain A being at version 3.
LmsKey storage existing = _lmsKey[account][chainId];
// An empty slot holds version 0, so this alone also refuses a version-0
// registration — versions start at 1.
if (version <= existing.version) {
revert VersionNotNewer(existing.version, version);
}
bytes32 signerId = lmsSignerId(keyId, height, root);
address boundTo = _lmsBinding[signerId].account;
if (boundTo != address(0) && boundTo != account) {
revert LmsKeyAlreadyBound(signerId, boundTo);
}
// The fingerprint being superseded, captured before the slot moves —
// `existing` is a storage pointer and reads the NEW key afterwards.
bytes32 superseded = existing.registered
? lmsSignerId(existing.keyId, existing.height, existing.root)
: bytes32(0);
// The superseded fingerprint is left bound to this account rather than
// cleared. It is history: a signature made under the old key was made
// by this operator, and a lookup that stopped resolving would make that
// unprovable after the fact.
_lmsKey[account][chainId] = LmsKey(keyId, height, root, version, true);
_lmsBinding[signerId] = LmsBinding(account, chainId);
emit LmsKeyRegistered(account, signerId, chainId, keyId, height, root, version);
// Supersession is a PERMANENT transition — the old fingerprint stops
// being this slot's current key and nothing re-registers it (a
// re-registration of the same material is the same fingerprint, which
// the guard below leaves alone). Recorded same-tx so the execution
// chains' suspension lane never depends on someone noticing.
if (superseded != bytes32(0) && superseded != signerId) {
_recordRevokedSigner(superseded);
}
_projectIdentity(account);
}
/// @notice The LMS key an account holds for one chain, if any.
function lmsKeyOf(address account, uint64 chainId) external view returns (LmsKey memory) {
return _lmsKey[account][chainId];
}
/// @notice What a fingerprint is bound to: the account that registered it
/// and the chain it signs for. Zeroes for a fingerprint never registered.
/// @dev The revocation log's permanence gate reads this to find the
/// (account, chain) SLOT a fingerprint belongs to — the slot's current key
/// is what separates a superseded fingerprint (permanent, recordable) from
/// a merely lapsed one (expiry, temporary, refused). Attribution is
/// history: the binding survives supersession, exactly as the mapping
/// behind {lmsSignerIsLive} does, because it IS that mapping.
function lmsBindingOf(bytes32 signerId) external view returns (address account, uint64 chainId) {
LmsBinding storage binding = _lmsBinding[signerId];
return (binding.account, binding.chainId);
}
/**
* @notice Is this signer fingerprint held by a live, unrevoked account?
* @dev The question a verifier actually has. A gateway roster names
* fingerprints and nothing else, so "is 0x39bb… still good?" is otherwise
* unanswerable from the state plane.
*/
function lmsSignerIsLive(bytes32 signerId) external view returns (bool live, address account) {
LmsBinding storage binding = _lmsBinding[signerId];
account = binding.account;
if (account == address(0)) return (false, address(0));
// `isActive`, not a registered/revoked pair spelled out here. The
// certificate validity window is part of standing: an expired identity
// already holds no role, and a signer lookup that disagreed would leave
// a roster satisfiable by an operator the rest of the registry has
// stopped honouring. Spelling the condition out a second time is how
// the two drift apart.
if (!isActive(account)) return (false, account);
// The CURRENT key of the fingerprint's own (account, chain) slot, not
// merely one this account ever held: a superseded fingerprint stays
// attributable but stops being live, and a rotation on one chain says
// nothing about the same operator's key on another.
LmsKey storage k = _lmsKey[account][binding.chainId];
live = k.registered && lmsSignerId(k.keyId, k.height, k.root) == signerId;
}
/// @notice Close the bootstrap window. Irreversible.
/// @dev Refuses while the registrar quorum is unset or unreachable, because
/// sealing then would leave a registry nobody can ever write to again. The
/// count is of registrars that can SEAL — a certificate authority carrying
/// the role has no seal key and can never contribute an approval.
function sealBootstrap() external {
if (msg.sender != bootstrapAdmin) revert NotAuthorized(msg.sender);
if (bootstrapSealed) revert BootstrapAlreadySealed();
if (registrarThreshold == 0) revert RegistrarThresholdIsZero();
uint256 sealable = sealableMemberCount(ROLE_REGISTRAR);
if (sealable < registrarThreshold) {
revert RegistrarThresholdUnreachable(sealable, registrarThreshold);
}
bootstrapSealed = true;
bootstrapAdmin = address(0);
emit BootstrapSealed(msg.sender);
}
// ------------------------------------------------- state-plane wiring
/**
* @notice Wire the trees and the revocation log, once, inside the
* bootstrap window.
* @dev One-shot because both pointers are TRUST TOPOLOGY: the trees
* pointer decides where the wallet-creation admission set is written, and
* the log pointer decides where permanent standing losses are recorded. A
* re-wireable pointer would be a key over both. It cannot be a constructor
* argument — both contracts take THIS registry as one — so the deploy
* tooling calls it in the same nonce-fixed block that deploys them, before
* any identity is registered.
*/
function wireStatePlane(address stateTrees_, address revocationLog_) external {
if (bootstrapSealed || msg.sender != bootstrapAdmin) revert NotAuthorized(msg.sender);
if (stateTrees != address(0) || revocationLog != address(0)) revert StatePlaneAlreadyWired();
if (stateTrees_ == address(0) || revocationLog_ == address(0)) revert ZeroStatePlane();
stateTrees = stateTrees_;
revocationLog = revocationLog_;
emit StatePlaneWired(stateTrees_, revocationLog_);
}
/// @dev Project `account`'s tree-8 leaf, same-tx. Skipped while the plane
/// is unwired — the bootstrap-window state the deploy tooling closes
/// before the first registration — and never otherwise: the leaf value is
/// derived by the trees contract from THIS registry's post-mutation state,
/// so there is nothing here to get wrong besides forgetting to call it.
function _projectIdentity(address account) private {
address trees = stateTrees;
if (trees == address(0)) return;
address[] memory one = new address[](1);
one[0] = account;
IIdentityLeafSink(trees).syncIdentityLeaves(one);
}
/// @dev Record a PERMANENTLY retired fingerprint, same-tx, unless the log
/// is unwired or someone already recorded it permissionlessly.
function _recordRevokedSigner(bytes32 signerId) private {
address log = revocationLog;
if (log == address(0)) return;
if (IRevocationRecorder(log).recorded(signerId)) return;
IRevocationRecorder(log).record(signerId);
}
// -------------------------------------------------------- registration
/// @notice The holder's admission proof of possession: both live-stage
/// families over the admission digest (schema §v5). There is no root
/// keypair and no CA signature any more — the chain admits, and the
/// "2 signatures at creation" are the HOLDER's, verified by the
/// precompiles inside this very transaction.
struct AdmissionProof {
bytes mlDsaSignature;
bytes slhDsaSignature;
}
/**
* @notice Register or rotate a Final Wallet identity from its two public
* certificates — CHAIN-ATTESTED (schema §v5, ruled 2026-09-01).
*
* @param account The wallet address the certificate set derives.
* @param liveTbs `live.pub.fcert` TBS — `activeTransaction` + `activeAccess`.
* @param recoveryTbs `recovery.pub.fcert` TBS — the pre-committed recovery pair.
* @param proof The HOLDER's two signatures over the admission digest —
* the live transaction key (ML-DSA-87) and the live access key
* (SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s), verified in the precompiles inside this
* transaction. This replaced the CA signature: issuance authority
* is the registrar quorum, possession is this proof, and there is
* no root keypair anywhere.
* @param roles Capability bitmask. The one thing the certificates do not
* say, because capability is this system's decision.
* @param version Monotonic. A rotation that does not advance it is refused.
* @param anchorBlock The block the registrars read the roster at. Ignored
* while bootstrap is open.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty while bootstrap is
* open. The digest binds the account, both certificates' bytes,
* the roles and the version.
*
* @dev **Both stages, together.** A wallet has four keys in two stages and
* the recovery pair is PRE-COMMITTED — written at `initialize` from the same
* certificate set that determined the address, which is why PQ migration
* takes no key arguments. The two must share a `SerialNumber`: a serial is
* per certificate SET, so two stages disagreeing are two different wallets.
*
* **Chain-attested means pinned, per stage:** the ruled IssuerDN and
* AuthorityKeyId constants, depth exactly 1 (directly under the chain),
* and `maxDelegationDepth == depth` (an end entity signs nothing — the
* same immutable pair `identityTreeLeafOf` discriminates records by).
*/
function registerWallet(
address account,
bytes calldata liveTbs,
bytes calldata recoveryTbs,
AdmissionProof calldata proof,
uint256 roles,
uint64 version,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external returns (bytes32 certHash) {
// Read BEFORE the authority check: the quorum path burns this counter
// inside `_requireRegistrarQuorum`, and the proof must bind the value
// the round was built over. The bootstrap path burns it explicitly in
// `_requireAdmissionProof`, so an admission is one-shot in both regimes.
uint64 admissionNonce = _gateNonce[address(this)];
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_REGISTER_WALLET,
keccak256(
abi.encode(account, keccak256(liveTbs), keccak256(recoveryTbs), roles, version)
),
anchorBlock,
approvals
);
FinalCertificate.Parsed memory l = FinalCertificate.parseLive(liveTbs);
FinalCertificate.Parsed memory r = FinalCertificate.parseRecovery(recoveryTbs);
if (l.serial != r.serial) revert StagesDisagree(l.serial, r.serial);
_requireChainAttestedEndEntity(l);
_requireChainAttestedEndEntity(r);
_requireAdmissionProof(account, l, r.certHash, proof, admissionNonce);
certHash = l.certHash;
_write(account, l, r, roles, version, false);
}
/**
* @notice Register or rotate an ISSUER — a third party (or our own
* intermediate) that signs certificates OFF-chain with the keys
* registered here (D2: the superCA).
*
* @param account The issuer's account on this chain.
* @param tbs The single issuer certificate's TBS: two CERT_SIGNING keys
* (ML-DSA-87 + SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s), no recovery stage — renewing an
* issuer is re-issuing, a governance act rather than a key rotation.
* @param parent The registered parent issuer for a nested intermediate;
* `address(0)` for an issuer hanging directly under the chain.
* @param proof The issuer's OWN two cert-signing keys over the admission
* digest (`recoveryCertHash` slot is zero — there is no recovery
* stage to bind).
*
* @dev Admission is chain-native like any identity: registrar quorum plus
* the holder's PoP. What the v4 delegation rules said survives verbatim as
* LINEAGE — a nested issuer's depth, delegation bound and AuthorityKeyId
* must chain to its registered parent — but no parent SIGNS anything; the
* chain's admission is the issuance.
*
* Ruling 3: a registered issuer always expires (`NotAfter` real, window
* bounded ~2 years) — the passive liveness touchpoint; renewal re-issues
* under the same registered keys with a version bump.
*
* The jurisdiction rule (ruled 2026-09-01, amended): only the trust root
* is jurisdiction-silent. An institution MUST carry its real ISO 3166
* `C=` in its subject DN, matching the `jurisdiction` field of its
* `0x0102` Institution extension — CA/Browser-Forum practice, enforced at
* the door because a verifier's legal recourse starts with knowing where
* an issuer answers for itself.
*/
function registerIssuer(
address account,
bytes calldata tbs,
address parent,
AdmissionProof calldata proof,
uint256 roles,
uint64 version,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external returns (bytes32 certHash) {
uint64 admissionNonce = _gateNonce[address(this)];
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_REGISTER_ISSUER,
keccak256(abi.encode(account, keccak256(tbs), parent, roles, version)),
anchorBlock,
approvals
);
FinalCertificate.Parsed memory c = FinalCertificate.parseCa(tbs);
// An issuer that cannot sign is an end entity wearing a profile —
// and an end entity belongs in `registerWallet`.
if (c.depth == 0 || c.maxDelegationDepth <= c.depth) {
revert IssuerCannotSign(c.depth, c.maxDelegationDepth);
}
if (c.notAfter == 0) revert IssuerMustExpire();
if (c.notAfter - c.notBefore > MAX_ISSUER_VALIDITY_MS) {
revert IssuerValidityTooLong(c.notBefore, c.notAfter);
}
if (c.issuerDnHash != CHAIN_ISSUER_DN_HASH) revert WrongIssuerDn(c.issuerDnHash);
_requireLineage(parent, c);
_requireJurisdiction(c);
_requireAdmissionProof(account, c, bytes32(0), proof, admissionNonce);
certHash = c.certHash;
_write(account, c, c, roles | ROLE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITY, version, true);
}
/// @notice Ruling 3's validity ceiling for registered issuers, in this
/// chain's milliseconds: two 366-day years.
uint64 public constant MAX_ISSUER_VALIDITY_MS = 2 * 366 days * 1000;
/// @dev The chain-attested end-entity pins, run once per stage.
function _requireChainAttestedEndEntity(FinalCertificate.Parsed memory c) private pure {
if (c.authorityKeyId != CHAIN_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID) revert NotChainAttested(c.authorityKeyId);
if (c.issuerDnHash != CHAIN_ISSUER_DN_HASH) revert WrongIssuerDn(c.issuerDnHash);
if (c.depth != 1 || c.maxDelegationDepth != c.depth) {
revert NotAnEndEntity(c.depth, c.maxDelegationDepth);
}
}
/// @dev The v4 delegation rules, surviving as lineage: a nested issuer
/// chains to a registered, signing-capable parent one level up; a direct
/// issuer hangs under the chain at depth 1.
function _requireLineage(address parent, FinalCertificate.Parsed memory c) private view {
if (parent == address(0)) {
if (c.authorityKeyId != CHAIN_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID) {
revert NotChainAttested(c.authorityKeyId);
}
if (c.depth != 1) revert WrongDepth(c.depth, 1);
return;
}
Identity storage ca = _identity[parent];
if (!hasRole(parent, ROLE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITY)) {
revert IssuerNotACertificateAuthority(parent);
}
// Delegation is governed by depth, not by a boolean. `Depth <
// MaxDelegationDepth` permits signing, and a child sits exactly one
// level down — an issuer cannot skip levels to escape its own bound.
if (ca.depth >= ca.maxDelegationDepth) {
revert IssuerMayNotSign(parent, ca.depth, ca.maxDelegationDepth);
}
if (c.depth != ca.depth + 1) revert WrongDepth(c.depth, ca.depth + 1);
if (c.maxDelegationDepth > ca.maxDelegationDepth) {
revert DelegationWidened(c.maxDelegationDepth, ca.maxDelegationDepth);
}
if (c.authorityKeyId != ca.subjectKeyId) {
revert AuthorityKeyIdMismatch(c.authorityKeyId, ca.subjectKeyId);
}
}
/// @dev The jurisdiction rule: a real ISO 3166 alpha-2 `C=` in the subject
/// DN, equal to the Institution extension's `jurisdiction` field. The DN
/// is canonical comma-separated form, so `C=` matches at the start or
/// right after a comma; the component value is exactly two bytes.
function _requireJurisdiction(FinalCertificate.Parsed memory c) private pure {
bytes memory dn = c.subjectDn;
bytes2 country;
bool found = false;
for (uint256 i = 0; i + 4 <= dn.length; i++) {
if ((i == 0 || dn[i - 1] == ",") && dn[i] == "C" && dn[i + 1] == "=") {
// Exactly two bytes, then end-of-DN or the next component.
if (i + 4 < dn.length && dn[i + 4] != ",") revert JurisdictionMissing();
country = bytes2(bytes.concat(dn[i + 2], dn[i + 3]));
found = true;
break;
}
}
if (!found) revert JurisdictionMissing();
// Institution extension: legalNameLength ‖ legalName ‖
// registrationNoLength ‖ registrationNo ‖ jurisdictionLength ‖
// jurisdiction. The jurisdiction must EQUAL the DN's country.
bytes memory ext = c.institutionExt;
if (ext.length < 6) revert JurisdictionMissing();
uint256 q = 2 + (uint256(uint8(ext[0])) << 8 | uint256(uint8(ext[1])));
if (ext.length < q + 2) revert JurisdictionMissing();
q += 2 + (uint256(uint8(ext[q])) << 8 | uint256(uint8(ext[q + 1])));
if (ext.length < q + 2) revert JurisdictionMissing();
uint256 jLen = uint256(uint8(ext[q])) << 8 | uint256(uint8(ext[q + 1]));
q += 2;
if (jLen != 2 || ext.length < q + 2) revert JurisdictionMismatch();
if (bytes2(bytes.concat(ext[q], ext[q + 1])) != country) revert JurisdictionMismatch();
}
/// @dev Verify the holder's PoP: both live-stage families over the
/// admission digest, in the precompiles, inside this transaction. Burns
/// the gate nonce on the bootstrap path (the quorum path burned it in
/// `_requireRegistrarQuorum` already), so an admission is one-shot in
/// both regimes.
function _requireAdmissionProof(
address account,
FinalCertificate.Parsed memory live,
bytes32 recoveryCertHash,
AdmissionProof calldata proof,
uint64 admissionNonce
) private {
bytes memory message = abi.encodePacked(
keccak256(
abi.encode(
DOMAIN_IDENTITY_ADMISSION,
block.chainid,
address(this),
live.certHash,
recoveryCertHash,
admissionNonce
)
)
);
if (
!FinalChainPrecompiles.verifyMlDsa87(live.transactionKey, message, proof.mlDsaSignature)
|| !FinalChainPrecompiles.verifySlhDsa(live.accessKey, message, proof.slhDsaSignature)
) revert AdmissionProofInvalid(account);
if (_gateNonce[address(this)] == admissionNonce) {
_gateNonce[address(this)] = admissionNonce + 1;
}
}
function _write(
address account,
FinalCertificate.Parsed memory live,
FinalCertificate.Parsed memory recovery,
uint256 roles,
uint64 version,
bool isCa
) private {
if (account == address(0)) revert UnknownAccount(account);
if (certificateRevoked[live.certHash]) revert CertificateIsRevoked(live.certHash);
address boundTo = accountOfCertificate[live.certHash];
if (boundTo != address(0) && boundTo != account) {
revert CertificateAlreadyBound(live.certHash, boundTo);
}
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
if (!id.registered) {
_accounts.push(account);
id.registered = true;
} else {
if (version <= id.version) revert VersionNotNewer(id.version, version);
if (id.revoked) revert CertificateIsRevoked(id.certHash);
// A rotation releases the previous certificate's binding. It is NOT
// revoked — a superseded certificate and a compromised one are
// different facts and revocation is the louder of the two.
if (id.certHash != live.certHash) delete accountOfCertificate[id.certHash];
}
id.certHash = live.certHash;
id.recoveryCertHash = recovery.certHash;
id.serial = live.serial;
id.subjectKeyId = live.subjectKeyId;
id.roles = roles;
id.depth = live.depth;
id.maxDelegationDepth = live.maxDelegationDepth;
id.notBefore = live.notBefore;
id.notAfter = live.notAfter;
id.version = version;
// The sender binding moves with the transaction key. The old sender is
// released rather than kept: a rotation is the account disowning that
// key, and a gate that still resolved it would honour a retired key.
address sender = senderFor(live.transactionKey);
address senderBoundTo = accountOfSender[sender];
if (senderBoundTo != address(0) && senderBoundTo != account) {
revert SenderAlreadyBound(sender, senderBoundTo);
}
if (_activeTransactionKey[account].length != 0) {
address previousSender = senderFor(_activeTransactionKey[account]);
if (previousSender != sender) delete accountOfSender[previousSender];
}
accountOfSender[sender] = account;
_activeTransactionKey[account] = live.transactionKey;
_activeAccessKey[account] = live.accessKey;
// A CA has no recovery pair; the two active slots are all it has.
_recoveryTransactionKey[account] = isCa ? bytes("") : recovery.transactionKey;
_recoveryAccessKey[account] = isCa ? bytes("") : recovery.accessKey;
// Cleared on a rotation to a certificate without one, for the same
// reason the encapsulation pair is: a stale seal surviving a rotation
// would let a retired key keep co-signing execution.
_activeSealKey[account] = isCa ? bytes("") : live.sealKey;
// The encapsulation pair, validated before it is stored.
//
// **The registry is where a sender looks up "encapsulate to this
// party", so a malformed key here is not a bad record — it is an
// account nobody can seal an intent to.** The discovery would happen at
// the first attempt, and on the hybrid path it would happen as a pair
// silently reduced to one family, which is identical on the wire. The
// precompiles make it a refusal at registration instead.
//
// Neither is a re-implementation of the KEM: `0x0203` runs FIPS 203
// §7.2's own encapsulation-key check and `0x0207` runs the structural
// check HQC-5's encoding admits. Encapsulation is a sender operation
// and decapsulation needs the secret key, so nothing more belongs here.
//
// A CA is sealed to by nobody and carries no encapsulation stage, so
// its slots are cleared rather than checked.
_storeKemPair(account, isCa, live.kemMlKem, live.kemHqc, true);
_storeKemPair(account, isCa, recovery.kemMlKem, recovery.kemHqc, false);
accountOfCertificate[live.certHash] = account;
emit IdentityRegistered(account, live.certHash, roles, version);
// Same-tx: a registration or rotation is visible to every execution
// chain's admission set the moment it is visible here.
_projectIdentity(account);
}
/**
* @dev Store one stage's encapsulation pair, or clear it.
*
* Empty is legitimate and is not the same as absent-and-wrong: a CA has no
* encapsulation stage, and a certificate issued before v4 carries none.
* `FinalCertificate.parse` has already refused the half-populated case, so
* by here the pair is both or neither.
*
* Cleared rather than left alone on a rotation to an empty pair. A stale
* key surviving a rotation is a sender encapsulating to a credential the
* account has disowned, and the intent then never decrypts — the failure
* mode with no error attached, and the one this whole pairing exists to
* avoid.
*/
function _storeKemPair(address account, bool isCa, bytes memory mlKem, bytes memory hqc, bool isLive)
private
{
if (isCa || mlKem.length == 0) {
delete (isLive ? _activeKemMlKem : _recoveryKemMlKem)[account];
delete (isLive ? _activeKemHqc : _recoveryKemHqc)[account];
return;
}
if (!FinalChainPrecompiles.isWellFormedMlKem1024(mlKem)) {
revert MalformedEncapsulationKey(account, FinalCertificate.ALG_ML_KEM_1024);
}
if (!FinalChainPrecompiles.isWellFormedHqc5(hqc)) {
revert MalformedEncapsulationKey(account, FinalCertificate.ALG_HQC_5);
}
if (isLive) {
_activeKemMlKem[account] = mlKem;
_activeKemHqc[account] = hqc;
} else {
_recoveryKemMlKem[account] = mlKem;
_recoveryKemHqc[account] = hqc;
}
}
/// @notice Grant or withdraw capabilities without rotating keys.
/// @dev Separate from registration because the two have different
/// cadences: a role changes when a service's job changes, a key changes
/// when it is compromised or aged out. Folding them together would force a
/// key rotation to express a role change.
function setRoles(
address account,
uint256 roles,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_SET_ROLES, keccak256(abi.encode(account, roles)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
if (!id.registered) revert UnknownAccount(account);
if (id.revoked) revert CertificateIsRevoked(id.certHash);
uint256 previous = id.roles;
id.roles = roles;
_requireRegistrarQuorumReachable();
emit IdentityRolesChanged(account, previous, roles);
// Roles are not in the tree-8 leaf, so this rewrites the same value —
// kept anyway so "every identity mutation projects" has no exceptions
// to remember.
_projectIdentity(account);
}
/// @dev Once sealed, no mutation may leave the registrar quorum unreachable
/// — that is the one change nothing could ever undo. Checked after the
/// write so the count reflects it.
function _requireRegistrarQuorumReachable() private view {
if (!bootstrapSealed) return;
uint256 sealable = sealableMemberCount(ROLE_REGISTRAR);
if (sealable < registrarThreshold) {
revert RegistrarThresholdUnreachable(sealable, registrarThreshold);
}
}
/// @notice Revoke an identity and its certificate. Irreversible.
/// @param chainIds The chains whose LMS-key slots this account holds — the
/// registrars supply the list (the digest binds it) because a mapping
/// cannot enumerate its own keys. Each named slot's current fingerprint is
/// recorded into the revocation log same-tx; a chain with no slot is
/// skipped, and a fingerprint missed by an incomplete list stays
/// permanently recordable through the log's permissionless door, since a
/// revoked account never regains standing.
/// @dev Clears the roles as well as setting the flag. Both are checked
/// everywhere, but leaving a revoked record carrying roles invites a future
/// reader that checks only one of them.
function revoke(
address account,
uint64[] calldata chainIds,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_REVOKE, keccak256(abi.encode(account, chainIds)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
if (!id.registered) revert UnknownAccount(account);
id.revoked = true;
id.roles = 0;
certificateRevoked[id.certHash] = true;
_requireRegistrarQuorumReachable();
emit IdentityRevoked(account, id.certHash);
// AFTER the flag lands, so the log's own gate sees the permanent
// transition it requires.
for (uint256 i = 0; i < chainIds.length; i++) {
LmsKey storage k = _lmsKey[account][chainIds[i]];
if (k.registered) _recordRevokedSigner(lmsSignerId(k.keyId, k.height, k.root));
}
_projectIdentity(account);
}
/**
* @notice Root-plane GLOBAL certificate revocation, by `certHash` (D5).
*
* @dev The half of the one revocation lane that gates registration and
* covers break-glass: any certificate — registered, off-chain-issued, or
* never seen — can be killed by handle under the registrar quorum. When
* the handle is a registered identity's CURRENT certificate the identity
* falls with it (flag, roles, same-tx projection), so a break-glass by
* handle is never weaker than {revoke} — it only skips the LMS-slot
* enumeration, which stays permanently recordable through the revocation
* log's permissionless door.
*/
function revokeCertificate(
bytes32 certHash,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireMembershipAuthority(
DOMAIN_REVOKE_CERTIFICATE, keccak256(abi.encode(certHash)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
certificateRevoked[certHash] = true;
address bound = accountOfCertificate[certHash];
if (bound != address(0)) {
Identity storage id = _identity[bound];
if (!id.revoked) {
id.revoked = true;
id.roles = 0;
_requireRegistrarQuorumReachable();
emit IdentityRevoked(bound, certHash);
_projectIdentity(bound);
}
}
emit CertificateRevoked(certHash, address(0));
}
/**
* @notice The ISSUING identity's half of the revocation lane: a registered
* issuer revokes a certificate it signed OFF-chain, by `certHash`.
*
* @dev "Sub-issuer and us alike" (D5) — but SCOPED: this records WHO
* revoked, and a verifier honours the entry only when the revoker is the
* certificate's own issuer (which the verifier knows — it holds the
* cert). It deliberately does NOT set the global `certificateRevoked`
* flag: that flag gates registration, and letting any registered issuer
* set it for an arbitrary handle would be a griefing lane over other
* people's certificates.
*
* Anyone may SUBMIT; authority is the two signatures — the issuer's
* registered cert-signing keys over a digest binding this registry, the
* chain, the handle and the issuer's own gate nonce. One-way: the first
* revoker of a handle is recorded and a second write is refused, because
* "revoked twice by two parties" is two facts where the lane models one.
*/
function revokeIssuedCertificate(
address issuer,
bytes32 certHash,
AdmissionProof calldata proof
) external {
if (!hasRole(issuer, ROLE_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITY)) {
revert IssuerNotACertificateAuthority(issuer);
}
if (certificateRevokedBy[certHash] != address(0)) revert CertificateIsRevoked(certHash);
uint64 nonce = _gateNonce[issuer];
_gateNonce[issuer] = nonce + 1;
bytes memory message = abi.encodePacked(
keccak256(
abi.encode(
DOMAIN_ISSUER_CERT_REVOCATION,
block.chainid,
address(this),
issuer,
certHash,
nonce
)
)
);
if (
!FinalChainPrecompiles.verifyMlDsa87(
_activeTransactionKey[issuer], message, proof.mlDsaSignature
)
|| !FinalChainPrecompiles.verifySlhDsa(
_activeAccessKey[issuer], message, proof.slhDsaSignature
)
) revert AdmissionProofInvalid(issuer);
certificateRevokedBy[certHash] = issuer;
emit CertificateRevoked(certHash, issuer);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- views
/// @notice The full identity record. `registered` is the field to branch on.
function identityOf(address account) external view returns (Identity memory) {
return _identity[account];
}
/// @notice `activeTransaction` — ML-DSA-87. What a quorum verifies against.
function activeTransactionKeyOf(address account) external view returns (bytes memory) {
return _activeTransactionKey[account];
}
/// @notice `activeAccess` — SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s. Identity, and guardianship.
function activeAccessKeyOf(address account) external view returns (bytes memory) {
return _activeAccessKey[account];
}
/// @notice `activeSeal` — SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s. What `FinalPqQuorum` verifies
/// an execution-class approval's `seal` against. Empty when the identity
/// carries no seal, in which case it cannot take part in a sealed quorum.
function activeSealKeyOf(address account) external view returns (bytes memory) {
return _activeSealKey[account];
}
/// @notice `recoveryTransaction`. Authorizes rotating this account's own
/// credentials and nothing else. Empty for a CA.
function recoveryTransactionKeyOf(address account) external view returns (bytes memory) {
return _recoveryTransactionKey[account];
}
/// @notice `recoveryAccess`. Empty for a CA.
function recoveryAccessKeyOf(address account) external view returns (bytes memory) {
return _recoveryAccessKey[account];
}
/// @notice The four commitments, in the order tree 1's leaf wants them.
/// @dev keccak, not SHA3 — these feed `FinalWalletFactory.accountStateLeafHash`,
/// which every other chain verifies with, and that one hashes with keccak.
function keyCommitments(address account)
external
view
returns (
bytes32 liveAccess,
bytes32 liveTransaction,
bytes32 recoveryAccess,
bytes32 recoveryTransaction
)
{
liveAccess = keccak256(_activeAccessKey[account]);
liveTransaction = keccak256(_activeTransactionKey[account]);
recoveryAccess = keccak256(_recoveryAccessKey[account]);
recoveryTransaction = keccak256(_recoveryTransactionKey[account]);
}
/**
* @notice The tree-8 leaf `account` currently earns: the execution
* chains' identity leaf while the identity stands, zero once it
* does not.
*
* @dev The leaf VALUE is `keccak256(DOMAIN_IDENTITY_LEAF ‖ serial ‖
* keysHash)` — byte-identical to `IdentityRootModule.identityLeafHash`,
* which is also the `certHash` inside the wallet's CREATE2 derivation —
* with `keysHash` folded exactly as the certificate issuer folds it:
* `keccak256(activeAccess ‖ activeTransaction ‖ recoveryAccess ‖
* recoveryTransaction ‖ activeKem ‖ recoveryKem)`, six commitment words
* packed in slot order (`minePqVanityCerts.cjs` is the reference encoder;
* the parity test pins this function against the premined fixtures).
*
* Zero — the empty slot's own value, unprovable as a leaf because no
* certificate hashes to it — for anything that must not admit a wallet
* creation: a revoked identity, one outside its validity window, and any
* CA. The CA exclusion is structural, not a role read: an end entity has
* `depth == maxDelegationDepth` (it issues nothing), a CA never does, and
* the depth pair is immutable per version where roles are not.
*
* Lives HERE rather than on `FinalStateTrees` (whose tree 8 consumes it)
* because every input is this contract's storage and the trees contract
* sits against EIP-170.
*/
function identityTreeLeafOf(address account) external view returns (bytes32) {
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
if (!id.registered) revert UnknownAccount(account);
if (id.revoked || !_withinValidity(id)) return bytes32(0);
if (id.depth != id.maxDelegationDepth) {
// D7 (ruled 2026-09-01): an ISSUER exists in tree 8 under its own
// domain, so its record is stapleable for offline licence
// verification. `certHash` suffices (it covers the whole TBS and
// the verifier holds the cert), `version` makes supersession move
// the leaf, and the third word RESERVES the issuer's own
// certificate-tree anchor — zero until wired. The distinct domain
// does the wallet-admission exclusion the zero projection used to
// do; zero-on-revoke above is now load-bearing for both record
// kinds (a fresh staple is an unrevoked statement).
return keccak256(
abi.encodePacked(DOMAIN_ISSUER_LEAF, id.certHash, uint64(id.version), bytes32(0))
);
}
bytes32 liveKem = keccak256(
abi.encodePacked(DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE, _activeKemMlKem[account], _activeKemHqc[account]));
bytes32 recoveryKem = keccak256(
abi.encodePacked(DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE, _recoveryKemMlKem[account], _recoveryKemHqc[account]));
bytes32 keysHash = keccak256(
abi.encodePacked(
keccak256(_activeAccessKey[account]),
keccak256(_activeTransactionKey[account]),
keccak256(_recoveryAccessKey[account]),
keccak256(_recoveryTransactionKey[account]),
liveKem,
recoveryKem
)
);
return keccak256(abi.encodePacked(DOMAIN_IDENTITY_LEAF, id.serial, keysHash));
}
/// @notice Per-stage encapsulation commitments, in `AccountStateLeaf` order.
/// @dev One word per STAGE, over both of that stage's KEM public keys. The
/// pair is the unit — an account holds both or neither — so committing them
/// separately would model a state the protocol does not recognise, and every
/// downstream record would carry two words where one says the same thing.
///
/// An account registered before the encapsulation slots existed hashes the
/// empty string here rather than reverting: `syncIdentities` must keep
/// projecting it, and a leaf that cannot be built is a party that cannot be
/// revoked.
function kemCommitments(address account)
external
view
returns (bytes32 liveKem, bytes32 recoveryKem)
{
liveKem = keccak256(
abi.encodePacked(DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE, _activeKemMlKem[account], _activeKemHqc[account]));
recoveryKem = keccak256(
abi.encodePacked(DOMAIN_KEM_BUNDLE, _recoveryKemMlKem[account], _recoveryKemHqc[account]));
}
/// @notice The encapsulation keys themselves, for a party composing a message.
function kemKeysOf(address account)
external
view
returns (bytes memory activeMlKem, bytes memory activeHqc)
{
return (_activeKemMlKem[account], _activeKemHqc[account]);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------- senders
/**
* @notice The Final Chain sender a transaction key produces.
* @dev `keccak256(uint8(4) ‖ publicKey)[12:]` — byte-identical to what the
* node derives from a type-0x46 envelope and to the backend's
* `pqTransaction.senderOf`. Pure, so a client can compute it from a
* certificate before the identity is registered.
*/
function senderFor(bytes memory transactionKey) public pure returns (address) {
return address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(ENVELOPE_ALG_ML_DSA_87, transactionKey)))));
}
/// @notice The sender `account`'s transactions arrive from, or zero for an
/// account with no transaction key on record.
function senderOf(address account) external view returns (address) {
bytes storage key = _activeTransactionKey[account];
if (key.length == 0) return address(0);
return senderFor(key);
}
/// @notice `hasRole` for a `msg.sender`: resolves the sender to its identity
/// first. False for a sender no identity claims.
function senderHasRole(address sender, uint256 roleMask) external view returns (bool) {
address account = accountOfSender[sender];
return account != address(0) && hasRole(account, roleMask);
}
/// @notice How many accounts carrying `roleMask` also hold a seal key —
/// the members that can take part in a sealed quorum.
function sealableMemberCount(uint256 roleMask) public view returns (uint256 sealable) {
uint256 n = _accounts.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n; i++) {
address a = _accounts[i];
if (hasRole(a, roleMask) && _activeSealKey[a].length != 0) sealable++;
}
}
/// @notice Number of registered accounts.
function accountCount() external view returns (uint256) {
return _accounts.length;
}
/// @notice Registered account by index, in registration order.
function accountAt(uint256 index) external view returns (address) {
return _accounts[index];
}
/// @notice Every account carrying every bit in `roleMask`.
/// @dev A view, so the O(n) scan costs nothing. Callers that need this in a
/// transaction should pass the member list explicitly instead — see
/// `FinalPqQuorum`, which takes signers rather than searching for them.
function accountsWithRole(uint256 roleMask) external view returns (address[] memory found) {
uint256 n = _accounts.length;
address[] memory buf = new address[](n);
uint256 count;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (hasRole(_accounts[i], roleMask)) {
buf[count++] = _accounts[i];
}
}
found = new address[](count);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < count; i++) {
found[i] = buf[i];
}
}
/**
* @notice How many accounts could satisfy a quorum for `roleMask` right now.
* @dev The number a threshold has to be reachable against. A threshold above
* it is not a strict quorum, it is a quorum that cannot be met — and the way
* that presents is an operation that reverts forever with nothing naming the
* roster as the cause.
*/
function liveMemberCount(uint256 roleMask) public view returns (uint256 live) {
uint256 n = _accounts.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (hasRole(_accounts[i], roleMask)) live++;
}
}
/**
* @notice Whether `account` currently carries every bit in `roleMask`.
* @dev Every gate in this system asks this one question, so every gate gets
* the same answer: registered, not revoked, inside its validity window, and
* holding the capability. A caller that checked only the role bit would
* accept an expired certificate.
*
* `roleMask == 0` is false. A zero mask asks nothing and must not read as
* "yes" — that is the shape of an uninitialised configuration variable, and
* the one reading it should not be a universal pass.
*/
function hasRole(address account, uint256 roleMask) public view returns (bool) {
if (roleMask == 0) return false;
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
if (!id.registered || id.revoked) return false;
if (id.roles & roleMask != roleMask) return false;
return _withinValidity(id);
}
/// @notice Whether `account` is registered, unrevoked and in date,
/// regardless of capability.
function isActive(address account) public view returns (bool) {
Identity storage id = _identity[account];
return id.registered && !id.revoked && _withinValidity(id);
}
function _withinValidity(Identity storage id) private view returns (bool) {
if (id.notBefore != 0 && FinalChainTime.nowMs() < id.notBefore) return false;
if (id.notAfter != 0 && FinalChainTime.nowMs() >= id.notAfter) return false;
return true;
}
}
contracts/finalchain/FinalPqQuorum.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {FinalChainPrecompiles} from "./FinalChainPrecompiles.sol";
import {FinalIdentityRegistry} from "./FinalIdentityRegistry.sol";
/**
* @title FinalPqQuorum
* @notice K-of-N approval where the signatures are post-quantum and the chain
* is what checks them.
*
* @dev This library is the reason Final Chain exists in this design.
*
* `FinalBackend/src/pq/credential.js` carries a rule it had to enforce in code
* because nothing else could: **a surface whose signature is verified on chain
* cannot be PQ.** A co-signer approval reaching `FinalRootAuthority` is checked
* by ECDSA/ERC-1271 in Solidity, so a PQ co-signer would produce approvals the
* contract cannot read, and the quorum would stop reaching threshold with
* nothing in any log naming the cause. `PQ_SURFACE` and `assertBackendVerified`
* exist to keep anyone from crossing that line by accident.
*
* Here the line is gone. The precompiles verify ML-DSA-87 and
* SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s natively, so a quorum can be PQ *and* on chain, and
* "the backend says these four signatures verified" becomes "these four
* signatures verify, and any node re-derives that independently".
*
* ## Three rules, each closing a specific hole
*
* 1. **Keys come from the registry, never from calldata.** A key passed as an
* argument proves nothing — anyone with a keypair can sign under it. This is
* the difference between a 4-of-5 quorum and a 1-of-1 held by whoever built
* the transaction.
*
* 2. **Signers strictly ascending.** One comparison per entry rejects duplicates
* outright, so a single member cannot supply four approvals and satisfy a
* threshold of four. The alternative — an O(n²) seen-check — is the same
* guarantee with more ways to get it wrong.
*
* 3. **The digest binds chain id and verifying contract.** Without both, an
* approval collected for one contract is replayable against another with the
* same payload shape, and an approval from the test chain is replayable on
* the production one. These co-signers hold one key across environments.
*
* ## Which algorithm
*
* The stack splits its keys by hardness assumption, not by convenience:
* ML-DSA-87 (lattice) signs transactions, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s (hash-based) signs
* identity. Two families, so one cryptanalytic result cannot take both.
*
* So an action inherits the class of what it authorizes. Advancing a state root
* is operational and high-cadence: transaction class. Registering or revoking
* an identity is the thing the access class exists for. `ALG_ANY` is available
* and should be used sparingly — accepting either means a break in one family
* takes the quorum.
*
* An action that authorizes EXECUTION takes both: the ML-DSA-87 approval and a
* `seal`, an SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s signature over the same digest by the member's
* `activeSeal` key. Neither family alone can then move funds, and the seal key
* is its own slot — never the access key — so the process that seals cannot
* also rotate the identity it seals for.
*
* Every digest binds an `anchorBlock`: the block at which the members read
* tree 1 to decide who is in the round. Binding it means every approval in a
* round was made against ONE roster view, and the window in `require_` means a
* view older than `ANCHOR_WINDOW` blocks is refused rather than honoured.
*
* The practical cost is worth stating: an SLH-DSA signature is 29,792 bytes, so
* a 4-of-5 access-class quorum is ~119 KB of calldata. That is affordable here
* only because this is our own chain. Do not carry this pattern to a chain
* where it is not.
*/
library FinalPqQuorum {
/// @notice ML-DSA-87 — FIPS 204. Algorithm ids are the FIPS numbers: the
/// same ids `FinalCertificate` and the backend registry use, and the numbers
/// the precompile addresses end in (`0x0204`).
uint8 internal constant ALG_ML_DSA_87 = 4;
/// @notice SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s — FIPS 205 (`0x0205`).
uint8 internal constant ALG_SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S = 5;
/// @notice Either scheme is acceptable for this action.
uint8 internal constant ALG_ANY = 0;
/// @notice How far behind the chain head an approval's anchor may sit.
/// @dev Members evaluate roster membership against tree 1 AT the anchor
/// block. 600 blocks is ten minutes at the chain's one-second cadence —
/// generous against a round that takes seconds, and short enough that a
/// roster rotated away is refused rather than counted.
uint64 internal constant ANCHOR_WINDOW = 600;
/// @dev Domain separator for every quorum digest. Distinct from any
/// EIP-712 domain in the stack: these are not typed-data signatures and
/// must not be confusable with one.
bytes32 internal constant DOMAIN_PQ_QUORUM = keccak256("FINAL_CHAIN_PQ_QUORUM_v01");
/// @notice One member's approval.
struct Approval {
/// The member's account, which is also the key it is looked up by.
address signer;
/// `ALG_ML_DSA_87` or `ALG_SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S`.
uint8 algorithm;
/// Over the 32-byte digest from `digest()`, verbatim. Both schemes
/// hash internally, so the digest is not re-hashed before signing.
bytes signature;
/// SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s over the same digest, by the member's `activeSeal`
/// key. Required where the action authorizes execution; empty otherwise.
bytes seal;
}
error ThresholdNotMet(uint256 valid, uint256 required);
error SignersNotAscending(address previous, address next);
error SignerLacksRole(address signer, uint256 roleMask);
error WrongAlgorithm(address signer, uint8 got, uint8 required);
error BadSignature(address signer, uint8 algorithm);
error BadSeal(address signer);
error AnchorAhead(uint64 anchorBlock, uint256 blockNumber);
error AnchorStale(uint64 anchorBlock, uint256 blockNumber);
error ThresholdIsZero();
/**
* @notice The message every member of this quorum signs.
* @param verifyingContract The contract consuming the approvals. Binding it
* stops an approval collected for one contract being replayed
* against another with the same payload shape.
* @param actionDomain What is being authorized — a per-action constant, so
* an approval for "advance the accounts tree" cannot be replayed as
* one for "revoke an identity".
* @param anchorBlock The Final Chain block the members read tree 1 at to
* decide the roster. Bound here so every approval in a round names
* the same view; checked against `ANCHOR_WINDOW` by `require_`.
* @param payloadDigest The action's own committed content. Callers MUST
* include a nonce or a monotonic counter in it; nothing here can
* tell a replay of round 7 from a fresh round 7.
*/
function digest(
address verifyingContract,
bytes32 actionDomain,
uint64 anchorBlock,
bytes32 payloadDigest
) internal view returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(
abi.encode(
DOMAIN_PQ_QUORUM,
block.chainid,
verifyingContract,
actionDomain,
anchorBlock,
payloadDigest
)
);
}
/**
* @notice Reverts unless at least `threshold` distinct members holding
* `roleMask` have signed `quorumDigest`.
* @param registry Where public keys and roles come from. Not a parameter
* for flexibility — a parameter so the caller's own immutable
* registry address is what is used, rather than one from calldata.
* @param requiredAlgorithm `ALG_ANY` to accept either scheme.
* @param anchorBlock The anchor the digest was built over. Refused if it is
* ahead of this block or more than `ANCHOR_WINDOW` behind it.
* @param requireSeal Whether every approval must also carry a valid `seal`
* by the member's `activeSeal` key — the execution class.
* @return valid The number of approvals that verified, which is at least
* `threshold` if this returns at all.
*
* @dev Every failure reverts with the offending signer named. A quorum that
* silently skipped bad approvals and counted the rest would let a
* misconfigured co-signer sit broken indefinitely: the threshold would keep
* being met by the others and nothing would say one member had stopped
* contributing. That is exactly the failure this program has already had,
* in `fanOut`, where a per-chain advance failure was recorded and execution
* continued.
*/
function require_(
FinalIdentityRegistry registry,
Approval[] calldata approvals,
bytes32 quorumDigest,
uint256 roleMask,
uint256 threshold,
uint8 requiredAlgorithm,
uint64 anchorBlock,
bool requireSeal
) internal view returns (uint256 valid) {
if (threshold == 0) revert ThresholdIsZero();
if (anchorBlock > block.number) revert AnchorAhead(anchorBlock, block.number);
if (block.number - anchorBlock > ANCHOR_WINDOW) revert AnchorStale(anchorBlock, block.number);
bytes memory message = abi.encodePacked(quorumDigest);
address previous = address(0);
uint256 n = approvals.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n; i++) {
Approval calldata a = approvals[i];
// Strictly ascending. `address(0)` as the initial value works
// because it can never be a registered signer.
if (a.signer <= previous) revert SignersNotAscending(previous, a.signer);
previous = a.signer;
if (!registry.hasRole(a.signer, roleMask)) revert SignerLacksRole(a.signer, roleMask);
if (requiredAlgorithm != ALG_ANY && a.algorithm != requiredAlgorithm) {
revert WrongAlgorithm(a.signer, a.algorithm, requiredAlgorithm);
}
if (!_verify(registry, a, message)) revert BadSignature(a.signer, a.algorithm);
if (requireSeal && !_verifySeal(registry, a, message)) revert BadSeal(a.signer);
valid++;
}
if (valid < threshold) revert ThresholdNotMet(valid, threshold);
}
/// @notice Non-reverting form, for views and for callers that want to
/// report rather than refuse.
function count(
FinalIdentityRegistry registry,
Approval[] calldata approvals,
bytes32 quorumDigest,
uint256 roleMask,
uint8 requiredAlgorithm,
uint64 anchorBlock,
bool requireSeal
) internal view returns (uint256 valid) {
if (anchorBlock > block.number || block.number - anchorBlock > ANCHOR_WINDOW) return 0;
bytes memory message = abi.encodePacked(quorumDigest);
address previous = address(0);
uint256 n = approvals.length;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n; i++) {
Approval calldata a = approvals[i];
if (a.signer <= previous) return valid;
previous = a.signer;
if (!registry.hasRole(a.signer, roleMask)) continue;
if (requiredAlgorithm != ALG_ANY && a.algorithm != requiredAlgorithm) continue;
if (!_verify(registry, a, message)) continue;
if (requireSeal && !_verifySeal(registry, a, message)) continue;
valid++;
}
}
/// @dev The seal: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s by the member's `activeSeal` key over
/// the same digest. A member with no seal key on record cannot seal, and an
/// approval with no seal bytes is not one.
function _verifySeal(
FinalIdentityRegistry registry,
Approval calldata a,
bytes memory message
) private view returns (bool) {
bytes memory key = registry.activeSealKeyOf(a.signer);
if (key.length == 0 || a.seal.length == 0) return false;
return FinalChainPrecompiles.verifySlhDsa(key, message, a.seal);
}
function _verify(
FinalIdentityRegistry registry,
Approval calldata a,
bytes memory message
) private view returns (bool) {
// The LIVE pair, always. The recovery pair authorizes rotating this
// account's own credentials and NOTHING else — a quorum that accepted
// it would hand the recovery keys everyday authority, which is exactly
// the separation the two stages exist to draw.
if (a.algorithm == ALG_ML_DSA_87) {
return FinalChainPrecompiles.verifyMlDsa87(
registry.activeTransactionKeyOf(a.signer), message, a.signature
);
}
if (a.algorithm == ALG_SLH_DSA_SHAKE_256S) {
return FinalChainPrecompiles.verifySlhDsa(
registry.activeAccessKeyOf(a.signer), message, a.signature
);
}
// Any other id is a refusal, never a default — including the KEM ids
// (3, 7) and the reserved FN-DSA id (6), none of which is a signature
// scheme this quorum verifies.
return false;
}
}
contracts/finalchain/FinalStateTrees.sol
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
// Copyright (c) 2024-2026 Final DeFi
// Licensed under the Business Source License 1.1 (the "License")
//
// Change Date: 2029-01-01
// Change License: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
// @author Final DeFi
// @version 1.0.0
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
import {FinalIdentityRegistry} from "./FinalIdentityRegistry.sol";
import {FinalChainTime} from "./FinalChainTime.sol";
import {FinalPqQuorum} from "./FinalPqQuorum.sol";
/// @notice The one question `syncIdentities` asks the asset registry.
/// @dev An interface rather than an import of `FinalAssetRegistry`, which
/// imports this file: the registry is tree 6's writer and holds the trees
/// as an immutable, so the dependency runs that way and this is the one
/// read that runs the other.
interface IChainSource {
function enabledChainRefs() external view returns (bytes32[] memory);
}
/// @notice The one question {FinalStateTrees.syncSlotKeyLeaves} asks the
/// slot-key registry: the leaf value for one member's slot — the
/// registry's own verdict, zero when the slot holds nothing usable.
interface ISlotKeySource {
function slotKeyLeafOf(address member, uint64 slotIndex) external view returns (bytes32);
}
/// @notice The one question {FinalStateTrees.syncEndpointLeaves} asks the
/// endpoint registry: the leaf value for one tunnel endpoint — the
/// registry's own verdict (certificate hash, status, expiry, region),
/// zero when nothing is registered under the id.
interface IEndpointSource {
function endpointLeafOf(bytes32 endpointId) external view returns (bytes32);
}
/**
* @title FinalStateTrees
* @notice The eight trees. Final Chain's state plane, and the source of truth
* every other chain projects from.
*
* @dev One tree per domain, because they change at unrelated cadences and a
* combined tree invalidates every outstanding proof on every tick:
*
* | # | tree | holds | cadence |
* |---|---|---|---|
* | 1 | accounts | every Final Wallet's public state | per rotation / creation |
* | 2 | phi | the PHI record: per (wallet, chain) balances, the lock, exposures | per publisher round |
* | 3 | vasset | issued vAsset supply and backing, per (asset, chain) | per settlement |
* | 4 | oracle | published prices and their inputs | ~10 s; 1 s for morph and fee assets |
* | 5 | settlement | chain and asset registry roots | rarely |
* | 6 | allowlist | assets, chains, policy, price sources, DEX deployments | rarely |
* | 7 | intents | intent status, ring-keyed over the posting sequence | per posting |
* | 8 | identity | the wallet-creation admission set, projected from the registry | per identity mutation |
*
* ## The hash shape is not a choice
*
* Leaves hash as `keccak256(0x00 ‖ leaf)` and internal nodes as
* `keccak256(0x01 ‖ lo ‖ hi)` with the pair sorted. That is
* `FinalMerkle.verifyTaggedSortedProof`, verbatim, which is what
* `FinalWalletFactory.syncAccountState` and `FinalSettlement` already run on
* every supported chain. A proof produced here is consumed there with no
* translation and no contract change, and tree 1's leaf preimage is exactly
* `FinalWalletFactory.accountStateLeafHash` — same fields, same order, the
* `deployedChains` table `abi.encode`d like every other field.
*
* Getting this wrong is not a compile error anywhere. It is a root every chain
* silently rejects, with nothing pointing at the cause.
*
* ## Positional slots under a sorted-pair tree
*
* Sorted pairs make a proof position-agnostic, which is why it carries no
* direction bits. That does not stop the TREE from being positional, and here
* it is: every key gets a permanent slot, so a single leaf update is `DEPTH`
* hashes instead of a rebuild over every leaf. The verifier neither knows nor
* needs to know that a slot exists.
*
* ## Branches (2026-09-04)
*
* The slot space of every tree is cut into `BRANCH_COUNT` branches by the top
* `BRANCH_BITS` of the slot: a branch is a subtree with a permanent place, its
* root is one internal node, and a leaf's path to the tree root passes through
* it. Branches hold what belongs to the same domain but not to the same rows
* — branch 0 is the owning service's CONFIGURATION on every tree, tree 8 adds
* the owner → wallets index and the co-signers' slot keys beside the admission
* set — and they are chosen over more trees because a branch shares its
* tree's authority doors and writer, while a tree would need its own. A leaf
* proves against its branch root with `BRANCH_DEPTH` siblings, against the
* tree root with `DEPTH`, against the round root with `ROUND_DEPTH`: one path,
* cut at three heights, one verifier.
*
* ## Rounds, and why the live roots are not the product
*
* `setLeaves` moves a tree. It does not publish one. A consumer that fetched
* eight roots one at a time would get a price proof from one moment and a
* roster proof from another, and something delisted in between would still
* verify.
*
* `publishRound` snapshots all eight together, and folds them into ONE round
* root — the tree roots as the level-`DEPTH` nodes of a depth-`ROUND_DEPTH`
* tree, tree `t` at position `t` — so a single word commits to the whole
* plane and any leaf in it proves against that word with four more siblings.
* A round is the unit a consumer pins, and it is the only thing this contract
* promises is contemporaneous. The execution chains keep anchoring per-tree
* roots (identity, account state, registry roots): those must move at their
* own cadence, not at the oracle's.
*/
contract FinalStateTrees {
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- trees
/// @notice Every Final Wallet's public state. The source of truth other
/// chains copy through `syncAccountState`.
uint8 public constant TREE_ACCOUNTS = 1;
/// @notice The PHI record, per `(wallet, chain)`: balances, the lock, its
/// terms, the exposures carved from it and the accrual between reconciliations.
uint8 public constant TREE_PHI = 2;
/// @notice vAsset supply and backing.
uint8 public constant TREE_VASSET = 3;
/// @notice Oracle prices and their inputs.
uint8 public constant TREE_ORACLE = 4;
/// @notice Settlement chain and asset registry roots.
uint8 public constant TREE_SETTLEMENT = 5;
/// @notice Which assets and chains are supported.
uint8 public constant TREE_ALLOWLIST = 6;
/// @notice Intent status, keyed by a RING over the posting sequence.
/// @dev The search structure beside `FinalBundleLog`'s permanent record.
/// Written only by `FinalIntentLog` through `treeWriter[7]` — the tree-1
/// argument verbatim: the log verified the bond, the commitment, the
/// approval and the consume itself, and a service quorum on top would be a
/// censorship point over posting. Slots are permanent and intents are
/// unbounded flow, so the log recycles keys modulo `CAPACITY`: the tree is
/// an index with a ~1M-posting retention window, never the record.
uint8 public constant TREE_INTENTS = 7;
/// @notice The wallet-creation admission set — the identity leaves
/// (`keccak256(DOMAIN_IDENTITY_LEAF ‖ serial ‖ keysHash)`) every execution
/// chain's gateway verifies certificates against.
/// @dev The root the gateways anchor as `currentIdentityRoot` — a
/// CONTINUOUS root over this tree replaces the cold-set snapshot the
/// retired `publishIdentityRoot.cjs` ceremony folded off-chain. Two
/// feeders, one per identity plane, and NO quorum door for either:
///
/// - SERVICE identities: {syncIdentityLeaves}, the permissionless
/// projection of `FinalIdentityRegistry`'s own verdict — the registry
/// calls it same-tx on every identity mutation, and anyone may call it
/// to retire a leaf whose standing lapsed by TIME (expiry moves no
/// registry storage, so only a projection pass can zero it).
/// - USER identities: `treeWriter[8]` — `FinalAccountLedger`, which
/// computes the leaf from the genesis certificate fields it verified
/// under its opener quorum and writes it once at `openAccount`. A user
/// admission leaf is permanent by construction: the certificate IS the
/// address, rotation never changes it, and a post-rotation creation on
/// a new chain reads PUBLISHED account state (WAL-02), never the
/// certificate's genesis keys.
///
/// A quorum of service signatures must not be able to state an identity
/// neither ruler decided, so `setLeaves` refuses this tree outright.
uint8 public constant TREE_IDENTITY = 8;
/// @notice Count, for iteration. Trees are 1-indexed; 0 is not a tree.
uint8 public constant TREE_COUNT = 8;
/// @notice 2^24 slots per tree, laid out as 16 BRANCHES of 2^20: the top
/// `BRANCH_BITS` of a slot name the branch, the rest its position in it.
/// A million rows per branch is far past where this design gets replaced
/// by Final Chain proper. Raising any of this later is a migration, not a
/// parameter change: the depth is in every root.
uint256 public constant DEPTH = 24;
uint256 public constant BRANCH_BITS = 4;
uint8 public constant BRANCH_COUNT = 16;
/// @notice Height of a branch: a leaf proves against its branch root with
/// this many siblings.
uint256 public constant BRANCH_DEPTH = DEPTH - BRANCH_BITS;
/// @notice Slots per branch.
uint256 public constant BRANCH_CAPACITY = 1 << BRANCH_DEPTH;
/// @notice Slots per tree, all branches together.
uint256 public constant CAPACITY = 1 << DEPTH;
/// @notice The round root is a tree over the tree roots — position `t`
/// holds tree `t`'s root, positions 0 and 9..15 the empty tree — folded
/// with the same node hash. It is literally the root of a depth-28 tree
/// whose level-24 nodes are the eight tree roots, which is what lets one
/// path prove a leaf against it.
uint256 public constant FOREST_BITS = 4;
uint256 public constant ROUND_DEPTH = DEPTH + FOREST_BITS;
/// @notice Branch 0 of EVERY tree: the configuration of the service that
/// owns the tree — key → one word, the VALUE stored so a contract on this
/// chain reads it directly (`configValue`), the hash in the tree so it is
/// provable wherever a round root is. Written only by {setConfig} under
/// the configuration authority; every other door refuses the branch.
uint8 public constant BRANCH_CONFIG = 0;
/// @notice Branch 1 of every tree: the domain's own rows — accounts, PHI
/// records, vAssets, prices, registry roots, the allowlist, the intent
/// ring, the identity admission set.
uint8 public constant BRANCH_MAIN = 1;
/// @notice Tree 8, branch 2: the owner → wallets index. Key = the owner
/// (`ownerIndexKeyFor`), leaf = {ownerIndexLeafHash} over the ledger's
/// `walletsByOwner(owner)`. Written by tree 8's writer, the ledger, beside
/// every open and every owner transfer — the tree is the search structure,
/// the ledger holds the readable array it proves.
uint8 public constant BRANCH_OWNER_INDEX = 2;
/// @notice Tree 8, branch 3: the co-signers' per-slot KEM publics — a RING
/// of `SLOT_KEY_RING` positions per member, projected from
/// `slotKeySource` by {syncSlotKeyLeaves} exactly as identities are.
uint8 public constant BRANCH_SLOT_KEYS = 3;
/// @notice Tree 8, branch 4: the tunnel endpoints — the Final Node
/// identities a wallet's FNP session terminates at. Key = the endpoint id
/// (`endpointKeyFor`, the certificate's subject key id), leaf = the
/// endpoint registry's verdict, projected from `endpointSource` by
/// {syncEndpointLeaves} exactly as slot keys are. An execution chain never
/// parses an endpoint certificate; it anchors this tree's root and a client
/// proves the leaf against it (user ruling 2026-09-05).
uint8 public constant BRANCH_ENDPOINTS = 4;
/// @notice Slot-key positions per member. A slot index wraps modulo this,
/// so the branch is an index over the recent slots and never fills; 1024
/// members × 1024 positions is the branch exactly.
uint64 public constant SLOT_KEY_RING = 1024;
/// @dev Must equal `FinalWalletFactory.DOMAIN_ACCOUNT_STATE_LEAF`. Pinned
/// by the cross-repo parity test; a field reordered on one side and not the
/// other is a root every chain rejects.
///
/// `v02`: `deployedChains` became the `(chainRef, account)` table. A v01
/// leaf and a v02 leaf never share a domain, so a proof built against the
/// retired plane cannot verify against this one by accident.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_ACCOUNT_STATE_LEAF =
keccak256("FINAL_ACCOUNT_STATE_LEAF_v02");
bytes32 private constant ACTION_SET_LEAVES = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.setLeaves.v01");
/// @dev Registrar-quorum actions, verified by the registry with this
/// contract as the verifying contract. See `FinalIdentityRegistry.requireRegistrarQuorum`.
bytes32 public constant ACTION_CONFIGURE_TREE = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_CONFIGURE_TREE_v01");
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SET_TREE_WRITER = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SET_TREE_WRITER_v01");
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SET_CHAIN_SOURCE = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SET_CHAIN_SOURCE_v01");
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SET_SLOT_KEY_SOURCE = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SET_SLOT_KEY_SOURCE_v01");
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SET_ENDPOINT_SOURCE = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SET_ENDPOINT_SOURCE_v01");
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SEED_COUNTERS = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SEED_COUNTERS_v01");
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SET_TYPED_WRITER = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SET_TYPED_WRITER_v01");
bytes32 public constant ACTION_SET_CONFIG = keccak256("FINAL_STATE_TREES_SET_CONFIG_v01");
/// @dev Key domains. Both are full-width hashes rather than the packed
/// address they came from, which matters: an address key occupies only the
/// low 160 bits, so a hashed key colliding with one needs ~2^96 work rather
/// than a full collision. That is expensive but not comfortable, and the
/// consequence would be a service identity landing in a wallet's slot.
bytes32 private constant DOMAIN_ACCOUNT_KEY = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.key.account.v01");
bytes32 private constant DOMAIN_IDENTITY_TREE_KEY = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.key.identity.v01");
/// @dev Tree 8, branches 2 and 3, and branch 0 of every tree. Each is its
/// own domain so a key can never land in another branch's slot by
/// construction — `_set` refuses a key whose slot sits in a different
/// branch, and the domain is what makes that refusal unreachable.
bytes32 private constant DOMAIN_OWNER_INDEX_KEY = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.key.ownerIndex.v01");
bytes32 private constant DOMAIN_SLOT_KEY = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.key.slotKey.v01");
bytes32 private constant DOMAIN_ENDPOINT_KEY = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.key.endpoint.v01");
bytes32 private constant DOMAIN_CONFIG_KEY = keccak256("FinalStateTrees.key.config.v01");
/// @notice Leaf domains for the owner index (tree 8, branch 2) and for
/// configuration rows (branch 0 of every tree). The config leaf binds the
/// tree too, so the same row in two trees is two different leaves.
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_OWNER_INDEX_LEAF = keccak256("FINAL_OWNER_INDEX_LEAF_v01");
bytes32 public constant DOMAIN_CONFIG_LEAF = keccak256("FINAL_CONFIG_LEAF_v01");
// -------------------------------------------------------------- storage
/// @notice The registry every signer is resolved through. Immutable so the
/// quorum can never be pointed at a registry supplied in calldata.
FinalIdentityRegistry public immutable registry;
/// @notice Approvals required per tree.
///
/// @dev Per-tree and not a scalar, because each tree is gated by a
/// DIFFERENT role — account co-signers, PHI, vAsset and oracle
/// publishers, registry publishers — so K is a property of that
/// tree's roster, not of the contract. All six read 2 today; that is
/// a deploy-time default, not an invariant, and collapsing them would
/// put the oracle roster's quorum on the account co-signers'.
///
/// The VALUE is a full word: it is a quantity compared against a live
/// member count, and every other threshold in the system is `uint256`.
/// The KEY is `uint8` because that is what a tree id is here — six
/// `uint8` constants, every parameter, every event, every error,
/// `_assertTree`, and the ten sibling mappings below. Widening it
/// would buy nothing (a narrow key is padded to 32 bytes before
/// hashing, so the slot is identical) and cost the getter's selector
/// on a contract that is live on both Final Chains.
mapping(uint8 treeId => uint256) public threshold;
/// @notice Role a signer must hold to write to a tree.
mapping(uint8 treeId => uint256) public writerRole;
/// Raw (untagged) leaf value by tree and slot.
mapping(uint8 => mapping(uint256 => bytes32)) private _leaf;
/// Internal nodes, levels 1..DEPTH. Level 0 is derived from `_leaf`.
mapping(uint8 => mapping(uint256 => mapping(uint256 => bytes32))) private _node;
/// Empty-subtree hash per level, computed once at construction — up to
/// the round root's height, since the forest's empty positions are empty
/// trees.
bytes32[ROUND_DEPTH + 1] private _zero;
/// Permanent slot for a key, 1-based so 0 means unassigned. The slot's top
/// `BRANCH_BITS` are the branch the key lives in.
mapping(uint8 => mapping(bytes32 => uint256)) private _slotPlusOne;
/// The key a slot was handed to — the reverse of `_slotPlusOne`, so any
/// branch enumerates on chain (`keyAt` over `0 .. branchSlotsUsed`) with
/// no log window. One extra word per NEW key, never per update.
mapping(uint8 => mapping(uint256 => bytes32)) private _keyAt;
/// @notice Slots handed out per tree, all branches together.
mapping(uint8 => uint256) public slotsUsed;
/// Slots handed out per branch — the next position in it.
mapping(uint8 => mapping(uint8 => uint256)) private _branchSlotsUsed;
/// The VALUE behind a configuration row (branch 0), by tree and key.
mapping(uint8 => mapping(bytes32 => bytes32)) private _configValue;
/// @notice Live root per tree. Moves on every `setLeaves`.
mapping(uint8 treeId => bytes32) public liveRoot;
/// @notice Writes applied per tree, for change detection between rounds.
mapping(uint8 treeId => uint64) public treeVersion;
/// @notice A contemporaneous snapshot of all eight roots, and the one
/// round root that folds them.
struct Round {
bytes32[TREE_COUNT + 1] roots;
bytes32 roundRoot;
uint64 blockNumber;
uint64 timestamp;
}
/// @notice Published rounds, 1-indexed. Round 0 is "nothing published".
mapping(uint64 => Round) private _rounds;
/// @notice Highest published round.
uint64 public round;
/// Tree versions as of the last published round.
mapping(uint8 => uint64) private _publishedVersion;
/// @notice Per-tree nonce, bound into every quorum digest.
mapping(uint8 treeId => uint64) public nonce;
/**
* @notice A CONTRACT allowed to write one tree without a quorum.
*
* @dev Exactly one per tree, and today exactly one exists: tree 1's is
* `FinalAccountLedger`.
*
* This looks like a hole and is the opposite. The quorum on `setLeaves`
* exists because a tree's writer is otherwise one key deciding what the
* chain states. A writer contract is not a key — its rules are its
* bytecode, it has no owner and no proxy, and tree 1's writer authorizes
* every change by verifying the ACCOUNT HOLDER'S own post-quantum signature
* in this chain's precompiles. That is strictly stronger evidence than a
* K-of-N of our own services attesting to what they read.
*
* Keeping the quorum on top of it would be actively worse: our fleet could
* then withhold approval from a user rotating a stolen key, which is a
* censorship power over the exact operation the account plane exists to
* make possible.
*
* The writer is set on the same bootstrap window as `configureTree` and can
* be moved by a registrar afterwards — an immutable pointer would mean a
* ledger upgrade abandons the tree it writes.
*/
mapping(uint8 treeId => address) public treeWriter;
/**
* @notice Where `syncIdentities` reads the chain set from — the asset
* registry, which is also tree 6's writer.
*
* @dev A service identity is a Final Wallet whose address is the same on
* every EVM chain, so its tree-1 `deployedChains` table is derivable: one
* `(chainRef, itself)` row per chain the registry has enabled. The table
* is DERIVED from state rather than supplied by the caller precisely so
* that `syncIdentities` can stay permissionless — a caller-chosen table
* would let anyone grant a service identity on a chain of their choosing.
*
* Unset (zero) means services carry an empty table and exist on Final
* Chain alone, which is what a plane looks like before its registry is
* seeded. Same configuration gate as `setTreeWriter`, because pointing this
* at a different contract changes what every service leaf says.
*/
address public chainSource;
/// @notice Where {syncSlotKeyLeaves} reads the co-signers' slot keys from
/// — the slot-key registry, whose verdict tree 8's branch 3
/// projects. Same configuration gate as `chainSource`; unset means
/// the branch cannot be written.
address public slotKeySource;
/// @notice The endpoint registry whose verdict tree 8's branch 4 projects.
address public endpointSource;
/// @notice The one contract admitted to {writeTyped}: `FinalStateRecords`,
/// which holds the preimages behind trees 2, 3 and 4 and computes
/// their keys and hashes. Same configuration gate as `treeWriter`.
address public typedWriter;
// --------------------------------------------------------------- events
event LeavesSet(uint8 indexed treeId, uint256 count, bytes32 newRoot, uint64 treeVersion);
event RoundPublished(uint64 indexed round, uint64 blockNumber, uint64 timestamp);
event TreeConfigured(uint8 indexed treeId, uint256 writerRole, uint256 threshold);
event TreeWriterSet(uint8 indexed treeId, address writer);
event ChainSourceSet(address source);
event SlotKeySourceSet(address source);
event EndpointSourceSet(address source);
/// @notice A fresh plane took over the previous plane's counters.
event CountersSeeded(uint64 round, uint64[] versions);
event TypedWriterSet(address writer);
event ConfigSet(uint8 indexed treeId, bytes32 indexed key, bytes32 value);
// --------------------------------------------------------------- errors
error UnknownTree(uint8 treeId);
error LengthMismatch(uint256 keys, uint256 leaves);
error BranchFull(uint8 treeId, uint8 branch);
error UnknownBranch(uint8 branch);
/// @notice A key already holds a slot in another branch of this tree.
error BranchMismatch(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key, uint8 have, uint8 want);
/// @notice Branch 0 is written by `setConfig` alone.
error ConfigBranchReserved(uint8 treeId);
error SlotKeySourceUnset();
error EndpointSourceUnset();
/// @notice Counters can be seeded only into a plane that has published nothing.
error NotFresh();
error VersionCountMismatch(uint256 given);
error TreeNotConfigured(uint8 treeId);
error NothingToPublish();
error UnknownKey(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key);
error NotAuthorized(address caller);
error NoRounds();
error ThresholdUnreachable(uint8 treeId, uint256 live, uint256 required);
/// @notice Trees 7 and 8 take no quorum writes — only their writer
/// contract (and, for tree 8, the registry projection).
error WriterOnlyTree(uint8 treeId);
/// @notice `setLeaves` was called on a tree that has a typed writer.
/// @dev Trees 2, 3 and 4 keep the leaf's preimage beside its hash so a
/// consumer can read the VALUE. An untyped write sets the hash and
/// cannot set the preimage — the pair would disagree, and the stored
/// value would look authoritative while committing to nothing. The
/// typed entrypoint is not a convenience over this one; it is the
/// only door.
error TypedTreeOnly(uint8 treeId);
/// @notice A `deployedChains` row names the zero chain or the zero account,
/// or repeats a chain. A table with either proves nothing about
/// where the account exists.
error InvalidChainAccount(bytes32 chainRef, bytes32 account);
// ---------------------------------------------------------- constructor
/**
* @param registry_ The identity registry. Every signer, key and role is
* resolved through it.
* @dev The empty-subtree table is built here rather than as constants
* because it depends on the tagging, and a constant table that drifted from
* the tagging would produce roots nothing can verify — silently, since both
* sides would still be self-consistent.
*/
constructor(FinalIdentityRegistry registry_) {
registry = registry_;
// Level 0: the tagged hash of an empty (zero) leaf.
_zero[0] = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0x00), bytes32(0)));
for (uint256 l = 0; l < ROUND_DEPTH; l++) {
// Both children equal, so the sort is a no-op and the order is
// irrelevant — which is the only reason this table is one value per
// level rather than one per position.
_zero[l + 1] = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0x01), _zero[l], _zero[l]));
}
for (uint8 t = 1; t <= TREE_COUNT; t++) {
liveRoot[t] = _zero[DEPTH];
}
}
// ------------------------------------------------------- configuration
/**
* @dev The configuration gate: the registry's bootstrap admin alone while
* its window is open, the sealed `ROLE_REGISTRAR` quorum afterwards. The
* same window the registry uses, for the same reason — every roster has to
* be installed by someone before it can install itself — and the same
* quorum, because a threshold is membership by another name: whoever can
* set K to one owns the tree.
*/
function _requireConfigurationAuthority(
bytes32 actionDomain,
bytes32 payloadDigest,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) private {
if (!registry.bootstrapSealed() && msg.sender == registry.bootstrapAdmin()) return;
registry.requireRegistrarQuorum(actionDomain, payloadDigest, anchorBlock, approvals);
}
/**
* @notice Set which role may write a tree and how many approvals it needs.
* @param k Approvals a write needs; `0` leaves the tree unconfigured.
* @param anchorBlock The registrars' roster anchor. Ignored during bootstrap.
* @param approvals The sealed registrar quorum. Empty during bootstrap.
*/
function configureTree(
uint8 treeId,
uint256 role,
uint256 k,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_assertTree(treeId);
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_CONFIGURE_TREE, keccak256(abi.encode(treeId, role, k)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
// Refuse a threshold nobody can meet. Register the members first; that
// ordering is the point, not an inconvenience. A 4-of-5 configured
// against three registered co-signers is a tree that reverts on every
// write, and the revert names the threshold rather than the roster.
if (k != 0) {
uint256 live = registry.liveMemberCount(role);
if (live < k) revert ThresholdUnreachable(treeId, live, k);
}
writerRole[treeId] = role;
threshold[treeId] = k;
emit TreeConfigured(treeId, role, k);
}
/**
* @notice Point a tree at the contract allowed to write it directly.
* @dev Same gate as `configureTree`, for the same reason. Setting it to the
* zero address removes the path entirely and leaves the tree quorum-only.
*/
function setTreeWriter(
uint8 treeId,
address writer,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_assertTree(treeId);
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SET_TREE_WRITER, keccak256(abi.encode(treeId, writer)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
treeWriter[treeId] = writer;
emit TreeWriterSet(treeId, writer);
}
/**
* @notice Point `syncIdentities` at the contract that knows the chain set.
* @dev Same gate as `setTreeWriter`. Zero removes the source, after which
* service leaves carry an empty `deployedChains` table.
*/
function setChainSource(
address source,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SET_CHAIN_SOURCE, keccak256(abi.encode(source)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
chainSource = source;
emit ChainSourceSet(source);
}
/// @notice Point tree 8's branch 3 at the slot-key registry it projects.
function setSlotKeySource(
address source,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SET_SLOT_KEY_SOURCE, keccak256(abi.encode(source)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
slotKeySource = source;
emit SlotKeySourceSet(source);
}
/// @notice Point tree 8's branch 4 at the endpoint registry it projects.
function setEndpointSource(
address source,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SET_ENDPOINT_SOURCE, keccak256(abi.encode(source)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
endpointSource = source;
emit EndpointSourceSet(source);
}
/**
* @notice Take over the previous plane's counters — one `treeVersion` per
* tree (index = treeId, 0 unused) and the published `round` — so a
* redeploy is monotonic for every consumer that compares them
* (rings, explorers, the round feed). NO-WIPE redeploy, ruled
* 2026-09-03. Past rounds' roots stay on the old plane:
* `roundRootAt` below the seed answers zero.
* @dev Configuration authority (bootstrap admin before the seal, registrar
* quorum after), and only while this plane has published nothing.
*/
function seedCounters(
uint64[] calldata versions,
uint64 round_,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SEED_COUNTERS, keccak256(abi.encode(versions, round_)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
if (versions.length != TREE_COUNT + 1) revert VersionCountMismatch(versions.length);
if (round != 0) revert NotFresh();
for (uint8 t = 1; t <= TREE_COUNT; t++) {
if (treeVersion[t] != 0) revert NotFresh();
}
for (uint8 t = 1; t <= TREE_COUNT; t++) {
treeVersion[t] = versions[t];
}
round = round_;
emit CountersSeeded(round_, versions);
}
/// @notice Install the records contract that writes the typed trees.
function setTypedWriter(
address writer,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SET_TYPED_WRITER, keccak256(abi.encode(writer)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
typedWriter = writer;
emit TypedWriterSet(writer);
}
/**
* @notice Write configuration rows into a tree's branch 0.
* @param treeId The tree whose owning service the rows configure.
* @param keys `configKey(name, sub)` per row.
* @param values One word per row — a duration, a count, an address, a
* flag; the reader knows the shape from the name.
*
* @dev The configuration authority, not the tree's writer or quorum: a
* tree's writer states what its domain verified, its quorum attests to
* what it read, and neither is the authority over how the service that
* feeds it is configured. The value is stored beside the hash so a
* contract on this chain reads it in one call (`configValue`) while the
* same row is provable off chain against the round root — one source for
* the fleet, the contracts and the explorer, where the fleet's environment
* used to be a second one.
*/
function setConfig(
uint8 treeId,
bytes32[] calldata keys,
bytes32[] calldata values,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_assertTree(treeId);
if (keys.length != values.length || keys.length == 0) revert LengthMismatch(keys.length, values.length);
_requireConfigurationAuthority(
ACTION_SET_CONFIG, keccak256(abi.encode(treeId, keys, values)), anchorBlock, approvals
);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) {
_configValue[treeId][keys[i]] = values[i];
_set(treeId, BRANCH_CONFIG, keys[i], configLeafHash(treeId, keys[i], values[i]));
emit ConfigSet(treeId, keys[i], values[i]);
}
_bump(treeId, keys.length);
}
// ------------------------------------------------------------- writing
/**
* @notice Write leaves into one branch of one tree under a PQ quorum.
* @param treeId Which tree.
* @param branch Which branch — never 0, which `setConfig` alone writes.
* @param keys Domain keys — a wallet address for accounts, an asset id for
* the allowlist, whatever identifies a row in that domain. Each gets
* a permanent slot in the branch on first write.
* @param leaves The raw (untagged) leaf values.
* @param approvals At least `threshold[treeId]` of them, ascending by signer.
*
* @dev The digest binds the tree, its nonce, and the full batch. Binding the
* nonce is what stops the same approved batch being replayed: without it,
* an approval to set a price is an approval to set that price again at any
* later block, which for an oracle is the whole attack.
*
* ML-DSA-87 is required rather than accepted. These are operational,
* high-cadence writes — the transaction class — and leaving the choice open
* would mean a break in either scheme takes the tree.
*/
function setLeaves(
uint8 treeId,
uint8 branch,
bytes32[] calldata keys,
bytes32[] calldata leaves,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
_assertTree(treeId);
_assertDataBranch(treeId, branch);
if (treeId == TREE_PHI || treeId == TREE_VASSET || treeId == TREE_ORACLE) {
revert TypedTreeOnly(treeId);
}
// Trees 7 and 8 have their own rulers and NO quorum path at all: an
// intent's status is what `FinalIntentLog` verified, an identity is
// what the registry or the ledger verified, and no set of service
// signatures can make a different answer true.
if (treeId == TREE_INTENTS || treeId == TREE_IDENTITY) revert WriterOnlyTree(treeId);
if (keys.length != leaves.length) revert LengthMismatch(keys.length, leaves.length);
uint256 k = threshold[treeId];
if (k == 0) revert TreeNotConfigured(treeId);
uint64 n = nonce[treeId];
FinalPqQuorum.require_(
registry,
approvals,
FinalPqQuorum.digest(
address(this),
ACTION_SET_LEAVES,
anchorBlock,
keccak256(abi.encode(treeId, branch, n, keys, leaves))
),
writerRole[treeId],
k,
FinalPqQuorum.ALG_ML_DSA_87,
anchorBlock,
false
);
nonce[treeId] = n + 1;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) {
_set(treeId, branch, keys[i], leaves[i]);
}
_bump(treeId, keys.length);
}
/// @notice One chain an account exists on, and as what.
/// @dev `chainRef` is the registry's CAIP-derived chain reference — the one
/// identifier that names an EVM chain and a non-EVM one alike — and
/// `account` is the wallet's account there, in that chain's own account
/// space (an EVM address right-aligned, a 32-byte key filling the
/// width). Field-for-field with `IWalletTypes.ChainAccount`.
struct ChainAccount {
bytes32 chainRef;
bytes32 account;
}
/// @notice `FinalWalletFactory.AccountStateLeaf`, field for field.
struct AccountStateLeaf {
address wallet;
bytes32 liveAccess;
bytes32 liveTransaction;
bytes32 recoveryAccess;
bytes32 recoveryTransaction;
/// @dev Active-stage encapsulation commitment and its pre-committed
/// successor. Field-for-field with `FinalWalletFactory.AccountStateLeaf`;
/// a field added on one side and not the other is a root every execution
/// chain rejects, with nothing pointing at the cause.
bytes32 liveKem;
bytes32 recoveryKem;
address owner;
bool pqEnabled;
bool frozen;
/// @dev The chains this account exists on, and its account on each —
/// including chains whose accounts are not EVM addresses. Decided HERE
/// (set by the holder through the ledger) and enforced there: an
/// execution chain refuses to create the account unless the table has a
/// row for it, and a settlement toward a chain with no row is refused at
/// the source. This is what a zero beneficiary resolves through; it
/// replaced a bitmask over registry slots that could only say "may
/// exist", never "as what".
ChainAccount[] deployedChains;
/// @dev Per-chain dormancy verdict, one bit per asset-registry chain
/// slot. Keeps the slot space the bitmask had.
uint32 dormantChains;
uint64 version;
}
/**
* @notice Write account state into tree 1 from the typed leaf.
* @dev The typed form exists so the leaf preimage is built HERE rather than
* by whoever assembles the calldata. Tree 1 is the source of truth for every
* other chain, and `syncAccountState` will accept any 32 bytes that carry a
* valid proof — so if the publisher chose the preimage, the publisher could
* write an account state that no wallet record on this chain agrees with,
* and the proof would still verify everywhere.
*
* **Sealed.** Tree 1 is membership: a leaf here is who an account is, on
* every chain. So the round takes the hybrid class — each approval carries
* the ML-DSA-87 vote AND the member's SLH-DSA seal — where the other trees
* take the transaction class alone. A lattice break rewrites a price; it
* does not rewrite an account.
*/
function setAccountStates(
AccountStateLeaf[] calldata leaves,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
uint256 k = threshold[TREE_ACCOUNTS];
if (k == 0) revert TreeNotConfigured(TREE_ACCOUNTS);
bytes32[] memory keys = new bytes32[](leaves.length);
bytes32[] memory hashes = new bytes32[](leaves.length);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < leaves.length; i++) {
keys[i] = accountKeyFor(leaves[i].wallet);
hashes[i] = accountStateLeafHash(leaves[i]);
}
uint64 n = nonce[TREE_ACCOUNTS];
FinalPqQuorum.require_(
registry,
approvals,
FinalPqQuorum.digest(
address(this),
ACTION_SET_LEAVES,
anchorBlock,
keccak256(abi.encode(TREE_ACCOUNTS, n, keys, hashes))
),
writerRole[TREE_ACCOUNTS],
k,
FinalPqQuorum.ALG_ML_DSA_87,
anchorBlock,
true
);
nonce[TREE_ACCOUNTS] = n + 1;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < leaves.length; i++) {
_set(TREE_ACCOUNTS, BRANCH_MAIN, keys[i], hashes[i]);
}
_bump(TREE_ACCOUNTS, leaves.length);
}
/**
* @notice Write account state into tree 1 from the contract that owns it.
* @dev No quorum, and no nonce burned: `treeWriter[1]` is the ledger, and
* the ledger already verified the holder's own signature before it called
* here. See {treeWriter} for why adding a service quorum on top would be a
* censorship power rather than a safeguard.
*
* Typed, exactly as `setAccountStates` is: the preimage is built HERE, so
* even the writer contract cannot publish a leaf whose meaning no record on
* this chain agrees with.
*/
function setAccountStatesAsWriter(AccountStateLeaf[] calldata leaves) external {
if (msg.sender != treeWriter[TREE_ACCOUNTS]) revert NotAuthorized(msg.sender);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < leaves.length; i++) {
_set(TREE_ACCOUNTS, BRANCH_MAIN, accountKeyFor(leaves[i].wallet), accountStateLeafHash(leaves[i]));
}
_bump(TREE_ACCOUNTS, leaves.length);
}
/**
* @notice Write raw leaves into any tree from the contract that owns it.
* @dev The generic sibling of {setAccountStatesAsWriter}, for a tree whose
* writer is a contract rather than a service quorum. Same authorization —
* `treeWriter[treeId]` and nothing else — and the same reasoning: the
* writer has already verified whatever its domain requires, and layering a
* quorum on top of a contract's own rules is a censorship power rather
* than a safeguard.
*
* UNTYPED, unlike the account path, and that is the trade. Tree 1's
* preimage is built here so even the ledger cannot publish a leaf whose
* meaning no record agrees with; a generic writer supplies its own hash,
* so the leaf means whatever that contract says it means. Acceptable only
* because the writer is a specific contract this chain's operators
* installed — its rules are its bytecode, it has no owner and no proxy —
* and NOT acceptable for a role-gated key. Point `treeWriter` at a
* contract, never at an EOA.
*/
function setLeavesAsWriter(uint8 treeId, uint8 branch, bytes32[] calldata keys, bytes32[] calldata leaves)
external
{
if (msg.sender != treeWriter[treeId]) revert NotAuthorized(msg.sender);
_assertDataBranch(treeId, branch);
if (keys.length != leaves.length) revert LengthMismatch(keys.length, leaves.length);
for (uint256 i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) {
_set(treeId, branch, keys[i], leaves[i]);
}
_bump(treeId, keys.length);
}
/// @notice The leaf hash `FinalWalletFactory.accountStateLeafHash` computes.
/// @dev Identical `abi.encode`, identical field order, identical domain.
/// Pinned against the factory by test. `deployedChains` rides through
/// `abi.encode` like every other field — head offset, then length and
/// rows — so the table is committed whole and in order.
function accountStateLeafHash(AccountStateLeaf memory leaf) public pure returns (bytes32) {
_assertChainAccounts(leaf.deployedChains);
return keccak256(
abi.encode(
DOMAIN_ACCOUNT_STATE_LEAF,
leaf.wallet,
leaf.liveAccess,
leaf.liveTransaction,
leaf.recoveryAccess,
leaf.recoveryTransaction,
leaf.liveKem,
leaf.recoveryKem,
leaf.owner,
leaf.pqEnabled,
leaf.frozen,
leaf.deployedChains,
leaf.dormantChains,
leaf.version
)
);
}
/// @dev A well-formed table: no zero chain, no zero account, no chain twice.
/// Checked where the leaf is hashed so no door — quorum, writer
/// contract, identity projection — can publish a table a resolver
/// would read two ways.
function _assertChainAccounts(ChainAccount[] memory rows) private pure {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < rows.length; i++) {
if (rows[i].chainRef == bytes32(0) || rows[i].account == bytes32(0)) {
revert InvalidChainAccount(rows[i].chainRef, rows[i].account);
}
for (uint256 j = 0; j < i; j++) {
if (rows[j].chainRef == rows[i].chainRef) {
revert InvalidChainAccount(rows[i].chainRef, rows[i].account);
}
}
}
}
/// @notice The account `wallet`'s published table names on `chainRef`, or
/// zero if it has no row there.
/// @dev A convenience over `accountStateLeafHash`'s input for readers on
/// this chain; execution chains answer the same question from their synced
/// record (`FinalWalletFactory.addressOn`).
function accountOn(AccountStateLeaf memory leaf, bytes32 chainRef) public pure returns (bytes32) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < leaf.deployedChains.length; i++) {
if (leaf.deployedChains[i].chainRef == chainRef) return leaf.deployedChains[i].account;
}
return bytes32(0);
}
/**
* @notice The typed trees' write door — `FinalStateRecords` alone.
* @dev The quorum, the nonce and the write, shared by every typed record.
* The records contract computed the keys and hashes from the structs it
* stores; this contract admits nobody else to trees 2, 3 and 4
* (`setLeaves` refuses them), so the value there can never drift from
* the commitment here.
*
* The digest is byte-identical to `setLeaves`' over the same keys and
* hashes, deliberately: the typed entrypoints choose the PREIMAGE, not the
* authorization. A member recomputes one digest whichever door the batch
* came through, and there is no second approval shape to get wrong.
*/
function writeTyped(
uint8 treeId,
bytes32[] memory keys,
bytes32[] memory hashes,
uint64 anchorBlock,
FinalPqQuorum.Approval[] calldata approvals
) external {
if (msg.sender != typedWriter) revert NotAuthorized(msg.sender);
uint256 k = threshold[treeId];
if (k == 0) revert TreeNotConfigured(treeId);
uint64 n = nonce[treeId];
FinalPqQuorum.require_(
registry,
approvals,
FinalPqQuorum.digest(
address(this),
ACTION_SET_LEAVES,
anchorBlock,
keccak256(abi.encode(treeId, n, keys, hashes))
),
writerRole[treeId],
k,
FinalPqQuorum.ALG_ML_DSA_87,
anchorBlock,
false
);
nonce[treeId] = n + 1;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < keys.length; i++) {
_set(treeId, BRANCH_MAIN, keys[i], hashes[i]);
}
_bump(treeId, keys.length);
}
/**
* @notice Snapshot every tree's root into a new round.
* @dev Permissionless, deliberately. Every root being snapshotted was
* already authorized by its tree's quorum, so this adds no authority — it
* only fixes a moment. Requiring a signature would put a liveness
* dependency in front of publication for no security gain.
*
* A round that would change nothing is refused, so the round number cannot
* be advanced by anyone with gas to spend.
*/
function publishRound() external returns (uint64 published) {
bool changed;
for (uint8 t = 1; t <= TREE_COUNT; t++) {
if (treeVersion[t] != _publishedVersion[t]) {
changed = true;
break;
}
}
if (!changed) revert NothingToPublish();
published = round + 1;
Round storage r = _rounds[published];
for (uint8 t = 1; t <= TREE_COUNT; t++) {
r.roots[t] = liveRoot[t];
_publishedVersion[t] = treeVersion[t];
}
r.roundRoot = _foldForest(_forestLeaves(r.roots));
r.blockNumber = uint64(block.number);
// MILLISECONDS, like every instant on this chain.
r.timestamp = FinalChainTime.nowMs();
round = published;
emit RoundPublished(published, r.blockNumber, r.timestamp);
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------- views
/// @notice Every root from one round. Index by the `TREE_*` constants;
/// index 0 is unused.
function rootsAt(uint64 which) external view returns (bytes32[TREE_COUNT + 1] memory) {
return _rounds[which].roots;
}
/// @notice One tree's root at one round.
function rootAt(uint64 which, uint8 treeId) external view returns (bytes32) {
_assertTree(treeId);
return _rounds[which].roots[treeId];
}
/// @notice The one word that commits to every tree at one round.
function roundRootAt(uint64 which) external view returns (bytes32) {
return _rounds[which].roundRoot;
}
/**
* @notice The `FOREST_BITS` siblings that take a tree's root at one round
* up to that round's root — appended to `proofFor`, they make a
* leaf provable against `roundRootAt(which)` by the same verifier.
*/
function roundProofFor(uint64 which, uint8 treeId) external view returns (bytes32[] memory path) {
_assertTree(treeId);
if (which == 0 || which > round) revert NoRounds();
bytes32[] memory level = _forestLeaves(_rounds[which].roots);
path = new bytes32[](FOREST_BITS);
uint256 idx = treeId;
uint256 n = level.length;
for (uint256 l = 0; l < FOREST_BITS; l++) {
path[l] = level[idx ^ 1];
n >>= 1;
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n; i++) {
level[i] = _pair(level[2 * i], level[2 * i + 1]);
}
idx >>= 1;
}
}
/// @notice The latest round's roots, with the block it was taken at.
function latestRound()
external
view
returns (uint64 which, bytes32[TREE_COUNT + 1] memory roots, uint64 blockNumber, uint64 timestamp)
{
which = round;
if (which == 0) revert NoRounds();
Round storage r = _rounds[which];
return (which, r.roots, r.blockNumber, r.timestamp);
}
/// @notice The raw leaf stored for a key, and whether it has a slot.
function leafOf(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key) external view returns (bytes32 leaf, bool present) {
uint256 s = _slotPlusOne[treeId][key];
if (s == 0) return (bytes32(0), false);
return (_leaf[treeId][s - 1], true);
}
/// @notice The permanent slot for a key. Reverts if it has none. The
/// slot's top `BRANCH_BITS` are its branch.
function slotOf(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key) public view returns (uint256) {
uint256 s = _slotPlusOne[treeId][key];
if (s == 0) revert UnknownKey(treeId, key);
return s - 1;
}
/// @notice The key a slot was handed to, or zero if it is still free —
/// the enumeration every branch offers: slots `branch << BRANCH_DEPTH`
/// through `+ branchSlotsUsed(treeId, branch) - 1`.
function keyAt(uint8 treeId, uint256 slot) external view returns (bytes32) {
return _keyAt[treeId][slot];
}
/// @notice Slots handed out in one branch.
function branchSlotsUsed(uint8 treeId, uint8 branch) external view returns (uint256) {
return _branchSlotsUsed[treeId][branch];
}
/// @notice One branch's root: the level-`BRANCH_DEPTH` node at its position.
function branchRoot(uint8 treeId, uint8 branch) external view returns (bytes32) {
_assertTree(treeId);
_assertBranch(branch);
return _nodeAt(treeId, BRANCH_DEPTH, branch);
}
/// @notice The first `BRANCH_DEPTH` siblings of `proofFor` — a proof
/// against the leaf's branch root rather than the tree root.
function branchProofFor(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key) external view returns (bytes32[] memory) {
_assertTree(treeId);
return _path(treeId, slotOf(treeId, key), BRANCH_DEPTH);
}
/// @notice A configuration row's value, and whether the row exists.
function configValue(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key) external view returns (bytes32 value, bool present) {
present = _slotPlusOne[treeId][key] != 0;
value = _configValue[treeId][key];
}
/// @notice The branch-0 key of a configuration row: a name the owning
/// service defines, and a sub-key (a chain reference, an asset, zero).
function configKey(bytes32 name, bytes32 sub) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_CONFIG_KEY, name, sub));
}
/// @notice The leaf a configuration row hashes to.
function configLeafHash(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key, bytes32 value) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_CONFIG_LEAF, treeId, key, value));
}
/// @notice The tree-8 branch-2 key an owner occupies.
function ownerIndexKeyFor(address owner) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_OWNER_INDEX_KEY, owner));
}
/// @notice The owner-index leaf: a commitment to the ledger's ordered
/// `walletsByOwner(owner)`.
function ownerIndexLeafHash(address owner, address[] memory wallets) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_OWNER_INDEX_LEAF, owner, wallets));
}
/// @notice The tree-8 branch-3 key of one member's slot — a ring position.
function slotKeyFor(address member, uint64 slotIndex) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_SLOT_KEY, member, slotIndex % SLOT_KEY_RING));
}
/**
* @notice Project slot keys into tree 8's branch 3 — the co-signers'
* per-slot KEM publics the private option seals to.
* @dev Permissionless, for {syncIdentityLeaves}' reason: the leaf VALUE
* is `slotKeySource`'s own verdict (the registry verified the member's
* signature when the key was published, and answers zero once the slot's
* window has passed), so this adds no authority and only projects. The
* registry calls it same-tx on publication; anyone may call it to retire a
* slot that lapsed by time.
*/
function syncSlotKeyLeaves(address member, uint64[] calldata slotIndexes) external {
address source = slotKeySource;
if (source == address(0)) revert SlotKeySourceUnset();
for (uint256 i = 0; i < slotIndexes.length; i++) {
_set(
TREE_IDENTITY,
BRANCH_SLOT_KEYS,
slotKeyFor(member, slotIndexes[i]),
ISlotKeySource(source).slotKeyLeafOf(member, slotIndexes[i])
);
}
_bump(TREE_IDENTITY, slotIndexes.length);
}
/// @notice The tree-8 branch-4 key of one tunnel endpoint.
function endpointKeyFor(bytes32 endpointId) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_ENDPOINT_KEY, endpointId));
}
/**
* @notice Project tunnel endpoints into tree 8's branch 4.
* @dev Permissionless, for {syncSlotKeyLeaves}' reason: the leaf VALUE is
* `endpointSource`'s own verdict — the registry admitted the certificate
* under the registrar quorum with the holder's proof of possession, and
* answers the revoked status once it is revoked — so this adds no authority
* and only projects. The registry calls it same-tx on registration and
* revocation; anyone may call it to re-project.
*/
function syncEndpointLeaves(bytes32[] calldata endpointIds) external {
address source = endpointSource;
if (source == address(0)) revert EndpointSourceUnset();
for (uint256 i = 0; i < endpointIds.length; i++) {
_set(
TREE_IDENTITY,
BRANCH_ENDPOINTS,
endpointKeyFor(endpointIds[i]),
IEndpointSource(source).endpointLeafOf(endpointIds[i])
);
}
_bump(TREE_IDENTITY, endpointIds.length);
}
/**
* @notice The sibling path for a key, ready for
* `FinalMerkle.verifyTaggedSortedProof` on any chain.
* @dev A view, so the backend fetches a proof with one `eth_call` instead of
* rebuilding the tree off chain. Rebuilding is where a divergence between
* what the chain holds and what a service believes it holds would come
* from, and this removes the second implementation entirely.
*/
function proofFor(uint8 treeId, bytes32 key) external view returns (bytes32[] memory) {
_assertTree(treeId);
return _path(treeId, slotOf(treeId, key), DEPTH);
}
/// @notice The empty-subtree hash at a level. Level `DEPTH` is the root of
/// a tree with nothing in it.
function emptyRoot(uint256 level) external view returns (bytes32) {
return _zero[level];
}
/// @notice The tree-1 key a wallet occupies.
function accountKeyFor(address wallet) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_ACCOUNT_KEY, wallet));
}
/**
* @notice Copy a registered identity into tree 1 as an account-state leaf.
* @dev Services are Final Wallets, so a service's leaf is the SAME leaf a
* user's wallet gets — `FinalWalletFactory.AccountStateLeaf`, four key
* commitments and all. There is no second shape and no second domain,
* which is what lets every chain that already consumes account state
* consume a co-signer's identity with no contract change.
*
* `owner` is the account itself: a service wallet is its own owner, having
* no separate holder to speak for it.
*
* Permissionless, and for the same reason `publishRound` is: every fact it
* writes was already authorized when it entered the registry, so this adds
* no authority and only projects. Gating it would put a liveness dependency
* in front of publishing a revocation, which is the one thing that must
* never wait.
*/
function syncIdentities(address[] calldata accounts) external {
// One table for the batch: a service is its own canonical address on
// every enabled chain, so the rows differ only in `account`.
bytes32[] memory chainRefs = _enabledChainRefs();
for (uint256 i = 0; i < accounts.length; i++) {
address who = accounts[i];
FinalIdentityRegistry.Identity memory id = registry.identityOf(who);
if (!id.registered) revert UnknownKey(TREE_ACCOUNTS, accountKeyFor(who));
(bytes32 la, bytes32 lt, bytes32 ra, bytes32 rt) = registry.keyCommitments(who);
(bytes32 lk, bytes32 rk) = registry.kemCommitments(who);
ChainAccount[] memory table = new ChainAccount[](chainRefs.length);
for (uint256 c = 0; c < chainRefs.length; c++) {
table[c] = ChainAccount({chainRef: chainRefs[c], account: bytes32(uint256(uint160(who)))});
}
AccountStateLeaf memory leaf = AccountStateLeaf({
wallet: who,
liveAccess: la,
liveTransaction: lt,
recoveryAccess: ra,
recoveryTransaction: rt,
liveKem: lk,
recoveryKem: rk,
// A service reaches every chain the registry has enabled, at
// its own address, and is never dormant: dormancy measures an
// ABSENT holder, and these identities have no holder to be
// absent.
deployedChains: table,
dormantChains: 0,
owner: who,
// Every identity here is PQ by construction — there is no other
// kind of key in this registry.
pqEnabled: true,
// Revocation is a leaf that CHANGES, not one that disappears.
// A consumer holding an old proof gets a stale `false`, which is
// why the round is the thing to pin.
frozen: id.revoked,
version: id.version
});
_set(TREE_ACCOUNTS, BRANCH_MAIN, accountKeyFor(who), accountStateLeafHash(leaf));
}
_bump(TREE_ACCOUNTS, accounts.length);
}
/// @notice The tree-8 slot key an identity occupies.
function identityKeyFor(address account) public pure returns (bytes32) {
return keccak256(abi.encode(DOMAIN_IDENTITY_TREE_KEY, account));
}
/**
* @notice Project identities into tree 8 — the wallet-creation admission
* set whose live root every execution chain anchors as its
* `currentIdentityRoot`.
*
* @dev The leaf VALUE is the registry's own verdict —
* `FinalIdentityRegistry.identityTreeLeafOf`: the execution chains'
* identity leaf while the identity stands, zero once it does not. Derived
* there rather than here because every input (serial, the six key
* commitments, standing, the CA depth pair) is registry storage, and this
* contract sits against EIP-170 while the registry does not.
*
* Permissionless, for exactly {syncIdentities}' reason: every fact
* written here was authorized when it entered the registry, so this adds
* no authority and only projects. The registry itself calls it same-tx on
* every identity mutation (register, rotate, roles, revoke, LMS-key ops),
* which is what makes the root CONTINUOUS; the open door additionally lets
* anyone retire a leaf whose standing lapsed by TIME — expiry moves no
* registry storage, so no mutation hook can ever fire for it.
*
* There is no quorum door and no writer seat (both raw doors refuse this
* tree), so the strongest thing any caller can do here is copy the
* registry's own verdict.
*/
function syncIdentityLeaves(address[] calldata accounts) external {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < accounts.length; i++) {
_set(TREE_IDENTITY, BRANCH_MAIN, identityKeyFor(accounts[i]), registry.identityTreeLeafOf(accounts[i]));
}
_bump(TREE_IDENTITY, accounts.length);
}
/**
* @notice Per-tree quorum health: can each configured tree still be written?
* @dev A threshold above the live member count is not a strict quorum, it is
* a tree that reverts forever with nothing naming the roster as the cause.
* `configureTree` refuses to create that state, but revocation can arrive at
* it later — revocation must never be blocked on quorum arithmetic, so the
* check has to be something monitoring reads rather than something the
* contract enforces after the fact.
*/
function quorumHealth()
external
view
returns (uint256[] memory live, uint256[] memory required, bool[] memory ok)
{
live = new uint256[](TREE_COUNT + 1);
required = new uint256[](TREE_COUNT + 1);
ok = new bool[](TREE_COUNT + 1);
for (uint8 t = 1; t <= TREE_COUNT; t++) {
required[t] = threshold[t];
live[t] = required[t] == 0 ? 0 : registry.liveMemberCount(writerRole[t]);
ok[t] = required[t] == 0 || live[t] >= required[t];
}
}
// -------------------------------------------------------------- internal
/// @dev The enabled chain references `chainSource` knows, or none if it is
/// unset. Read through the narrow interface so this contract need not
/// import the registry that imports it.
function _enabledChainRefs() private view returns (bytes32[] memory) {
address source = chainSource;
if (source == address(0)) return new bytes32[](0);
return IChainSource(source).enabledChainRefs();
}
function _assertTree(uint8 treeId) private pure {
if (treeId == 0 || treeId > TREE_COUNT) revert UnknownTree(treeId);
}
function _assertBranch(uint8 branch) private pure {
if (branch >= BRANCH_COUNT) revert UnknownBranch(branch);
}
/// @dev A branch a quorum or a writer may write: any but the config branch.
function _assertDataBranch(uint8 treeId, uint8 branch) private pure {
_assertBranch(branch);
if (branch == BRANCH_CONFIG) revert ConfigBranchReserved(treeId);
}
/// @dev Version + event, the tail of every write door.
function _bump(uint8 treeId, uint256 count) private {
uint64 v = treeVersion[treeId] + 1;
treeVersion[treeId] = v;
emit LeavesSet(treeId, count, liveRoot[treeId], v);
}
/// @dev `keccak256(0x01 ‖ lo ‖ hi)`, the pair sorted — the one node hash.
function _pair(bytes32 a, bytes32 b) private pure returns (bytes32) {
(bytes32 lo, bytes32 hi) = a < b ? (a, b) : (b, a);
return keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0x01), lo, hi));
}
/// @dev The sibling path from a slot up `height` levels.
function _path(uint8 treeId, uint256 idx, uint256 height) private view returns (bytes32[] memory path) {
path = new bytes32[](height);
for (uint256 l = 0; l < height; l++) {
path[l] = _nodeAt(treeId, l, idx ^ 1);
idx >>= 1;
}
}
/// @dev The forest's leaves: the tree roots at their positions, the
/// empty tree at the rest.
function _forestLeaves(bytes32[TREE_COUNT + 1] memory roots) private view returns (bytes32[] memory level) {
level = new bytes32[](1 << FOREST_BITS);
for (uint256 p = 0; p < level.length; p++) {
level[p] = (p >= 1 && p <= TREE_COUNT) ? roots[p] : _zero[DEPTH];
}
}
/// @dev Fold a power-of-two level to its root, in place.
function _foldForest(bytes32[] memory level) private pure returns (bytes32) {
for (uint256 n = level.length; n > 1; n >>= 1) {
for (uint256 i = 0; i < n / 2; i++) {
level[i] = _pair(level[2 * i], level[2 * i + 1]);
}
}
return level[0];
}
function _set(uint8 treeId, uint8 branch, bytes32 key, bytes32 leaf) private {
uint256 s = _slotPlusOne[treeId][key];
uint256 idx;
if (s == 0) {
uint256 used = _branchSlotsUsed[treeId][branch];
if (used >= BRANCH_CAPACITY) revert BranchFull(treeId, branch);
idx = (uint256(branch) << BRANCH_DEPTH) | used;
_branchSlotsUsed[treeId][branch] = used + 1;
slotsUsed[treeId] += 1;
_slotPlusOne[treeId][key] = idx + 1;
_keyAt[treeId][idx] = key;
} else {
idx = s - 1;
uint8 have = uint8(idx >> BRANCH_DEPTH);
if (have != branch) revert BranchMismatch(treeId, key, have, branch);
}
_leaf[treeId][idx] = leaf;
bytes32 cursor = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0x00), leaf));
for (uint256 l = 0; l < DEPTH; l++) {
cursor = _pair(cursor, _nodeAt(treeId, l, idx ^ 1));
idx >>= 1;
_node[treeId][l + 1][idx] = cursor;
}
liveRoot[treeId] = cursor;
}
/// @dev Level 0 is derived from the leaf store rather than duplicated into
/// `_node`, so there is one place a leaf lives and no way for the two to
/// disagree. Unset positions fall through to the empty-subtree hash.
function _nodeAt(uint8 treeId, uint256 level, uint256 index) private view returns (bytes32) {
if (level == 0) {
return keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0x00), _leaf[treeId][index]));
}
bytes32 v = _node[treeId][level][index];
return v == bytes32(0) ? _zero[level] : v;
}
}
abi
[
{
"type": "constructor",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "registry_",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "contract FinalIdentityRegistry"
}
],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "ACTION_CONFIGURE_TREE",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "ACTION_SEED_COUNTERS",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "ACTION_SET_CHAIN_SOURCE",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "ACTION_SET_CONFIG",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "ACTION_SET_ENDPOINT_SOURCE",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "ACTION_SET_SLOT_KEY_SOURCE",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "ACTION_SET_TREE_WRITER",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "ACTION_SET_TYPED_WRITER",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "BRANCH_BITS",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "BRANCH_CAPACITY",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "BRANCH_CONFIG",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "BRANCH_COUNT",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "BRANCH_DEPTH",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "BRANCH_ENDPOINTS",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "BRANCH_MAIN",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "BRANCH_OWNER_INDEX",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "BRANCH_SLOT_KEYS",
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"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "CAPACITY",
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"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "DEPTH",
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"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "DOMAIN_ACCOUNT_STATE_LEAF",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "DOMAIN_CONFIG_LEAF",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "DOMAIN_OWNER_INDEX_LEAF",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "FOREST_BITS",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "ROUND_DEPTH",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "SLOT_KEY_RING",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "TREE_ACCOUNTS",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "TREE_ALLOWLIST",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "TREE_COUNT",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "TREE_IDENTITY",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "TREE_INTENTS",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "TREE_ORACLE",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "TREE_PHI",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "TREE_SETTLEMENT",
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"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "TREE_VASSET",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "accountKeyFor",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "wallet",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "accountOn",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "leaf",
"type": "tuple",
"internalType": "struct FinalStateTrees.AccountStateLeaf",
"components": [
{
"name": "wallet",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "liveAccess",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "liveTransaction",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "recoveryAccess",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "recoveryTransaction",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "liveKem",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "recoveryKem",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "owner",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "pqEnabled",
"type": "bool",
"internalType": "bool"
},
{
"name": "frozen",
"type": "bool",
"internalType": "bool"
},
{
"name": "deployedChains",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalStateTrees.ChainAccount[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "chainRef",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "account",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
]
},
{
"name": "dormantChains",
"type": "uint32",
"internalType": "uint32"
},
{
"name": "version",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
]
},
{
"name": "chainRef",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
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{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "accountStateLeafHash",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "leaf",
"type": "tuple",
"internalType": "struct FinalStateTrees.AccountStateLeaf",
"components": [
{
"name": "wallet",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "liveAccess",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "liveTransaction",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "recoveryAccess",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "recoveryTransaction",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "liveKem",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "recoveryKem",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "owner",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "pqEnabled",
"type": "bool",
"internalType": "bool"
},
{
"name": "frozen",
"type": "bool",
"internalType": "bool"
},
{
"name": "deployedChains",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalStateTrees.ChainAccount[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "chainRef",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "account",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
]
},
{
"name": "dormantChains",
"type": "uint32",
"internalType": "uint32"
},
{
"name": "version",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
]
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "pure"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "branchProofFor",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "key",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32[]",
"internalType": "bytes32[]"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "branchRoot",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "branch",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "branchSlotsUsed",
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{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "branch",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "chainSource",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "configKey",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "name",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "sub",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "pure"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "configLeafHash",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "key",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "value",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "pure"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "configValue",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "key",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "value",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "present",
"type": "bool",
"internalType": "bool"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "configureTree",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "role",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "k",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "anchorBlock",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "approvals",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalPqQuorum.Approval[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "signature",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
},
{
"name": "seal",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
]
}
],
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},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "emptyRoot",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "level",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "endpointKeyFor",
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{
"name": "endpointId",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
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{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "pure"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "endpointSource",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "identityKeyFor",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "account",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "pure"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "keyAt",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "slot",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
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{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "latestRound",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "which",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "roots",
"type": "bytes32[9]",
"internalType": "bytes32[9]"
},
{
"name": "blockNumber",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "timestamp",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "leafOf",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "key",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "leaf",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "present",
"type": "bool",
"internalType": "bool"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "liveRoot",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "nonce",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "ownerIndexKeyFor",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "owner",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "pure"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "ownerIndexLeafHash",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "owner",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "wallets",
"type": "address[]",
"internalType": "address[]"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "pure"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "proofFor",
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{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "key",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32[]",
"internalType": "bytes32[]"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "publishRound",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "published",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "quorumHealth",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "live",
"type": "uint256[]",
"internalType": "uint256[]"
},
{
"name": "required",
"type": "uint256[]",
"internalType": "uint256[]"
},
{
"name": "ok",
"type": "bool[]",
"internalType": "bool[]"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "registry",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "contract FinalIdentityRegistry"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "rootAt",
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{
"name": "which",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "rootsAt",
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{
"name": "which",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32[9]",
"internalType": "bytes32[9]"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "round",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "roundProofFor",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "which",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "path",
"type": "bytes32[]",
"internalType": "bytes32[]"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "roundRootAt",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "which",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "seedCounters",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "versions",
"type": "uint64[]",
"internalType": "uint64[]"
},
{
"name": "round_",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "anchorBlock",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "approvals",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalPqQuorum.Approval[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "signature",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
},
{
"name": "seal",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
]
}
],
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"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "setAccountStates",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "leaves",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalStateTrees.AccountStateLeaf[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "wallet",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "liveAccess",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "liveTransaction",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "recoveryAccess",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "recoveryTransaction",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "liveKem",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "recoveryKem",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "owner",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "pqEnabled",
"type": "bool",
"internalType": "bool"
},
{
"name": "frozen",
"type": "bool",
"internalType": "bool"
},
{
"name": "deployedChains",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalStateTrees.ChainAccount[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "chainRef",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "account",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
]
},
{
"name": "dormantChains",
"type": "uint32",
"internalType": "uint32"
},
{
"name": "version",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
]
},
{
"name": "anchorBlock",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "approvals",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalPqQuorum.Approval[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "signature",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
},
{
"name": "seal",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
]
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "setAccountStatesAsWriter",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "leaves",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalStateTrees.AccountStateLeaf[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "wallet",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "liveAccess",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "liveTransaction",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "recoveryAccess",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "recoveryTransaction",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "liveKem",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "recoveryKem",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "owner",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "pqEnabled",
"type": "bool",
"internalType": "bool"
},
{
"name": "frozen",
"type": "bool",
"internalType": "bool"
},
{
"name": "deployedChains",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalStateTrees.ChainAccount[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "chainRef",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "account",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
]
},
{
"name": "dormantChains",
"type": "uint32",
"internalType": "uint32"
},
{
"name": "version",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
]
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "setChainSource",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "source",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "anchorBlock",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "approvals",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalPqQuorum.Approval[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "signature",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
},
{
"name": "seal",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
]
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "setConfig",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "keys",
"type": "bytes32[]",
"internalType": "bytes32[]"
},
{
"name": "values",
"type": "bytes32[]",
"internalType": "bytes32[]"
},
{
"name": "anchorBlock",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "approvals",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalPqQuorum.Approval[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "signature",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
},
{
"name": "seal",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
]
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "setEndpointSource",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "source",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "anchorBlock",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "approvals",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalPqQuorum.Approval[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "signature",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
},
{
"name": "seal",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
]
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "setLeaves",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "branch",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "keys",
"type": "bytes32[]",
"internalType": "bytes32[]"
},
{
"name": "leaves",
"type": "bytes32[]",
"internalType": "bytes32[]"
},
{
"name": "anchorBlock",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "approvals",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalPqQuorum.Approval[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "signature",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
},
{
"name": "seal",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
]
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "setLeavesAsWriter",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "branch",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "keys",
"type": "bytes32[]",
"internalType": "bytes32[]"
},
{
"name": "leaves",
"type": "bytes32[]",
"internalType": "bytes32[]"
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "setSlotKeySource",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "source",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "anchorBlock",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "approvals",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalPqQuorum.Approval[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "signature",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
},
{
"name": "seal",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
]
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "setTreeWriter",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "writer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "anchorBlock",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "approvals",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalPqQuorum.Approval[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "signature",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
},
{
"name": "seal",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
]
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "setTypedWriter",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "writer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "anchorBlock",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "approvals",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalPqQuorum.Approval[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "signature",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
},
{
"name": "seal",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
]
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "slotKeyFor",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "member",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "slotIndex",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"stateMutability": "pure"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "slotKeySource",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "slotOf",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "key",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "slotsUsed",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "syncEndpointLeaves",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "endpointIds",
"type": "bytes32[]",
"internalType": "bytes32[]"
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "syncIdentities",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "accounts",
"type": "address[]",
"internalType": "address[]"
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "syncIdentityLeaves",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "accounts",
"type": "address[]",
"internalType": "address[]"
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "syncSlotKeyLeaves",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "member",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "slotIndexes",
"type": "uint64[]",
"internalType": "uint64[]"
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "threshold",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "treeVersion",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "treeWriter",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "typedWriter",
"inputs": [],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "writeTyped",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "keys",
"type": "bytes32[]",
"internalType": "bytes32[]"
},
{
"name": "hashes",
"type": "bytes32[]",
"internalType": "bytes32[]"
},
{
"name": "anchorBlock",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "approvals",
"type": "tuple[]",
"internalType": "struct FinalPqQuorum.Approval[]",
"components": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "signature",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
},
{
"name": "seal",
"type": "bytes",
"internalType": "bytes"
}
]
}
],
"outputs": [],
"stateMutability": "nonpayable"
},
{
"type": "function",
"name": "writerRole",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
],
"outputs": [
{
"name": "",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"stateMutability": "view"
},
{
"type": "event",
"name": "ChainSourceSet",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "source",
"type": "address",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"anonymous": false
},
{
"type": "event",
"name": "ConfigSet",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"indexed": true,
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "key",
"type": "bytes32",
"indexed": true,
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "value",
"type": "bytes32",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
],
"anonymous": false
},
{
"type": "event",
"name": "CountersSeeded",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "round",
"type": "uint64",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "versions",
"type": "uint64[]",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "uint64[]"
}
],
"anonymous": false
},
{
"type": "event",
"name": "EndpointSourceSet",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "source",
"type": "address",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"anonymous": false
},
{
"type": "event",
"name": "LeavesSet",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"indexed": true,
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "count",
"type": "uint256",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "newRoot",
"type": "bytes32",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "treeVersion",
"type": "uint64",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"anonymous": false
},
{
"type": "event",
"name": "RoundPublished",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "round",
"type": "uint64",
"indexed": true,
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "blockNumber",
"type": "uint64",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "timestamp",
"type": "uint64",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "uint64"
}
],
"anonymous": false
},
{
"type": "event",
"name": "SlotKeySourceSet",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "source",
"type": "address",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"anonymous": false
},
{
"type": "event",
"name": "TreeConfigured",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"indexed": true,
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "writerRole",
"type": "uint256",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "threshold",
"type": "uint256",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "uint256"
}
],
"anonymous": false
},
{
"type": "event",
"name": "TreeWriterSet",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"indexed": true,
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "writer",
"type": "address",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"anonymous": false
},
{
"type": "event",
"name": "TypedWriterSet",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "writer",
"type": "address",
"indexed": false,
"internalType": "address"
}
],
"anonymous": false
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "AnchorAhead",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "anchorBlock",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "blockNumber",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "AnchorStale",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "anchorBlock",
"type": "uint64",
"internalType": "uint64"
},
{
"name": "blockNumber",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "BadSeal",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "BadSignature",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "algorithm",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "BranchFull",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "branch",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "BranchMismatch",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "key",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "have",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "want",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "ConfigBranchReserved",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "EndpointSourceUnset",
"inputs": []
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "InvalidChainAccount",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "chainRef",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
},
{
"name": "account",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "LengthMismatch",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "keys",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "leaves",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "NoRounds",
"inputs": []
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "NotAuthorized",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "caller",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "NotFresh",
"inputs": []
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "NothingToPublish",
"inputs": []
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "SignerLacksRole",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "roleMask",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "SignersNotAscending",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "previous",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "next",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "SlotKeySourceUnset",
"inputs": []
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "ThresholdIsZero",
"inputs": []
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "ThresholdNotMet",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "valid",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "required",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "ThresholdUnreachable",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "live",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
},
{
"name": "required",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "TreeNotConfigured",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "TypedTreeOnly",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "UnknownBranch",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "branch",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "UnknownKey",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "key",
"type": "bytes32",
"internalType": "bytes32"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "UnknownTree",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "VersionCountMismatch",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "given",
"type": "uint256",
"internalType": "uint256"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "WriterOnlyTree",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "treeId",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
]
},
{
"type": "error",
"name": "WrongAlgorithm",
"inputs": [
{
"name": "signer",
"type": "address",
"internalType": "address"
},
{
"name": "got",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
},
{
"name": "required",
"type": "uint8",
"internalType": "uint8"
}
]
}
]čtení kontraktu
bytecode · 26,167 bajtů
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Žádný ocas metadat CBOR — tento bytecode byl sestaven s vypnutým cbor_metadata, nastavením, které naše kontrakty fixují kvůli neměnnosti adres CREATE2.
disassemblace (prvních 4,000 op)
| pc | op | operand |
|---|---|---|
| 0000 | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 0002 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0004 | MSTORE | |
| 0005 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0007 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0008 | LT | |
| 0009 | ISZERO | |
| 000a | PUSH2 | 0x0011 |
| 000d | JUMPI | |
| 000e | PUSH0 | |
| 000f | DUP1 | |
| 0010 | REVERT | |
| 0011 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0012 | PUSH0 | |
| 0013 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0014 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 0016 | SHR | |
| 0017 | DUP1 | |
| 0018 | PUSH4 | 0x01e8a3a7 |
| 001d | EQ | |
| 001e | PUSH2 | 0x3629 |
| 0021 | JUMPI | |
| 0022 | DUP1 | |
| 0023 | PUSH4 | 0x02ffb43a |
| 0028 | EQ | |
| 0029 | PUSH2 | 0x35ac |
| 002c | JUMPI | |
| 002d | DUP1 | |
| 002e | PUSH4 | 0x06ff9a01 |
| 0033 | EQ | |
| 0034 | PUSH2 | 0x3248 |
| 0037 | JUMPI | |
| 0038 | DUP1 | |
| 0039 | PUSH4 | 0x07465c21 |
| 003e | EQ | |
| 003f | PUSH2 | 0x3205 |
| 0042 | JUMPI | |
| 0043 | DUP1 | |
| 0044 | PUSH4 | 0x08699369 |
| 0049 | EQ | |
| 004a | PUSH2 | 0x31ca |
| 004d | JUMPI | |
| 004e | DUP1 | |
| 004f | PUSH4 | 0x0acd12b5 |
| 0054 | EQ | |
| 0055 | PUSH2 | 0x314d |
| 0058 | JUMPI | |
| 0059 | DUP1 | |
| 005a | PUSH4 | 0x0b543248 |
| 005f | EQ | |
| 0060 | PUSH2 | 0x3113 |
| 0063 | JUMPI | |
| 0064 | DUP1 | |
| 0065 | PUSH4 | 0x0dc85691 |
| 006a | EQ | |
| 006b | PUSH2 | 0x30f8 |
| 006e | JUMPI | |
| 006f | DUP1 | |
| 0070 | PUSH4 | 0x10229c9b |
| 0075 | EQ | |
| 0076 | PUSH2 | 0x30be |
| 0079 | JUMPI | |
| 007a | DUP1 | |
| 007b | PUSH4 | 0x11cb42a6 |
| 0080 | EQ | |
| 0081 | PUSH2 | 0x3084 |
| 0084 | JUMPI | |
| 0085 | DUP1 | |
| 0086 | PUSH4 | 0x146ca531 |
| 008b | EQ | |
| 008c | PUSH2 | 0x305e |
| 008f | JUMPI | |
| 0090 | DUP1 | |
| 0091 | PUSH4 | 0x158f59b6 |
| 0096 | EQ | |
| 0097 | PUSH2 | 0x3023 |
| 009a | JUMPI | |
| 009b | DUP1 | |
| 009c | PUSH4 | 0x159735ac |
| 00a1 | EQ | |
| 00a2 | PUSH2 | 0x2fe9 |
| 00a5 | JUMPI | |
| 00a6 | DUP1 | |
| 00a7 | PUSH4 | 0x177b99da |
| 00ac | EQ | |
| 00ad | PUSH2 | 0x2fc2 |
| 00b0 | JUMPI | |
| 00b1 | DUP1 | |
| 00b2 | PUSH4 | 0x1bc6dca7 |
| 00b7 | EQ | |
| 00b8 | PUSH2 | 0x2f91 |
| 00bb | JUMPI | |
| 00bc | DUP1 | |
| 00bd | PUSH4 | 0x1c37f8be |
| 00c2 | EQ | |
| 00c3 | PUSH2 | 0x2be6 |
| 00c6 | JUMPI | |
| 00c7 | DUP1 | |
| 00c8 | PUSH4 | 0x1cb78cf6 |
| 00cd | EQ | |
| 00ce | PUSH2 | 0x2b83 |
| 00d1 | JUMPI | |
| 00d2 | DUP1 | |
| 00d3 | PUSH4 | 0x1ed23e25 |
| 00d8 | EQ | |
| 00d9 | PUSH2 | 0x2b45 |
| 00dc | JUMPI | |
| 00dd | DUP1 | |
| 00de | PUSH4 | 0x1ff31495 |
| 00e3 | EQ | |
| 00e4 | PUSH2 | 0x2b2a |
| 00e7 | JUMPI | |
| 00e8 | DUP1 | |
| 00e9 | PUSH4 | 0x21985270 |
| 00ee | EQ | |
| 00ef | PUSH2 | 0x2af0 |
| 00f2 | JUMPI | |
| 00f3 | DUP1 | |
| 00f4 | PUSH4 | 0x2211d9eb |
| 00f9 | EQ | |
| 00fa | PUSH2 | 0x2a73 |
| 00fd | JUMPI | |
| 00fe | DUP1 | |
| 00ff | PUSH4 | 0x227cab87 |
| 0104 | EQ | |
| 0105 | PUSH2 | 0x2995 |
| 0108 | JUMPI | |
| 0109 | DUP1 | |
| 010a | PUSH4 | 0x227d5d7a |
| 010f | EQ | |
| 0110 | PUSH2 | 0x2615 |
| 0113 | JUMPI | |
| 0114 | DUP1 | |
| 0115 | PUSH4 | 0x24a47334 |
| 011a | EQ | |
| 011b | PUSH2 | 0x25ed |
| 011e | JUMPI | |
| 011f | DUP1 | |
| 0120 | PUSH4 | 0x25030f27 |
| 0125 | EQ | |
| 0126 | PUSH2 | 0x25c5 |
| 0129 | JUMPI | |
| 012a | DUP1 | |
| 012b | PUSH4 | 0x2737f33e |
| 0130 | EQ | |
| 0131 | PUSH2 | 0x24a5 |
| 0134 | JUMPI | |
| 0135 | DUP1 | |
| 0136 | PUSH4 | 0x36179208 |
| 013b | EQ | |
| 013c | PUSH2 | 0x246b |
| 013f | JUMPI | |
| 0140 | DUP1 | |
| 0141 | PUSH4 | 0x38902300 |
| 0146 | EQ | |
| 0147 | PUSH2 | 0x244d |
| 014a | JUMPI | |
| 014b | DUP1 | |
| 014c | PUSH4 | 0x3fe9eec5 |
| 0151 | EQ | |
| 0152 | PUSH2 | 0x23d0 |
| 0155 | JUMPI | |
| 0156 | DUP1 | |
| 0157 | PUSH4 | 0x427fbf5a |
| 015c | EQ | |
| 015d | PUSH2 | 0x23b2 |
| 0160 | JUMPI | |
| 0161 | DUP1 | |
| 0162 | PUSH4 | 0x45763154 |
| 0167 | EQ | |
| 0168 | PUSH2 | 0x2394 |
| 016b | JUMPI | |
| 016c | DUP1 | |
| 016d | PUSH4 | 0x4d686726 |
| 0172 | EQ | |
| 0173 | PUSH2 | 0x21a1 |
| 0176 | JUMPI | |
| 0177 | DUP1 | |
| 0178 | PUSH4 | 0x4e4d143c |
| 017d | EQ | |
| 017e | PUSH2 | 0x2163 |
| 0181 | JUMPI | |
| 0182 | DUP1 | |
| 0183 | PUSH4 | 0x4e74a404 |
| 0188 | EQ | |
| 0189 | PUSH2 | 0x211b |
| 018c | JUMPI | |
| 018d | DUP1 | |
| 018e | PUSH4 | 0x563a6c07 |
| 0193 | EQ | |
| 0194 | PUSH2 | 0x2100 |
| 0197 | JUMPI | |
| 0198 | DUP1 | |
| 0199 | PUSH4 | 0x57c45d9c |
| 019e | EQ | |
| 019f | PUSH2 | 0x20d8 |
| 01a2 | JUMPI | |
| 01a3 | DUP1 | |
| 01a4 | PUSH4 | 0x5807879d |
| 01a9 | EQ | |
| 01aa | PUSH2 | 0x209e |
| 01ad | JUMPI | |
| 01ae | DUP1 | |
| 01af | PUSH4 | 0x614a5c34 |
| 01b4 | EQ | |
| 01b5 | PUSH2 | 0x2067 |
| 01b8 | JUMPI | |
| 01b9 | DUP1 | |
| 01ba | PUSH4 | 0x668a0f02 |
| 01bf | EQ | |
| 01c0 | PUSH2 | 0x1fe4 |
| 01c3 | JUMPI | |
| 01c4 | DUP1 | |
| 01c5 | PUSH4 | 0x6a404030 |
| 01ca | EQ | |
| 01cb | PUSH2 | 0x03f7 |
| 01ce | JUMPI | |
| 01cf | DUP1 | |
| 01d0 | PUSH4 | 0x6b6a2682 |
| 01d5 | EQ | |
| 01d6 | PUSH2 | 0x104f |
| 01d9 | JUMPI | |
| 01da | DUP1 | |
| 01db | PUSH4 | 0x6d2e5ca0 |
| 01e0 | EQ | |
| 01e1 | PUSH2 | 0x1faa |
| 01e4 | JUMPI | |
| 01e5 | DUP1 | |
| 01e6 | PUSH4 | 0x7203b807 |
| 01eb | EQ | |
| 01ec | PUSH2 | 0x1b8d |
| 01ef | JUMPI | |
| 01f0 | DUP1 | |
| 01f1 | PUSH4 | 0x76e058a8 |
| 01f6 | EQ | |
| 01f7 | PUSH2 | 0x078d |
| 01fa | JUMPI | |
| 01fb | DUP1 | |
| 01fc | PUSH4 | 0x79fee94a |
| 0201 | EQ | |
| 0202 | PUSH2 | 0x104f |
| 0205 | JUMPI | |
| 0206 | DUP1 | |
| 0207 | PUSH4 | 0x7a9730d7 |
| 020c | EQ | |
| 020d | PUSH2 | 0x1b53 |
| 0210 | JUMPI | |
| 0211 | DUP1 | |
| 0212 | PUSH4 | 0x7b103999 |
| 0217 | EQ | |
| 0218 | PUSH2 | 0x1b0f |
| 021b | JUMPI | |
| 021c | DUP1 | |
| 021d | PUSH4 | 0x7d211cba |
| 0222 | EQ | |
| 0223 | PUSH2 | 0x197f |
| 0226 | JUMPI | |
| 0227 | DUP1 | |
| 0228 | PUSH4 | 0x80d78ea9 |
| 022d | EQ | |
| 022e | PUSH2 | 0x1709 |
| 0231 | JUMPI | |
| 0232 | DUP1 | |
| 0233 | PUSH4 | 0x825c45cd |
| 0238 | EQ | |
| 0239 | PUSH2 | 0x16d7 |
| 023c | JUMPI | |
| 023d | DUP1 | |
| 023e | PUSH4 | 0x82edfbd9 |
| 0243 | EQ | |
| 0244 | PUSH2 | 0x16b4 |
| 0247 | JUMPI | |
| 0248 | DUP1 | |
| 0249 | PUSH4 | 0x87a2d8ae |
| 024e | EQ | |
| 024f | PUSH2 | 0x167a |
| 0252 | JUMPI | |
| 0253 | DUP1 | |
| 0254 | PUSH4 | 0x87bba45c |
| 0259 | EQ | |
| 025a | PUSH2 | 0x1623 |
| 025d | JUMPI | |
| 025e | DUP1 | |
| 025f | PUSH4 | 0x87c28345 |
| 0264 | EQ | |
| 0265 | PUSH2 | 0x1608 |
| 0268 | JUMPI | |
| 0269 | DUP1 | |
| 026a | PUSH4 | 0x89106905 |
| 026f | EQ | |
| 0270 | PUSH2 | 0x1562 |
| 0273 | JUMPI | |
| 0274 | DUP1 | |
| 0275 | PUSH4 | 0x8c3712dc |
| 027a | EQ | |
| 027b | PUSH2 | 0x104f |
| 027e | JUMPI | |
| 027f | DUP1 | |
| 0280 | PUSH4 | 0x8ca9a268 |
| 0285 | EQ | |
| 0286 | PUSH2 | 0x1509 |
| 0289 | JUMPI | |
| 028a | DUP1 | |
| 028b | PUSH4 | 0x8e808c09 |
| 0290 | EQ | |
| 0291 | PUSH2 | 0x14de |
| 0294 | JUMPI | |
| 0295 | DUP1 | |
| 0296 | PUSH4 | 0x915ed0bf |
| 029b | EQ | |
| 029c | PUSH2 | 0x14b6 |
| 029f | JUMPI | |
| 02a0 | DUP1 | |
| 02a1 | PUSH4 | 0x98366e35 |
| 02a6 | EQ | |
| 02a7 | PUSH2 | 0x149b |
| 02aa | JUMPI | |
| 02ab | DUP1 | |
| 02ac | PUSH4 | 0x9ca3c9c4 |
| 02b1 | EQ | |
| 02b2 | PUSH2 | 0x13e7 |
| 02b5 | JUMPI | |
| 02b6 | DUP1 | |
| 02b7 | PUSH4 | 0xa12af04d |
| 02bc | EQ | |
| 02bd | PUSH2 | 0x1054 |
| 02c0 | JUMPI | |
| 02c1 | DUP1 | |
| 02c2 | PUSH4 | 0xa2f2d26a |
| 02c7 | EQ | |
| 02c8 | PUSH2 | 0x104f |
| 02cb | JUMPI | |
| 02cc | DUP1 | |
| 02cd | PUSH4 | 0xa7b0e4d0 |
| 02d2 | EQ | |
| 02d3 | PUSH2 | 0x101a |
| 02d6 | JUMPI | |
| 02d7 | DUP1 | |
| 02d8 | PUSH4 | 0xab50578e |
| 02dd | EQ | |
| 02de | PUSH2 | 0x0e4e |
| 02e1 | JUMPI | |
| 02e2 | DUP1 | |
| 02e3 | PUSH4 | 0xabf1570d |
| 02e8 | EQ | |
| 02e9 | PUSH2 | 0x0d53 |
| 02ec | JUMPI | |
| 02ed | DUP1 | |
| 02ee | PUSH4 | 0xac81af2f |
| 02f3 | EQ | |
| 02f4 | PUSH2 | 0x0cf7 |
| 02f7 | JUMPI | |
| 02f8 | DUP1 | |
| 02f9 | PUSH4 | 0xae1be128 |
| 02fe | EQ | |
| 02ff | PUSH2 | 0x0cbd |
| 0302 | JUMPI | |
| 0303 | DUP1 | |
| 0304 | PUSH4 | 0xb31ec19e |
| 0309 | EQ | |
| 030a | PUSH2 | 0x0b7e |
| 030d | JUMPI | |
| 030e | DUP1 | |
| 030f | PUSH4 | 0xb5635867 |
| 0314 | EQ | |
| 0315 | PUSH2 | 0x0b44 |
| 0318 | JUMPI | |
| 0319 | DUP1 | |
| 031a | PUSH4 | 0xb7e7e92e |
| 031f | EQ | |
| 0320 | PUSH2 | 0x0b3f |
| 0323 | JUMPI | |
| 0324 | DUP1 | |
| 0325 | PUSH4 | 0xbab83782 |
| 032a | EQ | |
| 032b | PUSH2 | 0x0b3f |
| 032e | JUMPI | |
| 032f | DUP1 | |
| 0330 | PUSH4 | 0xc0347686 |
| 0335 | EQ | |
| 0336 | PUSH2 | 0x0b22 |
| 0339 | JUMPI | |
| 033a | DUP1 | |
| 033b | PUSH4 | 0xc161552b |
| 0340 | EQ | |
| 0341 | PUSH2 | 0x090d |
| 0344 | JUMPI | |
| 0345 | DUP1 | |
| 0346 | PUSH4 | 0xc1dac071 |
| 034b | EQ | |
| 034c | PUSH2 | 0x070e |
| 034f | JUMPI | |
| 0350 | DUP1 | |
| 0351 | PUSH4 | 0xc2b9f48e |
| 0356 | EQ | |
| 0357 | PUSH2 | 0x08a6 |
| 035a | JUMPI | |
| 035b | DUP1 | |
| 035c | PUSH4 | 0xc5eeeb39 |
| 0361 | EQ | |
| 0362 | PUSH2 | 0x088b |
| 0365 | JUMPI | |
| 0366 | DUP1 | |
| 0367 | PUSH4 | 0xcf3add5d |
| 036c | EQ | |
| 036d | PUSH2 | 0x0859 |
| 0370 | JUMPI | |
| 0371 | DUP1 | |
| 0372 | PUSH4 | 0xd2430e0e |
| 0377 | EQ | |
| 0378 | PUSH2 | 0x07ad |
| 037b | JUMPI | |
| 037c | DUP1 | |
| 037d | PUSH4 | 0xd5284ee3 |
| 0382 | EQ | |
| 0383 | PUSH2 | 0x0792 |
| 0386 | JUMPI | |
| 0387 | DUP1 | |
| 0388 | PUSH4 | 0xd8dea2bf |
| 038d | EQ | |
| 038e | PUSH2 | 0x078d |
| 0391 | JUMPI | |
| 0392 | DUP1 | |
| 0393 | PUSH4 | 0xe0236d37 |
| 0398 | EQ | |
| 0399 | PUSH2 | 0x0759 |
| 039c | JUMPI | |
| 039d | DUP1 | |
| 039e | PUSH4 | 0xe0b180f7 |
| 03a3 | EQ | |
| 03a4 | PUSH2 | 0x073f |
| 03a7 | JUMPI | |
| 03a8 | DUP1 | |
| 03a9 | PUSH4 | 0xe9750fcf |
| 03ae | EQ | |
| 03af | PUSH2 | 0x0713 |
| 03b2 | JUMPI | |
| 03b3 | DUP1 | |
| 03b4 | PUSH4 | 0xeaff2dda |
| 03b9 | EQ | |
| 03ba | PUSH2 | 0x070e |
| 03bd | JUMPI | |
| 03be | DUP1 | |
| 03bf | PUSH4 | 0xeb75174b |
| 03c4 | EQ | |
| 03c5 | PUSH2 | 0x06f2 |
| 03c8 | JUMPI | |
| 03c9 | DUP1 | |
| 03ca | PUSH4 | 0xec0bb249 |
| 03cf | EQ | |
| 03d0 | PUSH2 | 0x046d |
| 03d3 | JUMPI | |
| 03d4 | DUP1 | |
| 03d5 | PUSH4 | 0xf501cff3 |
| 03da | EQ | |
| 03db | PUSH2 | 0x043b |
| 03de | JUMPI | |
| 03df | DUP1 | |
| 03e0 | PUSH4 | 0xf5951975 |
| 03e5 | EQ | |
| 03e6 | PUSH2 | 0x03fc |
| 03e9 | JUMPI | |
| 03ea | PUSH4 | 0xfd1d0819 |
| 03ef | EQ | |
| 03f0 | PUSH2 | 0x03f7 |
| 03f3 | JUMPI | |
| 03f4 | PUSH0 | |
| 03f5 | DUP1 | |
| 03f6 | REVERT | |
| 03f7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 03f8 | PUSH2 | 0x3d9a |
| 03fb | JUMP | |
| 03fc | JUMPDEST | |
| 03fd | CALLVALUE | |
| 03fe | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0401 | JUMPI | |
| 0402 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0404 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0405 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0407 | NOT | |
| 0408 | ADD | |
| 0409 | SLT | |
| 040a | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 040d | JUMPI | |
| 040e | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 0410 | PUSH2 | 0x0417 |
| 0413 | PUSH2 | 0x3ad7 |
| 0416 | JUMP | |
| 0417 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0418 | AND | |
| 0419 | PUSH0 | |
| 041a | MSTORE | |
| 041b | PUSH1 | 0x2b |
| 041d | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 041f | MSTORE | |
| 0420 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0422 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0424 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0426 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0428 | SHL | |
| 0429 | SUB | |
| 042a | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 042c | PUSH0 | |
| 042d | KECCAK256 | |
| 042e | SLOAD | |
| 042f | AND | |
| 0430 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0432 | MLOAD | |
| 0433 | SWAP1 | |
| 0434 | DUP2 | |
| 0435 | MSTORE | |
| 0436 | RETURN | |
| 0437 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0438 | PUSH0 | |
| 0439 | DUP1 | |
| 043a | REVERT | |
| 043b | JUMPDEST | |
| 043c | CALLVALUE | |
| 043d | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0440 | JUMPI | |
| 0441 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0443 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0444 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0446 | NOT | |
| 0447 | ADD | |
| 0448 | SLT | |
| 0449 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 044c | JUMPI | |
| 044d | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 044f | PUSH2 | 0x0456 |
| 0452 | PUSH2 | 0x3ad7 |
| 0455 | JUMP | |
| 0456 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0457 | AND | |
| 0458 | PUSH0 | |
| 0459 | MSTORE | |
| 045a | PUSH1 | 0x23 |
| 045c | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 045e | MSTORE | |
| 045f | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0461 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0463 | PUSH0 | |
| 0464 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0465 | SLOAD | |
| 0466 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0468 | MLOAD | |
| 0469 | SWAP1 | |
| 046a | DUP2 | |
| 046b | MSTORE | |
| 046c | RETURN | |
| 046d | JUMPDEST | |
| 046e | CALLVALUE | |
| 046f | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0472 | JUMPI | |
| 0473 | PUSH0 | |
| 0474 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0475 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0477 | NOT | |
| 0478 | ADD | |
| 0479 | SLT | |
| 047a | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 047d | JUMPI | |
| 047e | PUSH0 | |
| 047f | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0481 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0482 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 0484 | DUP2 | |
| 0485 | AND | |
| 0486 | PUSH1 | 0x08 |
| 0488 | DUP2 | |
| 0489 | GT | |
| 048a | PUSH2 | 0x06eb |
| 048d | JUMPI | |
| 048e | DUP1 | |
| 048f | PUSH0 | |
| 0490 | MSTORE | |
| 0491 | PUSH1 | 0x27 |
| 0493 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0495 | MSTORE | |
| 0496 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0498 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 049a | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 049c | SHL | |
| 049d | SUB | |
| 049e | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 04a0 | PUSH0 | |
| 04a1 | KECCAK256 | |
| 04a2 | SLOAD | |
| 04a3 | AND | |
| 04a4 | SWAP1 | |
| 04a5 | PUSH0 | |
| 04a6 | MSTORE | |
| 04a7 | PUSH1 | 0x2a |
| 04a9 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 04ab | MSTORE | |
| 04ac | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 04ae | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 04b0 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 04b2 | SHL | |
| 04b3 | SUB | |
| 04b4 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 04b6 | PUSH0 | |
| 04b7 | KECCAK256 | |
| 04b8 | SLOAD | |
| 04b9 | AND | |
| 04ba | SUB | |
| 04bb | PUSH2 | 0x04cc |
| 04be | JUMPI | |
| 04bf | PUSH2 | 0x04c7 |
| 04c2 | SWAP1 | |
| 04c3 | PUSH2 | 0x3feb |
| 04c6 | JUMP | |
| 04c7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 04c8 | PUSH2 | 0x0481 |
| 04cb | JUMP | |
| 04cc | JUMPDEST | |
| 04cd | POP | |
| 04ce | POP | |
| 04cf | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 04d1 | JUMPDEST | |
| 04d2 | ISZERO | |
| 04d3 | PUSH2 | 0x06dc |
| 04d6 | JUMPI | |
| 04d7 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 04d9 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 04db | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 04dd | SHL | |
| 04de | SUB | |
| 04df | PUSH2 | 0x04eb |
| 04e2 | DUP2 | |
| 04e3 | PUSH1 | 0x29 |
| 04e5 | SLOAD | |
| 04e6 | AND | |
| 04e7 | PUSH2 | 0x3e52 |
| 04ea | JUMP | |
| 04eb | JUMPDEST | |
| 04ec | AND | |
| 04ed | DUP1 | |
| 04ee | PUSH0 | |
| 04ef | MSTORE | |
| 04f0 | PUSH1 | 0x28 |
| 04f2 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 04f4 | MSTORE | |
| 04f5 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 04f7 | PUSH0 | |
| 04f8 | KECCAK256 | |
| 04f9 | SWAP1 | |
| 04fa | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 04fc | JUMPDEST | |
| 04fd | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 04ff | DUP2 | |
| 0500 | AND | |
| 0501 | SWAP1 | |
| 0502 | PUSH1 | 0x08 |
| 0504 | DUP3 | |
| 0505 | GT | |
| 0506 | PUSH2 | 0x057e |
| 0509 | JUMPI | |
| 050a | DUP2 | |
| 050b | PUSH2 | 0x0579 |
| 050e | SWAP3 | |
| 050f | PUSH0 | |
| 0510 | MSTORE | |
| 0511 | PUSH1 | 0x26 |
| 0513 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0515 | MSTORE | |
| 0516 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0518 | PUSH0 | |
| 0519 | KECCAK256 | |
| 051a | SLOAD | |
| 051b | PUSH2 | 0x0524 |
| 051e | DUP4 | |
| 051f | DUP8 | |
| 0520 | PUSH2 | 0x4120 |
| 0523 | JUMP | |
| 0524 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0525 | DUP2 | |
| 0526 | SWAP3 | |
| 0527 | SWAP2 | |
| 0528 | SLOAD | |
| 0529 | SWAP1 | |
| 052a | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 052c | SHL | |
| 052d | SWAP2 | |
| 052e | DUP3 | |
| 052f | SHL | |
| 0530 | SWAP2 | |
| 0531 | PUSH0 | |
| 0532 | NOT | |
| 0533 | SWAP1 | |
| 0534 | SHL | |
| 0535 | NOT | |
| 0536 | AND | |
| 0537 | OR | |
| 0538 | SWAP1 | |
| 0539 | SSTORE | |
| 053a | DUP1 | |
| 053b | PUSH0 | |
| 053c | MSTORE | |
| 053d | PUSH1 | 0x27 |
| 053f | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0541 | MSTORE | |
| 0542 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0544 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0546 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0548 | SHL | |
| 0549 | SUB | |
| 054a | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 054c | PUSH0 | |
| 054d | KECCAK256 | |
| 054e | SLOAD | |
| 054f | AND | |
| 0550 | SWAP1 | |
| 0551 | PUSH0 | |
| 0552 | MSTORE | |
| 0553 | PUSH1 | 0x2a |
| 0555 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0557 | MSTORE | |
| 0558 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 055a | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 055c | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 055e | SHL | |
| 055f | SUB | |
| 0560 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0562 | PUSH0 | |
| 0563 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0564 | SWAP2 | |
| 0565 | AND | |
| 0566 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0568 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 056a | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 056c | SHL | |
| 056d | SUB | |
| 056e | NOT | |
| 056f | DUP3 | |
| 0570 | SLOAD | |
| 0571 | AND | |
| 0572 | OR | |
| 0573 | SWAP1 | |
| 0574 | SSTORE | |
| 0575 | PUSH2 | 0x3feb |
| 0578 | JUMP | |
| 0579 | JUMPDEST | |
| 057a | PUSH2 | 0x04fc |
| 057d | JUMP | |
| 057e | JUMPDEST | |
| 057f | POP | |
| 0580 | POP | |
| 0581 | PUSH2 | 0x0591 |
| 0584 | PUSH2 | 0x058c |
| 0587 | DUP4 | |
| 0588 | PUSH2 | 0x404d |
| 058b | JUMP | |
| 058c | JUMPDEST | |
| 058d | PUSH2 | 0x612d |
| 0590 | JUMP | |
| 0591 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0592 | SWAP2 | |
| 0593 | DUP3 | |
| 0594 | MLOAD | |
| 0595 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0596 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0598 | DUP2 | |
| 0599 | GT | |
| 059a | PUSH2 | 0x065e |
| 059d | JUMPI | |
| 059e | POP | |
| 059f | DUP3 | |
| 05a0 | MLOAD | |
| 05a1 | ISZERO | |
| 05a2 | PUSH2 | 0x064a |
| 05a5 | JUMPI | |
| 05a6 | PUSH32 | 0x5a33796ad97fb8cf3289d33093f3deb1797b5bcf1e795e716194046784ca4d3c |
| 05c7 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 05c9 | PUSH1 | 0x0a |
| 05cb | DUP5 | |
| 05cc | SWAP4 | |
| 05cd | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 05cf | DUP1 | |
| 05d0 | SWAP8 | |
| 05d1 | ADD | |
| 05d2 | MLOAD | |
| 05d3 | PUSH1 | 0x09 |
| 05d5 | DUP3 | |
| 05d6 | ADD | |
| 05d7 | SSTORE | |
| 05d8 | ADD | |
| 05d9 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 05db | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 05dd | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 05df | SHL | |
| 05e0 | SUB | |
| 05e1 | DUP1 | |
| 05e2 | NUMBER | |
| 05e3 | AND | |
| 05e4 | AND | |
| 05e5 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 05e7 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 05e9 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 05eb | SHL | |
| 05ec | SUB | |
| 05ed | NOT | |
| 05ee | DUP3 | |
| 05ef | SLOAD | |
| 05f0 | AND | |
| 05f1 | OR | |
| 05f2 | DUP2 | |
| 05f3 | SSTORE | |
| 05f4 | DUP1 | |
| 05f5 | SLOAD | |
| 05f6 | PUSH8 | 0xffffffffffffffff |
| 05ff | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0601 | SHL | |
| 0602 | TIMESTAMP | |
| 0603 | DUP5 | |
| 0604 | SHL | |
| 0605 | AND | |
| 0606 | SWAP1 | |
| 0607 | PUSH8 | 0xffffffffffffffff |
| 0610 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0612 | SHL | |
| 0613 | NOT | |
| 0614 | AND | |
| 0615 | OR | |
| 0616 | DUP2 | |
| 0617 | SSTORE | |
| 0618 | DUP4 | |
| 0619 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 061b | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 061d | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 061f | SHL | |
| 0620 | SUB | |
| 0621 | NOT | |
| 0622 | PUSH1 | 0x29 |
| 0624 | SLOAD | |
| 0625 | AND | |
| 0626 | OR | |
| 0627 | PUSH1 | 0x29 |
| 0629 | SSTORE | |
| 062a | SLOAD | |
| 062b | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 062d | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 062f | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0631 | SHL | |
| 0632 | SUB | |
| 0633 | DUP3 | |
| 0634 | MLOAD | |
| 0635 | SWAP2 | |
| 0636 | DUP2 | |
| 0637 | DUP2 | |
| 0638 | AND | |
| 0639 | DUP4 | |
| 063a | MSTORE | |
| 063b | DUP4 | |
| 063c | SHR | |
| 063d | AND | |
| 063e | DUP7 | |
| 063f | DUP3 | |
| 0640 | ADD | |
| 0641 | MSTORE | |
| 0642 | LOG2 | |
| 0643 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0645 | MLOAD | |
| 0646 | SWAP1 | |
| 0647 | DUP2 | |
| 0648 | MSTORE | |
| 0649 | RETURN | |
| 064a | JUMPDEST | |
| 064b | PUSH4 | 0x4e487b71 |
| 0650 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 0652 | SHL | |
| 0653 | PUSH0 | |
| 0654 | MSTORE | |
| 0655 | PUSH1 | 0x32 |
| 0657 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0659 | MSTORE | |
| 065a | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 065c | PUSH0 | |
| 065d | REVERT | |
| 065e | JUMPDEST | |
| 065f | PUSH0 | |
| 0660 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0661 | DUP2 | |
| 0662 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0664 | SHR | |
| 0665 | DUP2 | |
| 0666 | LT | |
| 0667 | PUSH2 | 0x0673 |
| 066a | JUMPI | |
| 066b | POP | |
| 066c | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 066e | SHR | |
| 066f | PUSH2 | 0x0595 |
| 0672 | JUMP | |
| 0673 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0674 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0676 | DUP2 | |
| 0677 | SWAP1 | |
| 0678 | SHL | |
| 0679 | SWAP1 | |
| 067a | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 067c | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 067e | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 0680 | SHL | |
| 0681 | SUB | |
| 0682 | DUP2 | |
| 0683 | AND | |
| 0684 | DUP2 | |
| 0685 | SUB | |
| 0686 | PUSH2 | 0x06c8 |
| 0689 | JUMPI | |
| 068a | PUSH2 | 0x0693 |
| 068d | DUP3 | |
| 068e | DUP8 | |
| 068f | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 0692 | JUMP | |
| 0693 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0694 | MLOAD | |
| 0695 | SWAP2 | |
| 0696 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0698 | DUP2 | |
| 0699 | ADD | |
| 069a | DUP1 | |
| 069b | SWAP2 | |
| 069c | GT | |
| 069d | PUSH2 | 0x06c8 |
| 06a0 | JUMPI | |
| 06a1 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 06a3 | SWAP3 | |
| 06a4 | PUSH2 | 0x06b0 |
| 06a7 | PUSH2 | 0x06b7 |
| 06aa | SWAP3 | |
| 06ab | DUP10 | |
| 06ac | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 06af | JUMP | |
| 06b0 | JUMPDEST | |
| 06b1 | MLOAD | |
| 06b2 | SWAP1 | |
| 06b3 | PUSH2 | 0x61a9 |
| 06b6 | JUMP | |
| 06b7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 06b8 | PUSH2 | 0x06c1 |
| 06bb | DUP3 | |
| 06bc | DUP9 | |
| 06bd | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 06c0 | JUMP | |
| 06c1 | JUMPDEST | |
| 06c2 | MSTORE | |
| 06c3 | ADD | |
| 06c4 | PUSH2 | 0x0660 |
| 06c7 | JUMP | |
| 06c8 | JUMPDEST | |
| 06c9 | PUSH4 | 0x4e487b71 |
| 06ce | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 06d0 | SHL | |
| 06d1 | PUSH0 | |
| 06d2 | MSTORE | |
| 06d3 | PUSH1 | 0x11 |
| 06d5 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 06d7 | MSTORE | |
| 06d8 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 06da | PUSH0 | |
| 06db | REVERT | |
| 06dc | JUMPDEST | |
| 06dd | PUSH4 | 0x0eba0e1b |
| 06e2 | PUSH1 | 0xe2 |
| 06e4 | SHL | |
| 06e5 | PUSH0 | |
| 06e6 | MSTORE | |
| 06e7 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 06e9 | PUSH0 | |
| 06ea | REVERT | |
| 06eb | JUMPDEST | |
| 06ec | POP | |
| 06ed | POP | |
| 06ee | PUSH2 | 0x04d1 |
| 06f1 | JUMP | |
| 06f2 | JUMPDEST | |
| 06f3 | CALLVALUE | |
| 06f4 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 06f7 | JUMPI | |
| 06f8 | PUSH0 | |
| 06f9 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 06fa | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 06fc | NOT | |
| 06fd | ADD | |
| 06fe | SLT | |
| 06ff | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0702 | JUMPI | |
| 0703 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0705 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0707 | MLOAD | |
| 0708 | PUSH2 | 0x0400 |
| 070b | DUP2 | |
| 070c | MSTORE | |
| 070d | RETURN | |
| 070e | JUMPDEST | |
| 070f | PUSH2 | 0x3e13 |
| 0712 | JUMP | |
| 0713 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0714 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0715 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0718 | JUMPI | |
| 0719 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 071b | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 071c | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 071e | NOT | |
| 071f | ADD | |
| 0720 | SLT | |
| 0721 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0724 | JUMPI | |
| 0725 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0727 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0728 | PUSH1 | 0x1d |
| 072a | DUP2 | |
| 072b | LT | |
| 072c | ISZERO | |
| 072d | PUSH2 | 0x064a |
| 0730 | JUMPI | |
| 0731 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0733 | SWAP1 | |
| 0734 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0736 | ADD | |
| 0737 | SLOAD | |
| 0738 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 073a | MLOAD | |
| 073b | SWAP1 | |
| 073c | DUP2 | |
| 073d | MSTORE | |
| 073e | RETURN | |
| 073f | JUMPDEST | |
| 0740 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0741 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0744 | JUMPI | |
| 0745 | PUSH0 | |
| 0746 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0747 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0749 | NOT | |
| 074a | ADD | |
| 074b | SLT | |
| 074c | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 074f | JUMPI | |
| 0750 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0752 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0754 | MLOAD | |
| 0755 | PUSH0 | |
| 0756 | DUP2 | |
| 0757 | MSTORE | |
| 0758 | RETURN | |
| 0759 | JUMPDEST | |
| 075a | CALLVALUE | |
| 075b | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 075e | JUMPI | |
| 075f | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0761 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0762 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0764 | NOT | |
| 0765 | ADD | |
| 0766 | SLT | |
| 0767 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 076a | JUMPI | |
| 076b | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 076d | PUSH2 | 0x0785 |
| 0770 | PUSH2 | 0x0777 |
| 0773 | PUSH2 | 0x39eb |
| 0776 | JUMP | |
| 0777 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0778 | PUSH2 | 0x077f |
| 077b | PUSH2 | 0x3a57 |
| 077e | JUMP | |
| 077f | JUMPDEST | |
| 0780 | SWAP1 | |
| 0781 | PUSH2 | 0x43e4 |
| 0784 | JUMP | |
| 0785 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0786 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0788 | MLOAD | |
| 0789 | SWAP1 | |
| 078a | DUP2 | |
| 078b | MSTORE | |
| 078c | RETURN | |
| 078d | JUMPDEST | |
| 078e | PUSH2 | 0x3dd0 |
| 0791 | JUMP | |
| 0792 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0793 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0794 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0797 | JUMPI | |
| 0798 | PUSH0 | |
| 0799 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 079a | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 079c | NOT | |
| 079d | ADD | |
| 079e | SLT | |
| 079f | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 07a2 | JUMPI | |
| 07a3 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 07a5 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 07a7 | MLOAD | |
| 07a8 | PUSH1 | 0x14 |
| 07aa | DUP2 | |
| 07ab | MSTORE | |
| 07ac | RETURN | |
| 07ad | JUMPDEST | |
| 07ae | CALLVALUE | |
| 07af | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 07b2 | JUMPI | |
| 07b3 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 07b5 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 07b6 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 07b8 | NOT | |
| 07b9 | ADD | |
| 07ba | SLT | |
| 07bb | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 07be | JUMPI | |
| 07bf | PUSH2 | 0x07c6 |
| 07c2 | PUSH2 | 0x3ad7 |
| 07c5 | JUMP | |
| 07c6 | JUMPDEST | |
| 07c7 | PUSH2 | 0x07cf |
| 07ca | DUP2 | |
| 07cb | PUSH2 | 0x5f46 |
| 07ce | JUMP | |
| 07cf | JUMPDEST | |
| 07d0 | PUSH2 | 0x07db |
| 07d3 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 07d5 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 07d6 | DUP3 | |
| 07d7 | PUSH2 | 0x3e84 |
| 07da | JUMP | |
| 07db | JUMPDEST | |
| 07dc | SWAP1 | |
| 07dd | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 07df | MLOAD | |
| 07e0 | SWAP2 | |
| 07e1 | PUSH2 | 0x0320 |
| 07e4 | PUSH2 | 0x07ed |
| 07e7 | DUP2 | |
| 07e8 | DUP6 | |
| 07e9 | PUSH2 | 0x3b3c |
| 07ec | JUMP | |
| 07ed | JUMPDEST | |
| 07ee | PUSH1 | 0x18 |
| 07f0 | DUP5 | |
| 07f1 | MSTORE | |
| 07f2 | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 07f4 | NOT | |
| 07f5 | ADD | |
| 07f6 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 07f7 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 07f9 | DUP6 | |
| 07fa | ADD | |
| 07fb | CALLDATACOPY | |
| 07fc | PUSH0 | |
| 07fd | SWAP1 | |
| 07fe | JUMPDEST | |
| 07ff | PUSH1 | 0x18 |
| 0801 | DUP3 | |
| 0802 | LT | |
| 0803 | PUSH2 | 0x0820 |
| 0806 | JUMPI | |
| 0807 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0809 | MLOAD | |
| 080a | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 080c | DUP1 | |
| 080d | DUP3 | |
| 080e | MSTORE | |
| 080f | DUP2 | |
| 0810 | SWAP1 | |
| 0811 | PUSH2 | 0x081c |
| 0814 | SWAP1 | |
| 0815 | DUP3 | |
| 0816 | ADD | |
| 0817 | DUP8 | |
| 0818 | PUSH2 | 0x3d40 |
| 081b | JUMP | |
| 081c | JUMPDEST | |
| 081d | SUB | |
| 081e | SWAP1 | |
| 081f | RETURN | |
| 0820 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0821 | DUP1 | |
| 0822 | PUSH2 | 0x0830 |
| 0825 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0827 | DUP1 | |
| 0828 | SWAP4 | |
| 0829 | XOR | |
| 082a | DUP5 | |
| 082b | DUP7 | |
| 082c | PUSH2 | 0x5f96 |
| 082f | JUMP | |
| 0830 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0831 | PUSH2 | 0x083a |
| 0834 | DUP5 | |
| 0835 | DUP8 | |
| 0836 | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 0839 | JUMP | |
| 083a | JUMPDEST | |
| 083b | MSTORE | |
| 083c | DUP2 | |
| 083d | SHR | |
| 083e | SWAP2 | |
| 083f | ADD | |
| 0840 | SWAP1 | |
| 0841 | PUSH2 | 0x07fe |
| 0844 | JUMP | |
| 0845 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0846 | PUSH4 | 0x4e487b71 |
| 084b | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 084d | SHL | |
| 084e | PUSH0 | |
| 084f | MSTORE | |
| 0850 | PUSH1 | 0x41 |
| 0852 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0854 | MSTORE | |
| 0855 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0857 | PUSH0 | |
| 0858 | REVERT | |
| 0859 | JUMPDEST | |
| 085a | CALLVALUE | |
| 085b | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 085e | JUMPI | |
| 085f | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0861 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0862 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0864 | NOT | |
| 0865 | ADD | |
| 0866 | SLT | |
| 0867 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 086a | JUMPI | |
| 086b | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 086d | PUSH2 | 0x0874 |
| 0870 | PUSH2 | 0x3ad7 |
| 0873 | JUMP | |
| 0874 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0875 | AND | |
| 0876 | PUSH0 | |
| 0877 | MSTORE | |
| 0878 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 087a | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 087c | MSTORE | |
| 087d | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 087f | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0881 | PUSH0 | |
| 0882 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0883 | SLOAD | |
| 0884 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0886 | MLOAD | |
| 0887 | SWAP1 | |
| 0888 | DUP2 | |
| 0889 | MSTORE | |
| 088a | RETURN | |
| 088b | JUMPDEST | |
| 088c | CALLVALUE | |
| 088d | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0890 | JUMPI | |
| 0891 | PUSH0 | |
| 0892 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0893 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0895 | NOT | |
| 0896 | ADD | |
| 0897 | SLT | |
| 0898 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 089b | JUMPI | |
| 089c | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 089e | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 08a0 | MLOAD | |
| 08a1 | PUSH1 | 0x1c |
| 08a3 | DUP2 | |
| 08a4 | MSTORE | |
| 08a5 | RETURN | |
| 08a6 | JUMPDEST | |
| 08a7 | CALLVALUE | |
| 08a8 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 08ab | JUMPI | |
| 08ac | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 08ae | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 08af | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 08b1 | NOT | |
| 08b2 | ADD | |
| 08b3 | SLT | |
| 08b4 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 08b7 | JUMPI | |
| 08b8 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 08ba | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 08bc | MLOAD | |
| 08bd | DUP2 | |
| 08be | DUP2 | |
| 08bf | ADD | |
| 08c0 | SWAP1 | |
| 08c1 | PUSH32 | 0xf12bce0649327409848ceec32acf20a7e21971869cbf30f9d92357bbe85565b7 |
| 08e2 | DUP3 | |
| 08e3 | MSTORE | |
| 08e4 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 08e6 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 08e7 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 08e9 | DUP3 | |
| 08ea | ADD | |
| 08eb | MSTORE | |
| 08ec | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 08ee | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 08ef | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 08f1 | DUP3 | |
| 08f2 | ADD | |
| 08f3 | MSTORE | |
| 08f4 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 08f6 | DUP2 | |
| 08f7 | MSTORE | |
| 08f8 | PUSH2 | 0x0902 |
| 08fb | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 08fd | DUP3 | |
| 08fe | PUSH2 | 0x3b3c |
| 0901 | JUMP | |
| 0902 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0903 | MLOAD | |
| 0904 | SWAP1 | |
| 0905 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0906 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0908 | MLOAD | |
| 0909 | SWAP1 | |
| 090a | DUP2 | |
| 090b | MSTORE | |
| 090c | RETURN | |
| 090d | JUMPDEST | |
| 090e | CALLVALUE | |
| 090f | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0912 | JUMPI | |
| 0913 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 0915 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0916 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0918 | NOT | |
| 0919 | ADD | |
| 091a | SLT | |
| 091b | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 091e | JUMPI | |
| 091f | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0921 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0922 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0924 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0926 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0928 | SHL | |
| 0929 | SUB | |
| 092a | DUP2 | |
| 092b | GT | |
| 092c | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 092f | JUMPI | |
| 0930 | PUSH2 | 0x093d |
| 0933 | SWAP1 | |
| 0934 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0935 | SWAP1 | |
| 0936 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0938 | ADD | |
| 0939 | PUSH2 | 0x39bb |
| 093c | JUMP | |
| 093d | JUMPDEST | |
| 093e | SWAP1 | |
| 093f | PUSH2 | 0x0946 |
| 0942 | PUSH2 | 0x3a57 |
| 0945 | JUMP | |
| 0946 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0947 | SWAP1 | |
| 0948 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 094a | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 094b | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 094d | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 094f | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0951 | SHL | |
| 0952 | SUB | |
| 0953 | DUP2 | |
| 0954 | GT | |
| 0955 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0958 | JUMPI | |
| 0959 | PUSH2 | 0x0966 |
| 095c | SWAP1 | |
| 095d | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 095e | SWAP1 | |
| 095f | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0961 | ADD | |
| 0962 | PUSH2 | 0x39bb |
| 0965 | JUMP | |
| 0966 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0967 | SWAP1 | |
| 0968 | SWAP3 | |
| 0969 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 096b | PUSH0 | |
| 096c | MSTORE | |
| 096d | PUSH0 | |
| 096e | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0970 | MSTORE | |
| 0971 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0973 | PUSH0 | |
| 0974 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0975 | SLOAD | |
| 0976 | DUP1 | |
| 0977 | ISZERO | |
| 0978 | PUSH2 | 0x0b0e |
| 097b | JUMPI | |
| 097c | PUSH2 | 0x0984 |
| 097f | DUP7 | |
| 0980 | PUSH2 | 0x3fb9 |
| 0983 | JUMP | |
| 0984 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0985 | SWAP5 | |
| 0986 | PUSH2 | 0x098e |
| 0989 | DUP8 | |
| 098a | PUSH2 | 0x3fb9 |
| 098d | JUMP | |
| 098e | JUMPDEST | |
| 098f | SWAP5 | |
| 0990 | PUSH0 | |
| 0991 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0992 | DUP9 | |
| 0993 | DUP2 | |
| 0994 | LT | |
| 0995 | PUSH2 | 0x0ab8 |
| 0998 | JUMPI | |
| 0999 | POP | |
| 099a | POP | |
| 099b | SWAP2 | |
| 099c | PUSH2 | 0x0a50 |
| 099f | SWAP2 | |
| 09a0 | PUSH2 | 0x0a56 |
| 09a3 | SWAP5 | |
| 09a4 | SWAP4 | |
| 09a5 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 09a7 | PUSH0 | |
| 09a8 | MSTORE | |
| 09a9 | PUSH1 | 0x2b |
| 09ab | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 09ad | MSTORE | |
| 09ae | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 09b0 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 09b2 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 09b4 | SHL | |
| 09b5 | SUB | |
| 09b6 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 09b8 | PUSH0 | |
| 09b9 | KECCAK256 | |
| 09ba | SLOAD | |
| 09bb | AND | |
| 09bc | SWAP5 | |
| 09bd | PUSH2 | 0x0a1a |
| 09c0 | DUP7 | |
| 09c1 | PUSH2 | 0x09f0 |
| 09c4 | PUSH2 | 0x0a10 |
| 09c7 | DUP13 | |
| 09c8 | PUSH2 | 0x0a02 |
| 09cb | DUP14 | |
| 09cc | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 09ce | MLOAD | |
| 09cf | SWAP5 | |
| 09d0 | DUP6 | |
| 09d1 | SWAP4 | |
| 09d2 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 09d4 | DUP6 | |
| 09d5 | ADD | |
| 09d6 | SWAP8 | |
| 09d7 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 09d9 | DUP10 | |
| 09da | MSTORE | |
| 09db | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 09dd | DUP7 | |
| 09de | ADD | |
| 09df | MSTORE | |
| 09e0 | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 09e2 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 09e4 | DUP7 | |
| 09e5 | ADD | |
| 09e6 | MSTORE | |
| 09e7 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 09e9 | DUP6 | |
| 09ea | ADD | |
| 09eb | SWAP1 | |
| 09ec | PUSH2 | 0x3d40 |
| 09ef | JUMP | |
| 09f0 | JUMPDEST | |
| 09f1 | DUP4 | |
| 09f2 | DUP2 | |
| 09f3 | SUB | |
| 09f4 | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 09f6 | NOT | |
| 09f7 | ADD | |
| 09f8 | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 09fa | DUP6 | |
| 09fb | ADD | |
| 09fc | MSTORE | |
| 09fd | SWAP1 | |
| 09fe | PUSH2 | 0x3d40 |
| 0a01 | JUMP | |
| 0a02 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a03 | SUB | |
| 0a04 | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 0a06 | NOT | |
| 0a07 | DUP2 | |
| 0a08 | ADD | |
| 0a09 | DUP4 | |
| 0a0a | MSTORE | |
| 0a0b | DUP3 | |
| 0a0c | PUSH2 | 0x3b3c |
| 0a0f | JUMP | |
| 0a10 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a11 | MLOAD | |
| 0a12 | SWAP1 | |
| 0a13 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0a14 | DUP6 | |
| 0a15 | ADDRESS | |
| 0a16 | PUSH2 | 0x5a89 |
| 0a19 | JUMP | |
| 0a1a | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a1b | SWAP1 | |
| 0a1c | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0a1e | PUSH0 | |
| 0a1f | MSTORE | |
| 0a20 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0a22 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0a24 | MSTORE | |
| 0a25 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0a27 | PUSH0 | |
| 0a28 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0a29 | SLOAD | |
| 0a2a | SWAP3 | |
| 0a2b | PUSH32 | 0x000000000000000000000000a2e71fc2fb02d1ce93aa958e56cab83d26f3bfa6 |
| 0a4c | PUSH2 | 0x5dac |
| 0a4f | JUMP | |
| 0a50 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a51 | POP | |
| 0a52 | PUSH2 | 0x3e52 |
| 0a55 | JUMP | |
| 0a56 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a57 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0a59 | PUSH0 | |
| 0a5a | MSTORE | |
| 0a5b | PUSH1 | 0x2b |
| 0a5d | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0a5f | MSTORE | |
| 0a60 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0a62 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0a64 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0a66 | SHL | |
| 0a67 | SUB | |
| 0a68 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0a6a | PUSH0 | |
| 0a6b | KECCAK256 | |
| 0a6c | SWAP2 | |
| 0a6d | AND | |
| 0a6e | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0a70 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0a72 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0a74 | SHL | |
| 0a75 | SUB | |
| 0a76 | NOT | |
| 0a77 | DUP3 | |
| 0a78 | SLOAD | |
| 0a79 | AND | |
| 0a7a | OR | |
| 0a7b | SWAP1 | |
| 0a7c | SSTORE | |
| 0a7d | PUSH0 | |
| 0a7e | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a7f | DUP4 | |
| 0a80 | DUP2 | |
| 0a81 | LT | |
| 0a82 | PUSH2 | 0x0a90 |
| 0a85 | JUMPI | |
| 0a86 | PUSH2 | 0x0a8e |
| 0a89 | DUP5 | |
| 0a8a | PUSH2 | 0x4951 |
| 0a8d | JUMP | |
| 0a8e | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a8f | STOP | |
| 0a90 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0a91 | DUP1 | |
| 0a92 | PUSH2 | 0x0ab2 |
| 0a95 | PUSH2 | 0x0aa0 |
| 0a98 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0a9a | SWAP4 | |
| 0a9b | DUP7 | |
| 0a9c | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 0a9f | JUMP | |
| 0aa0 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0aa1 | MLOAD | |
| 0aa2 | PUSH2 | 0x0aab |
| 0aa5 | DUP4 | |
| 0aa6 | DUP7 | |
| 0aa7 | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 0aaa | JUMP | |
| 0aab | JUMPDEST | |
| 0aac | MLOAD | |
| 0aad | SWAP1 | |
| 0aae | PUSH2 | 0x4436 |
| 0ab1 | JUMP | |
| 0ab2 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0ab3 | ADD | |
| 0ab4 | PUSH2 | 0x0a7e |
| 0ab7 | JUMP | |
| 0ab8 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0ab9 | DUP1 | |
| 0aba | PUSH2 | 0x0ad6 |
| 0abd | PUSH2 | 0x0ad1 |
| 0ac0 | PUSH2 | 0x0acc |
| 0ac3 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0ac5 | SWAP5 | |
| 0ac6 | DUP14 | |
| 0ac7 | DUP8 | |
| 0ac8 | PUSH2 | 0x417d |
| 0acb | JUMP | |
| 0acc | JUMPDEST | |
| 0acd | PUSH2 | 0x3e3e |
| 0ad0 | JUMP | |
| 0ad1 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0ad2 | PUSH2 | 0x3f70 |
| 0ad5 | JUMP | |
| 0ad6 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0ad7 | PUSH2 | 0x0ae0 |
| 0ada | DUP3 | |
| 0adb | DUP12 | |
| 0adc | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 0adf | JUMP | |
| 0ae0 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0ae1 | MSTORE | |
| 0ae2 | PUSH2 | 0x0afd |
| 0ae5 | PUSH2 | 0x0af8 |
| 0ae8 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0ae9 | PUSH2 | 0x0af3 |
| 0aec | DUP5 | |
| 0aed | DUP15 | |
| 0aee | DUP9 | |
| 0aef | PUSH2 | 0x417d |
| 0af2 | JUMP | |
| 0af3 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0af4 | PUSH2 | 0x3bde |
| 0af7 | JUMP | |
| 0af8 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0af9 | PUSH2 | 0x41a0 |
| 0afc | JUMP | |
| 0afd | JUMPDEST | |
| 0afe | PUSH2 | 0x0b07 |
| 0b01 | DUP3 | |
| 0b02 | DUP11 | |
| 0b03 | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 0b06 | JUMP | |
| 0b07 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0b08 | MSTORE | |
| 0b09 | ADD | |
| 0b0a | PUSH2 | 0x0991 |
| 0b0d | JUMP | |
| 0b0e | JUMPDEST | |
| 0b0f | PUSH4 | 0x47c987b5 |
| 0b14 | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 0b16 | SHL | |
| 0b17 | PUSH0 | |
| 0b18 | MSTORE | |
| 0b19 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0b1b | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0b1d | MSTORE | |
| 0b1e | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0b20 | PUSH0 | |
| 0b21 | REVERT | |
| 0b22 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0b23 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0b24 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0b27 | JUMPI | |
| 0b28 | PUSH0 | |
| 0b29 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0b2a | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0b2c | NOT | |
| 0b2d | ADD | |
| 0b2e | SLT | |
| 0b2f | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0b32 | JUMPI | |
| 0b33 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0b35 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0b37 | MLOAD | |
| 0b38 | PUSH3 | 0x100000 |
| 0b3c | DUP2 | |
| 0b3d | MSTORE | |
| 0b3e | RETURN | |
| 0b3f | JUMPDEST | |
| 0b40 | PUSH2 | 0x3deb |
| 0b43 | JUMP | |
| 0b44 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0b45 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0b46 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0b49 | JUMPI | |
| 0b4a | PUSH0 | |
| 0b4b | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0b4c | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0b4e | NOT | |
| 0b4f | ADD | |
| 0b50 | SLT | |
| 0b51 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0b54 | JUMPI | |
| 0b55 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0b57 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0b59 | MLOAD | |
| 0b5a | PUSH32 | 0xb3b4169a40f71a0b1b279bcd6443676c80bdb4ebe0b1db4478b6879321174391 |
| 0b7b | DUP2 | |
| 0b7c | MSTORE | |
| 0b7d | RETURN | |
| 0b7e | JUMPDEST | |
| 0b7f | CALLVALUE | |
| 0b80 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0b83 | JUMPI | |
| 0b84 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0b86 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0b87 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0b89 | NOT | |
| 0b8a | ADD | |
| 0b8b | SLT | |
| 0b8c | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0b8f | JUMPI | |
| 0b90 | PUSH2 | 0x0b97 |
| 0b93 | PUSH2 | 0x3a2b |
| 0b96 | JUMP | |
| 0b97 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0b98 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0b9a | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0b9c | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0b9e | SHL | |
| 0b9f | SUB | |
| 0ba0 | PUSH2 | 0x0ba7 |
| 0ba3 | PUSH2 | 0x3ae7 |
| 0ba6 | JUMP | |
| 0ba7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0ba8 | SWAP2 | |
| 0ba9 | PUSH2 | 0x0bb1 |
| 0bac | DUP4 | |
| 0bad | PUSH2 | 0x5f46 |
| 0bb0 | JUMP | |
| 0bb1 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0bb2 | AND | |
| 0bb3 | DUP1 | |
| 0bb4 | ISZERO | |
| 0bb5 | DUP1 | |
| 0bb6 | ISZERO | |
| 0bb7 | PUSH2 | 0x0ca9 |
| 0bba | JUMPI | |
| 0bbb | JUMPDEST | |
| 0bbc | PUSH2 | 0x0c9a |
| 0bbf | JUMPI | |
| 0bc0 | PUSH0 | |
| 0bc1 | MSTORE | |
| 0bc2 | PUSH1 | 0x28 |
| 0bc4 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0bc6 | MSTORE | |
| 0bc7 | PUSH2 | 0x0bd5 |
| 0bca | PUSH2 | 0x058c |
| 0bcd | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0bcf | PUSH0 | |
| 0bd0 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0bd1 | PUSH2 | 0x404d |
| 0bd4 | JUMP | |
| 0bd5 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0bd6 | SWAP1 | |
| 0bd7 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 0bd9 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0bdb | MLOAD | |
| 0bdc | SWAP2 | |
| 0bdd | PUSH2 | 0x0be7 |
| 0be0 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0be2 | DUP5 | |
| 0be3 | PUSH2 | 0x3b3c |
| 0be6 | JUMP | |
| 0be7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0be8 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0bea | DUP4 | |
| 0beb | MSTORE | |
| 0bec | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 0bee | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0bef | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0bf1 | DUP6 | |
| 0bf2 | ADD | |
| 0bf3 | CALLDATACOPY | |
| 0bf4 | AND | |
| 0bf5 | DUP3 | |
| 0bf6 | MLOAD | |
| 0bf7 | PUSH0 | |
| 0bf8 | SWAP1 | |
| 0bf9 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0bfa | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0bfc | DUP3 | |
| 0bfd | LT | |
| 0bfe | PUSH2 | 0x0c17 |
| 0c01 | JUMPI | |
| 0c02 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0c04 | MLOAD | |
| 0c05 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0c07 | DUP1 | |
| 0c08 | DUP3 | |
| 0c09 | MSTORE | |
| 0c0a | DUP2 | |
| 0c0b | SWAP1 | |
| 0c0c | PUSH2 | 0x081c |
| 0c0f | SWAP1 | |
| 0c10 | DUP3 | |
| 0c11 | ADD | |
| 0c12 | DUP8 | |
| 0c13 | PUSH2 | 0x3d40 |
| 0c16 | JUMP | |
| 0c17 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c18 | PUSH2 | 0x0c24 |
| 0c1b | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0c1d | DUP5 | |
| 0c1e | XOR | |
| 0c1f | DUP7 | |
| 0c20 | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 0c23 | JUMP | |
| 0c24 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c25 | MLOAD | |
| 0c26 | PUSH2 | 0x0c2f |
| 0c29 | DUP4 | |
| 0c2a | DUP7 | |
| 0c2b | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 0c2e | JUMP | |
| 0c2f | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c30 | MSTORE | |
| 0c31 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0c33 | SHR | |
| 0c34 | SWAP2 | |
| 0c35 | PUSH0 | |
| 0c36 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c37 | DUP4 | |
| 0c38 | DUP2 | |
| 0c39 | LT | |
| 0c3a | PUSH2 | 0x0c4c |
| 0c3d | JUMPI | |
| 0c3e | POP | |
| 0c3f | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0c41 | SWAP1 | |
| 0c42 | DUP2 | |
| 0c43 | SHR | |
| 0c44 | SWAP2 | |
| 0c45 | ADD | |
| 0c46 | SWAP1 | |
| 0c47 | SWAP2 | |
| 0c48 | PUSH2 | 0x0bf9 |
| 0c4b | JUMP | |
| 0c4c | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c4d | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0c4f | DUP2 | |
| 0c50 | SWAP1 | |
| 0c51 | SHL | |
| 0c52 | SWAP1 | |
| 0c53 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0c55 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0c57 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 0c59 | SHL | |
| 0c5a | SUB | |
| 0c5b | DUP2 | |
| 0c5c | AND | |
| 0c5d | DUP2 | |
| 0c5e | SUB | |
| 0c5f | PUSH2 | 0x06c8 |
| 0c62 | JUMPI | |
| 0c63 | PUSH2 | 0x0c6c |
| 0c66 | DUP3 | |
| 0c67 | DUP9 | |
| 0c68 | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 0c6b | JUMP | |
| 0c6c | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c6d | MLOAD | |
| 0c6e | SWAP2 | |
| 0c6f | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0c71 | DUP2 | |
| 0c72 | ADD | |
| 0c73 | DUP1 | |
| 0c74 | SWAP2 | |
| 0c75 | GT | |
| 0c76 | PUSH2 | 0x06c8 |
| 0c79 | JUMPI | |
| 0c7a | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0c7c | SWAP3 | |
| 0c7d | PUSH2 | 0x06b0 |
| 0c80 | PUSH2 | 0x0c89 |
| 0c83 | SWAP3 | |
| 0c84 | DUP11 | |
| 0c85 | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 0c88 | JUMP | |
| 0c89 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c8a | PUSH2 | 0x0c93 |
| 0c8d | DUP3 | |
| 0c8e | DUP10 | |
| 0c8f | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 0c92 | JUMP | |
| 0c93 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c94 | MSTORE | |
| 0c95 | ADD | |
| 0c96 | PUSH2 | 0x0c36 |
| 0c99 | JUMP | |
| 0c9a | JUMPDEST | |
| 0c9b | PUSH4 | 0x12c6ca05 |
| 0ca0 | PUSH1 | 0xe2 |
| 0ca2 | SHL | |
| 0ca3 | PUSH0 | |
| 0ca4 | MSTORE | |
| 0ca5 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0ca7 | PUSH0 | |
| 0ca8 | REVERT | |
| 0ca9 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0caa | POP | |
| 0cab | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0cad | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0caf | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0cb1 | SHL | |
| 0cb2 | SUB | |
| 0cb3 | PUSH1 | 0x29 |
| 0cb5 | SLOAD | |
| 0cb6 | AND | |
| 0cb7 | DUP2 | |
| 0cb8 | GT | |
| 0cb9 | PUSH2 | 0x0bbb |
| 0cbc | JUMP | |
| 0cbd | JUMPDEST | |
| 0cbe | CALLVALUE | |
| 0cbf | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0cc2 | JUMPI | |
| 0cc3 | PUSH0 | |
| 0cc4 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0cc5 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0cc7 | NOT | |
| 0cc8 | ADD | |
| 0cc9 | SLT | |
| 0cca | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0ccd | JUMPI | |
| 0cce | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0cd0 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0cd2 | MLOAD | |
| 0cd3 | PUSH32 | 0xaac3f59af44d7d33ac1e055e30909d4c9da73d4ab294df533f38b5e23d376e61 |
| 0cf4 | DUP2 | |
| 0cf5 | MSTORE | |
| 0cf6 | RETURN | |
| 0cf7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0cf8 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0cf9 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0cfc | JUMPI | |
| 0cfd | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0cff | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0d00 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0d02 | NOT | |
| 0d03 | ADD | |
| 0d04 | SLT | |
| 0d05 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0d08 | JUMPI | |
| 0d09 | PUSH2 | 0x0d10 |
| 0d0c | PUSH2 | 0x3ad7 |
| 0d0f | JUMP | |
| 0d10 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0d11 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 0d13 | AND | |
| 0d14 | PUSH0 | |
| 0d15 | DUP2 | |
| 0d16 | DUP2 | |
| 0d17 | MSTORE | |
| 0d18 | PUSH1 | 0x21 |
| 0d1a | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0d1c | SWAP1 | |
| 0d1d | DUP2 | |
| 0d1e | MSTORE | |
| 0d1f | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0d21 | DUP1 | |
| 0d22 | DUP4 | |
| 0d23 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0d24 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0d26 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0d27 | DUP1 | |
| 0d28 | DUP6 | |
| 0d29 | MSTORE | |
| 0d2a | SWAP1 | |
| 0d2b | DUP4 | |
| 0d2c | MSTORE | |
| 0d2d | DUP2 | |
| 0d2e | DUP5 | |
| 0d2f | KECCAK256 | |
| 0d30 | SLOAD | |
| 0d31 | SWAP5 | |
| 0d32 | DUP5 | |
| 0d33 | MSTORE | |
| 0d34 | PUSH1 | 0x25 |
| 0d36 | DUP4 | |
| 0d37 | MSTORE | |
| 0d38 | DUP2 | |
| 0d39 | DUP5 | |
| 0d3a | KECCAK256 | |
| 0d3b | SWAP1 | |
| 0d3c | DUP5 | |
| 0d3d | MSTORE | |
| 0d3e | DUP3 | |
| 0d3f | MSTORE | |
| 0d40 | SWAP2 | |
| 0d41 | DUP3 | |
| 0d42 | SWAP1 | |
| 0d43 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0d44 | SLOAD | |
| 0d45 | DUP3 | |
| 0d46 | MLOAD | |
| 0d47 | SWAP1 | |
| 0d48 | DUP2 | |
| 0d49 | MSTORE | |
| 0d4a | SWAP3 | |
| 0d4b | ISZERO | |
| 0d4c | ISZERO | |
| 0d4d | SWAP1 | |
| 0d4e | DUP4 | |
| 0d4f | ADD | |
| 0d50 | MSTORE | |
| 0d51 | SWAP1 | |
| 0d52 | RETURN | |
| 0d53 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0d54 | CALLVALUE | |
| 0d55 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0d58 | JUMPI | |
| 0d59 | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 0d5b | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0d5c | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0d5e | NOT | |
| 0d5f | ADD | |
| 0d60 | SLT | |
| 0d61 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0d64 | JUMPI | |
| 0d65 | PUSH2 | 0x0d6c |
| 0d68 | PUSH2 | 0x3ad7 |
| 0d6b | JUMP | |
| 0d6c | JUMPDEST | |
| 0d6d | PUSH2 | 0x0d74 |
| 0d70 | PUSH2 | 0x3ae7 |
| 0d73 | JUMP | |
| 0d74 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0d75 | SWAP1 | |
| 0d76 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 0d78 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0d79 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0d7b | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0d7d | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0d7f | SHL | |
| 0d80 | SUB | |
| 0d81 | DUP2 | |
| 0d82 | GT | |
| 0d83 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0d86 | JUMPI | |
| 0d87 | PUSH2 | 0x0d94 |
| 0d8a | SWAP1 | |
| 0d8b | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0d8c | SWAP1 | |
| 0d8d | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0d8f | ADD | |
| 0d90 | PUSH2 | 0x39bb |
| 0d93 | JUMP | |
| 0d94 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0d95 | SWAP2 | |
| 0d96 | SWAP1 | |
| 0d97 | PUSH1 | 0x64 |
| 0d99 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0d9a | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0d9c | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0d9e | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0da0 | SHL | |
| 0da1 | SUB | |
| 0da2 | DUP2 | |
| 0da3 | GT | |
| 0da4 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0da7 | JUMPI | |
| 0da8 | PUSH2 | 0x0db5 |
| 0dab | SWAP1 | |
| 0dac | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0dad | SWAP1 | |
| 0dae | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0db0 | ADD | |
| 0db1 | PUSH2 | 0x39bb |
| 0db4 | JUMP | |
| 0db5 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0db6 | SWAP5 | |
| 0db7 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 0db9 | DUP5 | |
| 0dba | AND | |
| 0dbb | PUSH0 | |
| 0dbc | MSTORE | |
| 0dbd | PUSH1 | 0x2c |
| 0dbf | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0dc1 | MSTORE | |
| 0dc2 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0dc4 | DUP1 | |
| 0dc5 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 0dc7 | SHL | |
| 0dc8 | SUB | |
| 0dc9 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0dcb | PUSH0 | |
| 0dcc | KECCAK256 | |
| 0dcd | SLOAD | |
| 0dce | AND | |
| 0dcf | CALLER | |
| 0dd0 | SUB | |
| 0dd1 | PUSH2 | 0x0e3b |
| 0dd4 | JUMPI | |
| 0dd5 | PUSH2 | 0x0dde |
| 0dd8 | DUP2 | |
| 0dd9 | DUP6 | |
| 0dda | PUSH2 | 0x6102 |
| 0ddd | JUMP | |
| 0dde | JUMPDEST | |
| 0ddf | DUP6 | |
| 0de0 | DUP6 | |
| 0de1 | SUB | |
| 0de2 | PUSH2 | 0x0e24 |
| 0de5 | JUMPI | |
| 0de6 | PUSH0 | |
| 0de7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0de8 | DUP6 | |
| 0de9 | DUP2 | |
| 0dea | LT | |
| 0deb | PUSH2 | 0x0df8 |
| 0dee | JUMPI | |
| 0def | PUSH2 | 0x0a8e |
| 0df2 | DUP7 | |
| 0df3 | DUP7 | |
| 0df4 | PUSH2 | 0x4996 |
| 0df7 | JUMP | |
| 0df8 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0df9 | DUP1 | |
| 0dfa | PUSH2 | 0x0e1e |
| 0dfd | PUSH2 | 0x0e09 |
| 0e00 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0e02 | SWAP4 | |
| 0e03 | DUP10 | |
| 0e04 | DUP9 | |
| 0e05 | PUSH2 | 0x3e2e |
| 0e08 | JUMP | |
| 0e09 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e0a | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0e0b | PUSH2 | 0x0e15 |
| 0e0e | DUP4 | |
| 0e0f | DUP12 | |
| 0e10 | DUP9 | |
| 0e11 | PUSH2 | 0x3e2e |
| 0e14 | JUMP | |
| 0e15 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e16 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0e17 | SWAP1 | |
| 0e18 | DUP6 | |
| 0e19 | DUP10 | |
| 0e1a | PUSH2 | 0x46e0 |
| 0e1d | JUMP | |
| 0e1e | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e1f | ADD | |
| 0e20 | PUSH2 | 0x0de7 |
| 0e23 | JUMP | |
| 0e24 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e25 | DUP6 | |
| 0e26 | DUP6 | |
| 0e27 | PUSH4 | 0x55c5b3e3 |
| 0e2c | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 0e2e | SHL | |
| 0e2f | PUSH0 | |
| 0e30 | MSTORE | |
| 0e31 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0e33 | MSTORE | |
| 0e34 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0e36 | MSTORE | |
| 0e37 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 0e39 | PUSH0 | |
| 0e3a | REVERT | |
| 0e3b | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e3c | PUSH4 | 0x4a0bfec1 |
| 0e41 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 0e43 | SHL | |
| 0e44 | PUSH0 | |
| 0e45 | MSTORE | |
| 0e46 | CALLER | |
| 0e47 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0e49 | MSTORE | |
| 0e4a | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 0e4c | PUSH0 | |
| 0e4d | REVERT | |
| 0e4e | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e4f | CALLVALUE | |
| 0e50 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0e53 | JUMPI | |
| 0e54 | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 0e56 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0e57 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 0e59 | NOT | |
| 0e5a | ADD | |
| 0e5b | SLT | |
| 0e5c | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0e5f | JUMPI | |
| 0e60 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0e62 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0e63 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0e65 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0e67 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0e69 | SHL | |
| 0e6a | SUB | |
| 0e6b | DUP2 | |
| 0e6c | GT | |
| 0e6d | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0e70 | JUMPI | |
| 0e71 | PUSH2 | 0x0e7e |
| 0e74 | SWAP1 | |
| 0e75 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0e76 | SWAP1 | |
| 0e77 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0e79 | ADD | |
| 0e7a | PUSH2 | 0x39bb |
| 0e7d | JUMP | |
| 0e7e | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e7f | SWAP1 | |
| 0e80 | PUSH2 | 0x0e87 |
| 0e83 | PUSH2 | 0x3a57 |
| 0e86 | JUMP | |
| 0e87 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e88 | SWAP1 | |
| 0e89 | PUSH2 | 0x0e90 |
| 0e8c | PUSH2 | 0x3a41 |
| 0e8f | JUMP | |
| 0e90 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0e91 | PUSH1 | 0x64 |
| 0e93 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 0e94 | SWAP1 | |
| 0e95 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0e97 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0e99 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0e9b | SHL | |
| 0e9c | SUB | |
| 0e9d | DUP3 | |
| 0e9e | GT | |
| 0e9f | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 0ea2 | JUMPI | |
| 0ea3 | PUSH2 | 0x0eb3 |
| 0ea6 | PUSH2 | 0x0ef9 |
| 0ea9 | SWAP3 | |
| 0eaa | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 0eab | SWAP1 | |
| 0eac | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0eae | ADD | |
| 0eaf | PUSH2 | 0x39bb |
| 0eb2 | JUMP | |
| 0eb3 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0eb4 | SWAP2 | |
| 0eb5 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0eb7 | MLOAD | |
| 0eb8 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0eba | DUP2 | |
| 0ebb | ADD | |
| 0ebc | SWAP1 | |
| 0ebd | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0ebf | DUP3 | |
| 0ec0 | MSTORE | |
| 0ec1 | PUSH2 | 0x0ef1 |
| 0ec4 | DUP2 | |
| 0ec5 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0ec7 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0ec9 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0ecb | SHL | |
| 0ecc | SUB | |
| 0ecd | PUSH2 | 0x0eda |
| 0ed0 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 0ed2 | DUP4 | |
| 0ed3 | ADD | |
| 0ed4 | DUP14 | |
| 0ed5 | DUP13 | |
| 0ed6 | PUSH2 | 0x43a3 |
| 0ed9 | JUMP | |
| 0eda | JUMPDEST | |
| 0edb | SWAP11 | |
| 0edc | AND | |
| 0edd | SWAP10 | |
| 0ede | DUP11 | |
| 0edf | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0ee1 | DUP4 | |
| 0ee2 | ADD | |
| 0ee3 | MSTORE | |
| 0ee4 | SUB | |
| 0ee5 | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 0ee7 | NOT | |
| 0ee8 | DUP2 | |
| 0ee9 | ADD | |
| 0eea | DUP4 | |
| 0eeb | MSTORE | |
| 0eec | DUP3 | |
| 0eed | PUSH2 | 0x3b3c |
| 0ef0 | JUMP | |
| 0ef1 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0ef2 | MLOAD | |
| 0ef3 | SWAP1 | |
| 0ef4 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0ef5 | PUSH2 | 0x588a |
| 0ef8 | JUMP | |
| 0ef9 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0efa | PUSH1 | 0x08 |
| 0efc | NOT | |
| 0efd | DUP4 | |
| 0efe | ADD | |
| 0eff | PUSH2 | 0x1007 |
| 0f02 | JUMPI | |
| 0f03 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f05 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f07 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0f09 | SHL | |
| 0f0a | SUB | |
| 0f0b | PUSH1 | 0x29 |
| 0f0d | SLOAD | |
| 0f0e | AND | |
| 0f0f | PUSH2 | 0x0f48 |
| 0f12 | JUMPI | |
| 0f13 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f15 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0f16 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 0f18 | DUP2 | |
| 0f19 | AND | |
| 0f1a | PUSH1 | 0x08 |
| 0f1c | DUP2 | |
| 0f1d | GT | |
| 0f1e | PUSH2 | 0x0f57 |
| 0f21 | JUMPI | |
| 0f22 | PUSH0 | |
| 0f23 | MSTORE | |
| 0f24 | PUSH1 | 0x27 |
| 0f26 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0f28 | MSTORE | |
| 0f29 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f2b | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f2d | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0f2f | SHL | |
| 0f30 | SUB | |
| 0f31 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0f33 | PUSH0 | |
| 0f34 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0f35 | SLOAD | |
| 0f36 | AND | |
| 0f37 | PUSH2 | 0x0f48 |
| 0f3a | JUMPI | |
| 0f3b | PUSH2 | 0x0f43 |
| 0f3e | SWAP1 | |
| 0f3f | PUSH2 | 0x3feb |
| 0f42 | JUMP | |
| 0f43 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0f44 | PUSH2 | 0x0f15 |
| 0f47 | JUMP | |
| 0f48 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0f49 | PUSH4 | 0xdc63d81f |
| 0f4e | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 0f50 | SHL | |
| 0f51 | PUSH0 | |
| 0f52 | MSTORE | |
| 0f53 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 0f55 | PUSH0 | |
| 0f56 | REVERT | |
| 0f57 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0f58 | DUP3 | |
| 0f59 | DUP6 | |
| 0f5a | DUP6 | |
| 0f5b | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f5d | JUMPDEST | |
| 0f5e | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 0f60 | DUP2 | |
| 0f61 | AND | |
| 0f62 | PUSH1 | 0x08 |
| 0f64 | DUP2 | |
| 0f65 | GT | |
| 0f66 | PUSH2 | 0x0fb0 |
| 0f69 | JUMPI | |
| 0f6a | SWAP1 | |
| 0f6b | DUP2 | |
| 0f6c | PUSH2 | 0x0f81 |
| 0f6f | PUSH2 | 0x0f7c |
| 0f72 | PUSH2 | 0x0fab |
| 0f75 | SWAP5 | |
| 0f76 | DUP8 | |
| 0f77 | DUP10 | |
| 0f78 | PUSH2 | 0x3e2e |
| 0f7b | JUMP | |
| 0f7c | JUMPDEST | |
| 0f7d | PUSH2 | 0x3ecb |
| 0f80 | JUMP | |
| 0f81 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0f82 | SWAP1 | |
| 0f83 | PUSH0 | |
| 0f84 | MSTORE | |
| 0f85 | PUSH1 | 0x27 |
| 0f87 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0f89 | MSTORE | |
| 0f8a | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f8c | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f8e | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0f90 | SHL | |
| 0f91 | SUB | |
| 0f92 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0f94 | PUSH0 | |
| 0f95 | KECCAK256 | |
| 0f96 | SWAP2 | |
| 0f97 | AND | |
| 0f98 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f9a | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0f9c | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0f9e | SHL | |
| 0f9f | SUB | |
| 0fa0 | NOT | |
| 0fa1 | DUP3 | |
| 0fa2 | SLOAD | |
| 0fa3 | AND | |
| 0fa4 | OR | |
| 0fa5 | SWAP1 | |
| 0fa6 | SSTORE | |
| 0fa7 | PUSH2 | 0x3feb |
| 0faa | JUMP | |
| 0fab | JUMPDEST | |
| 0fac | PUSH2 | 0x0f5d |
| 0faf | JUMP | |
| 0fb0 | JUMPDEST | |
| 0fb1 | POP | |
| 0fb2 | POP | |
| 0fb3 | PUSH2 | 0x1002 |
| 0fb6 | PUSH32 | 0x15fd51992bd825f38af10ca1ec217ca34f12b24fa98401404df53e3052deac48 |
| 0fd7 | SWAP4 | |
| 0fd8 | DUP3 | |
| 0fd9 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0fdb | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 0fdd | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0fdf | SHL | |
| 0fe0 | SUB | |
| 0fe1 | NOT | |
| 0fe2 | PUSH1 | 0x29 |
| 0fe4 | SLOAD | |
| 0fe5 | AND | |
| 0fe6 | OR | |
| 0fe7 | PUSH1 | 0x29 |
| 0fe9 | SSTORE | |
| 0fea | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0fec | MLOAD | |
| 0fed | SWAP4 | |
| 0fee | DUP5 | |
| 0fef | SWAP4 | |
| 0ff0 | DUP5 | |
| 0ff1 | MSTORE | |
| 0ff2 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0ff4 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 0ff6 | DUP6 | |
| 0ff7 | ADD | |
| 0ff8 | MSTORE | |
| 0ff9 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 0ffb | DUP5 | |
| 0ffc | ADD | |
| 0ffd | SWAP2 | |
| 0ffe | PUSH2 | 0x43a3 |
| 1001 | JUMP | |
| 1002 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1003 | SUB | |
| 1004 | SWAP1 | |
| 1005 | LOG1 | |
| 1006 | STOP | |
| 1007 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1008 | DUP3 | |
| 1009 | PUSH4 | 0x2c9979d1 |
| 100e | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 1010 | SHL | |
| 1011 | PUSH0 | |
| 1012 | MSTORE | |
| 1013 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 1015 | MSTORE | |
| 1016 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 1018 | PUSH0 | |
| 1019 | REVERT | |
| 101a | JUMPDEST | |
| 101b | CALLVALUE | |
| 101c | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 101f | JUMPI | |
| 1020 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1022 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 1023 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 1025 | NOT | |
| 1026 | ADD | |
| 1027 | SLT | |
| 1028 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 102b | JUMPI | |
| 102c | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 102e | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 102f | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1031 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1033 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1035 | SHL | |
| 1036 | SUB | |
| 1037 | DUP2 | |
| 1038 | GT | |
| 1039 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 103c | JUMPI | |
| 103d | PUSH2 | 0x0785 |
| 1040 | PUSH2 | 0x0af8 |
| 1043 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1045 | SWAP3 | |
| 1046 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 1047 | SWAP1 | |
| 1048 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 104a | ADD | |
| 104b | PUSH2 | 0x3bde |
| 104e | JUMP | |
| 104f | JUMPDEST | |
| 1050 | PUSH2 | 0x3db5 |
| 1053 | JUMP | |
| 1054 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1055 | CALLVALUE | |
| 1056 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 1059 | JUMPI | |
| 105a | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 105c | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 105d | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 105f | NOT | |
| 1060 | ADD | |
| 1061 | SLT | |
| 1062 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 1065 | JUMPI | |
| 1066 | PUSH2 | 0x106d |
| 1069 | PUSH2 | 0x3ad7 |
| 106c | JUMP | |
| 106d | JUMPDEST | |
| 106e | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 1070 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 1071 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1073 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1075 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1077 | SHL | |
| 1078 | SUB | |
| 1079 | DUP2 | |
| 107a | GT | |
| 107b | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 107e | JUMPI | |
| 107f | PUSH2 | 0x108c |
| 1082 | SWAP1 | |
| 1083 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 1084 | SWAP1 | |
| 1085 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 1087 | ADD | |
| 1088 | PUSH2 | 0x39bb |
| 108b | JUMP | |
| 108c | JUMPDEST | |
| 108d | SWAP1 | |
| 108e | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 1090 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 1091 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1093 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1095 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1097 | SHL | |
| 1098 | SUB | |
| 1099 | DUP2 | |
| 109a | GT | |
| 109b | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 109e | JUMPI | |
| 109f | PUSH2 | 0x10ac |
| 10a2 | SWAP1 | |
| 10a3 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 10a4 | SWAP1 | |
| 10a5 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 10a7 | ADD | |
| 10a8 | PUSH2 | 0x39bb |
| 10ab | JUMP | |
| 10ac | JUMPDEST | |
| 10ad | PUSH2 | 0x10b4 |
| 10b0 | PUSH2 | 0x3a15 |
| 10b3 | JUMP | |
| 10b4 | JUMPDEST | |
| 10b5 | PUSH1 | 0x84 |
| 10b7 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 10b8 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 10ba | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 10bc | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 10be | SHL | |
| 10bf | SUB | |
| 10c0 | DUP2 | |
| 10c1 | GT | |
| 10c2 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 10c5 | JUMPI | |
| 10c6 | PUSH2 | 0x10d3 |
| 10c9 | SWAP1 | |
| 10ca | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 10cb | SWAP1 | |
| 10cc | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 10ce | ADD | |
| 10cf | PUSH2 | 0x39bb |
| 10d2 | JUMP | |
| 10d3 | JUMPDEST | |
| 10d4 | SWAP2 | |
| 10d5 | PUSH2 | 0x10dd |
| 10d8 | DUP9 | |
| 10d9 | PUSH2 | 0x5f46 |
| 10dc | JUMP | |
| 10dd | JUMPDEST | |
| 10de | DUP4 | |
| 10df | DUP8 | |
| 10e0 | EQ | |
| 10e1 | DUP1 | |
| 10e2 | ISZERO | |
| 10e3 | SWAP1 | |
| 10e4 | PUSH2 | 0x13df |
| 10e7 | JUMPI | |
| 10e8 | JUMPDEST | |
| 10e9 | PUSH2 | 0x13c8 |
| 10ec | JUMPI | |
| 10ed | SWAP2 | |
| 10ee | PUSH2 | 0x113b |
| 10f1 | SWAP2 | |
| 10f2 | DUP8 | |
| 10f3 | SWAP5 | |
| 10f4 | SWAP4 | |
| 10f5 | DUP10 | |
| 10f6 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 10f8 | MLOAD | |
| 10f9 | PUSH2 | 0x1133 |
| 10fc | DUP2 | |
| 10fd | PUSH2 | 0x0a02 |
| 1100 | PUSH2 | 0x1120 |
| 1103 | DUP14 | |
| 1104 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 1106 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1108 | DUP6 | |
| 1109 | ADD | |
| 110a | SWAP8 | |
| 110b | AND | |
| 110c | SWAP13 | |
| 110d | DUP14 | |
| 110e | DUP9 | |
| 110f | MSTORE | |
| 1110 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 1112 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1114 | DUP7 | |
| 1115 | ADD | |
| 1116 | MSTORE | |
| 1117 | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 1119 | DUP6 | |
| 111a | ADD | |
| 111b | SWAP2 | |
| 111c | PUSH2 | 0x40b3 |
| 111f | JUMP | |
| 1120 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1121 | DUP3 | |
| 1122 | DUP2 | |
| 1123 | SUB | |
| 1124 | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 1126 | NOT | |
| 1127 | ADD | |
| 1128 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 112a | DUP5 | |
| 112b | ADD | |
| 112c | MSTORE | |
| 112d | DUP11 | |
| 112e | DUP14 | |
| 112f | PUSH2 | 0x40b3 |
| 1132 | JUMP | |
| 1133 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1134 | MLOAD | |
| 1135 | SWAP1 | |
| 1136 | KECCAK256 | |
| 1137 | PUSH2 | 0x568b |
| 113a | JUMP | |
| 113b | JUMPDEST | |
| 113c | PUSH0 | |
| 113d | JUMPDEST | |
| 113e | DUP6 | |
| 113f | DUP2 | |
| 1140 | LT | |
| 1141 | PUSH2 | 0x114e |
| 1144 | JUMPI | |
| 1145 | PUSH2 | 0x0a8e |
| 1148 | DUP7 | |
| 1149 | DUP9 | |
| 114a | PUSH2 | 0x4996 |
| 114d | JUMP | |
| 114e | JUMPDEST | |
| 114f | PUSH2 | 0x1159 |
| 1152 | DUP2 | |
| 1153 | DUP4 | |
| 1154 | DUP7 | |
| 1155 | PUSH2 | 0x3e2e |
| 1158 | JUMP | |
| 1159 | JUMPDEST | |
| 115a | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 115b | DUP4 | |
| 115c | PUSH0 | |
| 115d | MSTORE | |
| 115e | PUSH1 | 0x25 |
| 1160 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1162 | MSTORE | |
| 1163 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1165 | PUSH0 | |
| 1166 | KECCAK256 | |
| 1167 | PUSH2 | 0x1171 |
| 116a | DUP4 | |
| 116b | DUP10 | |
| 116c | DUP10 | |
| 116d | PUSH2 | 0x3e2e |
| 1170 | JUMP | |
| 1171 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1172 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 1173 | PUSH0 | |
| 1174 | MSTORE | |
| 1175 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1177 | MSTORE | |
| 1178 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 117a | PUSH0 | |
| 117b | KECCAK256 | |
| 117c | SSTORE | |
| 117d | PUSH2 | 0x1187 |
| 1180 | DUP2 | |
| 1181 | DUP8 | |
| 1182 | DUP8 | |
| 1183 | PUSH2 | 0x3e2e |
| 1186 | JUMP | |
| 1187 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1188 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 1189 | PUSH2 | 0x11aa |
| 118c | PUSH2 | 0x1196 |
| 118f | DUP4 | |
| 1190 | DUP10 | |
| 1191 | DUP10 | |
| 1192 | PUSH2 | 0x3e2e |
| 1195 | JUMP | |
| 1196 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1197 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 1198 | PUSH2 | 0x11a2 |
| 119b | DUP5 | |
| 119c | DUP7 | |
| 119d | DUP10 | |
| 119e | PUSH2 | 0x3e2e |
| 11a1 | JUMP | |
| 11a2 | JUMPDEST | |
| 11a3 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 11a4 | SWAP1 | |
| 11a5 | DUP11 | |
| 11a6 | PUSH2 | 0x412f |
| 11a9 | JUMP | |
| 11aa | JUMPDEST | |
| 11ab | DUP5 | |
| 11ac | PUSH0 | |
| 11ad | MSTORE | |
| 11ae | PUSH1 | 0x21 |
| 11b0 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 11b2 | MSTORE | |
| 11b3 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 11b5 | PUSH0 | |
| 11b6 | KECCAK256 | |
| 11b7 | DUP3 | |
| 11b8 | PUSH0 | |
| 11b9 | MSTORE | |
| 11ba | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 11bc | MSTORE | |
| 11bd | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 11bf | PUSH0 | |
| 11c0 | KECCAK256 | |
| 11c1 | SLOAD | |
| 11c2 | DUP1 | |
| 11c3 | ISZERO | |
| 11c4 | PUSH0 | |
| 11c5 | EQ | |
| 11c6 | PUSH2 | 0x137e |
| 11c9 | JUMPI | |
| 11ca | POP | |
| 11cb | DUP5 | |
| 11cc | PUSH0 | |
| 11cd | MSTORE | |
| 11ce | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 11d0 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 11d2 | MSTORE | |
| 11d3 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 11d5 | PUSH0 | |
| 11d6 | KECCAK256 | |
| 11d7 | PUSH0 | |
| 11d8 | DUP1 | |
| 11d9 | MSTORE | |
| 11da | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 11dc | MSTORE | |
| 11dd | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 11df | PUSH0 | |
| 11e0 | KECCAK256 | |
| 11e1 | SLOAD | |
| 11e2 | SWAP2 | |
| 11e3 | PUSH3 | 0x100000 |
| 11e7 | DUP4 | |
| 11e8 | LT | |
| 11e9 | ISZERO | |
| 11ea | PUSH2 | 0x1367 |
| 11ed | JUMPI | |
| 11ee | DUP3 | |
| 11ef | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 11f1 | DUP2 | |
| 11f2 | ADD | |
| 11f3 | DUP1 | |
| 11f4 | DUP3 | |
| 11f5 | GT | |
| 11f6 | PUSH2 | 0x06c8 |
| 11f9 | JUMPI | |
| 11fa | DUP8 | |
| 11fb | PUSH0 | |
| 11fc | MSTORE | |
| 11fd | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 11ff | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1201 | MSTORE | |
| 1202 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1204 | PUSH0 | |
| 1205 | KECCAK256 | |
| 1206 | PUSH0 | |
| 1207 | DUP1 | |
| 1208 | MSTORE | |
| 1209 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 120b | MSTORE | |
| 120c | DUP1 | |
| 120d | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 120f | PUSH0 | |
| 1210 | KECCAK256 | |
| 1211 | SSTORE | |
| 1212 | DUP8 | |
| 1213 | PUSH0 | |
| 1214 | MSTORE | |
| 1215 | PUSH1 | 0x23 |
| 1217 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1219 | MSTORE | |
| 121a | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 121c | PUSH0 | |
| 121d | KECCAK256 | |
| 121e | DUP1 | |
| 121f | SLOAD | |
| 1220 | SWAP1 | |
| 1221 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1223 | DUP3 | |
| 1224 | ADD | |
| 1225 | DUP1 | |
| 1226 | SWAP3 | |
| 1227 | GT | |
| 1228 | PUSH2 | 0x06c8 |
| 122b | JUMPI | |
| 122c | SSTORE | |
| 122d | DUP8 | |
| 122e | PUSH0 | |
| 122f | MSTORE | |
| 1230 | PUSH1 | 0x21 |
| 1232 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1234 | MSTORE | |
| 1235 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1237 | PUSH0 | |
| 1238 | KECCAK256 | |
| 1239 | DUP4 | |
| 123a | PUSH0 | |
| 123b | MSTORE | |
| 123c | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 123e | MSTORE | |
| 123f | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1241 | PUSH0 | |
| 1242 | KECCAK256 | |
| 1243 | SSTORE | |
| 1244 | DUP7 | |
| 1245 | PUSH0 | |
| 1246 | MSTORE | |
| 1247 | PUSH1 | 0x22 |
| 1249 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 124b | MSTORE | |
| 124c | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 124e | PUSH0 | |
| 124f | KECCAK256 | |
| 1250 | SWAP1 | |
| 1251 | PUSH0 | |
| 1252 | MSTORE | |
| 1253 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1255 | MSTORE | |
| 1256 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1258 | PUSH0 | |
| 1259 | KECCAK256 | |
| 125a | SSTORE | |
| 125b | JUMPDEST | |
| 125c | DUP5 | |
| 125d | PUSH0 | |
| 125e | MSTORE | |
| 125f | PUSH1 | 0x02 |
| 1261 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1263 | MSTORE | |
| 1264 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1266 | PUSH0 | |
| 1267 | KECCAK256 | |
| 1268 | DUP3 | |
| 1269 | PUSH0 | |
| 126a | MSTORE | |
| 126b | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 126d | MSTORE | |
| 126e | DUP1 | |
| 126f | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1271 | PUSH0 | |
| 1272 | KECCAK256 | |
| 1273 | SSTORE | |
| 1274 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1276 | MLOAD | |
| 1277 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1279 | DUP2 | |
| 127a | ADD | |
| 127b | SWAP2 | |
| 127c | PUSH0 | |
| 127d | DUP4 | |
| 127e | MSTORE | |
| 127f | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1281 | DUP4 | |
| 1282 | ADD | |
| 1283 | MSTORE | |
| 1284 | PUSH2 | 0x1299 |
| 1287 | DUP2 | |
| 1288 | PUSH1 | 0x21 |
| 128a | DUP5 | |
| 128b | ADD | |
| 128c | SUB | |
| 128d | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 128f | NOT | |
| 1290 | DUP2 | |
| 1291 | ADD | |
| 1292 | DUP4 | |
| 1293 | MSTORE | |
| 1294 | DUP3 | |
| 1295 | PUSH2 | 0x3b3c |
| 1298 | JUMP | |
| 1299 | JUMPDEST | |
| 129a | MLOAD | |
| 129b | SWAP1 | |
| 129c | KECCAK256 | |
| 129d | SWAP1 | |
| 129e | PUSH0 | |
| 129f | JUMPDEST | |
| 12a0 | PUSH1 | 0x18 |
| 12a2 | DUP2 | |
| 12a3 | LT | |
| 12a4 | PUSH2 | 0x1303 |
| 12a7 | JUMPI | |
| 12a8 | POP | |
| 12a9 | POP | |
| 12aa | SWAP1 | |
| 12ab | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 12ad | SWAP2 | |
| 12ae | DUP5 | |
| 12af | PUSH0 | |
| 12b0 | MSTORE | |
| 12b1 | PUSH1 | 0x26 |
| 12b3 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 12b5 | MSTORE | |
| 12b6 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 12b8 | PUSH0 | |
| 12b9 | KECCAK256 | |
| 12ba | SSTORE | |
| 12bb | PUSH2 | 0x12c5 |
| 12be | DUP2 | |
| 12bf | DUP9 | |
| 12c0 | DUP9 | |
| 12c1 | PUSH2 | 0x3e2e |
| 12c4 | JUMP | |
| 12c5 | JUMPDEST | |
| 12c6 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 12c7 | DUP5 | |
| 12c8 | PUSH32 | 0x2e0f0f49c5675cc0ca3b0631934e93ab749ffc07928459dd09921848e5cc2f54 |
| 12e9 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 12eb | PUSH2 | 0x12f5 |
| 12ee | DUP6 | |
| 12ef | DUP9 | |
| 12f0 | DUP12 | |
| 12f1 | PUSH2 | 0x3e2e |
| 12f4 | JUMP | |
| 12f5 | JUMPDEST | |
| 12f6 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 12f7 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 12f9 | MLOAD | |
| 12fa | SWAP1 | |
| 12fb | DUP2 | |
| 12fc | MSTORE | |
| 12fd | LOG3 | |
| 12fe | ADD | |
| 12ff | PUSH2 | 0x113d |
| 1302 | JUMP | |
| 1303 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1304 | SWAP1 | |
| 1305 | SWAP2 | |
| 1306 | PUSH2 | 0x1324 |
| 1309 | SWAP1 | |
| 130a | PUSH2 | 0x131e |
| 130d | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 130f | DUP6 | |
| 1310 | SWAP12 | |
| 1311 | SWAP8 | |
| 1312 | SWAP9 | |
| 1313 | SWAP10 | |
| 1314 | SWAP11 | |
| 1315 | SWAP7 | |
| 1316 | SWAP12 | |
| 1317 | XOR | |
| 1318 | DUP5 | |
| 1319 | DUP14 | |
| 131a | PUSH2 | 0x5f96 |
| 131d | JUMP | |
| 131e | JUMPDEST | |
| 131f | SWAP1 | |
| 1320 | PUSH2 | 0x61a9 |
| 1323 | JUMP | |
| 1324 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1325 | SWAP2 | |
| 1326 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1328 | SHR | |
| 1329 | SWAP1 | |
| 132a | DUP7 | |
| 132b | PUSH0 | |
| 132c | MSTORE | |
| 132d | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 132f | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1331 | MSTORE | |
| 1332 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1334 | PUSH0 | |
| 1335 | KECCAK256 | |
| 1336 | SWAP1 | |
| 1337 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1339 | DUP2 | |
| 133a | ADD | |
| 133b | SWAP2 | |
| 133c | DUP3 | |
| 133d | DUP3 | |
| 133e | GT | |
| 133f | PUSH2 | 0x06c8 |
| 1342 | JUMPI | |
| 1343 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1345 | SWAP3 | |
| 1346 | PUSH0 | |
| 1347 | MSTORE | |
| 1348 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 134a | MSTORE | |
| 134b | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 134d | PUSH0 | |
| 134e | KECCAK256 | |
| 134f | DUP4 | |
| 1350 | PUSH0 | |
| 1351 | MSTORE | |
| 1352 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1354 | MSTORE | |
| 1355 | DUP4 | |
| 1356 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1358 | PUSH0 | |
| 1359 | KECCAK256 | |
| 135a | SSTORE | |
| 135b | ADD | |
| 135c | SWAP8 | |
| 135d | SWAP3 | |
| 135e | SWAP7 | |
| 135f | SWAP6 | |
| 1360 | SWAP5 | |
| 1361 | SWAP4 | |
| 1362 | SWAP8 | |
| 1363 | PUSH2 | 0x129f |
| 1366 | JUMP | |
| 1367 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1368 | DUP6 | |
| 1369 | PUSH4 | 0x5633a85b |
| 136e | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 1370 | SHL | |
| 1371 | PUSH0 | |
| 1372 | MSTORE | |
| 1373 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 1375 | MSTORE | |
| 1376 | PUSH0 | |
| 1377 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 1379 | MSTORE | |
| 137a | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 137c | PUSH0 | |
| 137d | REVERT | |
| 137e | JUMPDEST | |
| 137f | PUSH0 | |
| 1380 | NOT | |
| 1381 | DUP2 | |
| 1382 | ADD | |
| 1383 | SWAP3 | |
| 1384 | SWAP1 | |
| 1385 | DUP4 | |
| 1386 | GT | |
| 1387 | PUSH2 | 0x06c8 |
| 138a | JUMPI | |
| 138b | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 138d | DUP4 | |
| 138e | PUSH1 | 0x14 |
| 1390 | SHR | |
| 1391 | AND | |
| 1392 | SWAP1 | |
| 1393 | DUP2 | |
| 1394 | PUSH2 | 0x139e |
| 1397 | JUMPI | |
| 1398 | POP | |
| 1399 | POP | |
| 139a | PUSH2 | 0x125b |
| 139d | JUMP | |
| 139e | JUMPDEST | |
| 139f | PUSH1 | 0x84 |
| 13a1 | SWAP2 | |
| 13a2 | DUP8 | |
| 13a3 | SWAP2 | |
| 13a4 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 13a6 | MLOAD | |
| 13a7 | SWAP3 | |
| 13a8 | PUSH4 | 0x431ddf35 |
| 13ad | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 13af | SHL | |
| 13b0 | DUP5 | |
| 13b1 | MSTORE | |
| 13b2 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 13b4 | DUP5 | |
| 13b5 | ADD | |
| 13b6 | MSTORE | |
| 13b7 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 13b9 | DUP4 | |
| 13ba | ADD | |
| 13bb | MSTORE | |
| 13bc | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 13be | DUP3 | |
| 13bf | ADD | |
| 13c0 | MSTORE | |
| 13c1 | PUSH0 | |
| 13c2 | PUSH1 | 0x64 |
| 13c4 | DUP3 | |
| 13c5 | ADD | |
| 13c6 | MSTORE | |
| 13c7 | REVERT | |
| 13c8 | JUMPDEST | |
| 13c9 | DUP4 | |
| 13ca | DUP8 | |
| 13cb | PUSH4 | 0x55c5b3e3 |
| 13d0 | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 13d2 | SHL | |
| 13d3 | PUSH0 | |
| 13d4 | MSTORE | |
| 13d5 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 13d7 | MSTORE | |
| 13d8 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 13da | MSTORE | |
| 13db | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 13dd | PUSH0 | |
| 13de | REVERT | |
| 13df | JUMPDEST | |
| 13e0 | POP | |
| 13e1 | DUP7 | |
| 13e2 | ISZERO | |
| 13e3 | PUSH2 | 0x10e8 |
| 13e6 | JUMP | |
| 13e7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 13e8 | CALLVALUE | |
| 13e9 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 13ec | JUMPI | |
| 13ed | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 13ef | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 13f0 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 13f2 | NOT | |
| 13f3 | ADD | |
| 13f4 | SLT | |
| 13f5 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 13f8 | JUMPI | |
| 13f9 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 13fb | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 13fc | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 13fe | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1400 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1402 | SHL | |
| 1403 | SUB | |
| 1404 | DUP2 | |
| 1405 | GT | |
| 1406 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 1409 | JUMPI | |
| 140a | PUSH2 | 0x1417 |
| 140d | SWAP1 | |
| 140e | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 140f | SWAP1 | |
| 1410 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 1412 | ADD | |
| 1413 | PUSH2 | 0x39bb |
| 1416 | JUMP | |
| 1417 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1418 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 141a | PUSH0 | |
| 141b | MSTORE | |
| 141c | PUSH1 | 0x2c |
| 141e | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1420 | MSTORE | |
| 1421 | PUSH32 | 0xa1f88ee5f5d946e3956f6291445d84cd8aea2bf6c57f4f4ac349f7a338882643 |
| 1442 | SLOAD | |
| 1443 | SWAP1 | |
| 1444 | SWAP2 | |
| 1445 | SWAP1 | |
| 1446 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1448 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 144a | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 144c | SHL | |
| 144d | SUB | |
| 144e | AND | |
| 144f | CALLER | |
| 1450 | SUB | |
| 1451 | PUSH2 | 0x0e3b |
| 1454 | JUMPI | |
| 1455 | PUSH0 | |
| 1456 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1457 | DUP3 | |
| 1458 | DUP2 | |
| 1459 | LT | |
| 145a | PUSH2 | 0x1466 |
| 145d | JUMPI | |
| 145e | PUSH2 | 0x0a8e |
| 1461 | DUP4 | |
| 1462 | PUSH2 | 0x4951 |
| 1465 | JUMP | |
| 1466 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1467 | DUP1 | |
| 1468 | PUSH2 | 0x1495 |
| 146b | PUSH2 | 0x147d |
| 146e | PUSH2 | 0x0ad1 |
| 1471 | PUSH2 | 0x0acc |
| 1474 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1476 | SWAP6 | |
| 1477 | DUP9 | |
| 1478 | DUP9 | |
| 1479 | PUSH2 | 0x417d |
| 147c | JUMP | |
| 147d | JUMPDEST | |
| 147e | PUSH2 | 0x148f |
| 1481 | PUSH2 | 0x0af8 |
| 1484 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 1485 | PUSH2 | 0x0af3 |
| 1488 | DUP7 | |
| 1489 | DUP11 | |
| 148a | DUP11 | |
| 148b | PUSH2 | 0x417d |
| 148e | JUMP | |
| 148f | JUMPDEST | |
| 1490 | SWAP1 | |
| 1491 | PUSH2 | 0x4436 |
| 1494 | JUMP | |
| 1495 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1496 | ADD | |
| 1497 | PUSH2 | 0x1456 |
| 149a | JUMP | |
| 149b | JUMPDEST | |
| 149c | CALLVALUE | |
| 149d | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 14a0 | JUMPI | |
| 14a1 | PUSH0 | |
| 14a2 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 14a3 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 14a5 | NOT | |
| 14a6 | ADD | |
| 14a7 | SLT | |
| 14a8 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 14ab | JUMPI | |
| 14ac | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 14ae | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 14b0 | MLOAD | |
| 14b1 | PUSH1 | 0x18 |
| 14b3 | DUP2 | |
| 14b4 | MSTORE | |
| 14b5 | RETURN | |
| 14b6 | JUMPDEST | |
| 14b7 | CALLVALUE | |
| 14b8 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 14bb | JUMPI | |
| 14bc | PUSH0 | |
| 14bd | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 14be | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 14c0 | NOT | |
| 14c1 | ADD | |
| 14c2 | SLT | |
| 14c3 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 14c6 | JUMPI | |
| 14c7 | PUSH1 | 0x2e |
| 14c9 | SLOAD | |
| 14ca | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 14cc | MLOAD | |
| 14cd | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 14cf | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 14d1 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 14d3 | SHL | |
| 14d4 | SUB | |
| 14d5 | SWAP1 | |
| 14d6 | SWAP2 | |
| 14d7 | AND | |
| 14d8 | DUP2 | |
| 14d9 | MSTORE | |
| 14da | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 14dc | SWAP1 | |
| 14dd | RETURN | |
| 14de | JUMPDEST | |
| 14df | CALLVALUE | |
| 14e0 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 14e3 | JUMPI | |
| 14e4 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 14e6 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 14e7 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 14e9 | NOT | |
| 14ea | ADD | |
| 14eb | SLT | |
| 14ec | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 14ef | JUMPI | |
| 14f0 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 14f2 | PUSH2 | 0x0785 |
| 14f5 | PUSH2 | 0x14fc |
| 14f8 | PUSH2 | 0x3ad7 |
| 14fb | JUMP | |
| 14fc | JUMPDEST | |
| 14fd | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 14ff | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 1500 | SWAP1 | |
| 1501 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 1503 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 1504 | SWAP1 | |
| 1505 | PUSH2 | 0x412f |
| 1508 | JUMP | |
| 1509 | JUMPDEST | |
| 150a | CALLVALUE | |
| 150b | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 150e | JUMPI | |
| 150f | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1511 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 1512 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 1514 | NOT | |
| 1515 | ADD | |
| 1516 | SLT | |
| 1517 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 151a | JUMPI | |
| 151b | PUSH2 | 0x1522 |
| 151e | PUSH2 | 0x3a2b |
| 1521 | JUMP | |
| 1522 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1523 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1525 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1527 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1529 | SHL | |
| 152a | SUB | |
| 152b | PUSH2 | 0x0120 |
| 152e | SWAP2 | |
| 152f | DUP3 | |
| 1530 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1532 | MLOAD | |
| 1533 | PUSH2 | 0x153c |
| 1536 | DUP3 | |
| 1537 | DUP3 | |
| 1538 | PUSH2 | 0x3b3c |
| 153b | JUMP | |
| 153c | JUMPDEST | |
| 153d | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 153e | SWAP1 | |
| 153f | CALLDATACOPY | |
| 1540 | AND | |
| 1541 | PUSH0 | |
| 1542 | MSTORE | |
| 1543 | PUSH1 | 0x28 |
| 1545 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1547 | MSTORE | |
| 1548 | PUSH2 | 0x1553 |
| 154b | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 154d | PUSH0 | |
| 154e | KECCAK256 | |
| 154f | PUSH2 | 0x404d |
| 1552 | JUMP | |
| 1553 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1554 | PUSH2 | 0x1560 |
| 1557 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1559 | MLOAD | |
| 155a | DUP1 | |
| 155b | SWAP3 | |
| 155c | PUSH2 | 0x3d73 |
| 155f | JUMP | |
| 1560 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1561 | RETURN | |
| 1562 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1563 | CALLVALUE | |
| 1564 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 1567 | JUMPI | |
| 1568 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 156a | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 156b | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 156d | NOT | |
| 156e | ADD | |
| 156f | SLT | |
| 1570 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 1573 | JUMPI | |
| 1574 | PUSH2 | 0x157b |
| 1577 | PUSH2 | 0x3ad7 |
| 157a | JUMP | |
| 157b | JUMPDEST | |
| 157c | PUSH2 | 0x1584 |
| 157f | DUP2 | |
| 1580 | PUSH2 | 0x5f46 |
| 1583 | JUMP | |
| 1584 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1585 | PUSH2 | 0x1590 |
| 1588 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 158a | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 158b | DUP3 | |
| 158c | PUSH2 | 0x3e84 |
| 158f | JUMP | |
| 1590 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1591 | PUSH1 | 0x14 |
| 1593 | SWAP1 | |
| 1594 | PUSH2 | 0x159d |
| 1597 | PUSH1 | 0x14 |
| 1599 | PUSH2 | 0x3b5d |
| 159c | JUMP | |
| 159d | JUMPDEST | |
| 159e | SWAP3 | |
| 159f | PUSH2 | 0x15ab |
| 15a2 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 15a4 | MLOAD | |
| 15a5 | SWAP5 | |
| 15a6 | DUP6 | |
| 15a7 | PUSH2 | 0x3b3c |
| 15aa | JUMP | |
| 15ab | JUMPDEST | |
| 15ac | PUSH1 | 0x14 |
| 15ae | DUP5 | |
| 15af | MSTORE | |
| 15b0 | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 15b2 | NOT | |
| 15b3 | PUSH2 | 0x15bc |
| 15b6 | PUSH1 | 0x14 |
| 15b8 | PUSH2 | 0x3b5d |
| 15bb | JUMP | |
| 15bc | JUMPDEST | |
| 15bd | ADD | |
| 15be | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 15bf | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 15c1 | DUP7 | |
| 15c2 | ADD | |
| 15c3 | CALLDATACOPY | |
| 15c4 | PUSH0 | |
| 15c5 | SWAP2 | |
| 15c6 | JUMPDEST | |
| 15c7 | DUP4 | |
| 15c8 | DUP4 | |
| 15c9 | LT | |
| 15ca | PUSH2 | 0x15e3 |
| 15cd | JUMPI | |
| 15ce | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 15d0 | MLOAD | |
| 15d1 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 15d3 | DUP1 | |
| 15d4 | DUP3 | |
| 15d5 | MSTORE | |
| 15d6 | DUP2 | |
| 15d7 | SWAP1 | |
| 15d8 | PUSH2 | 0x081c |
| 15db | SWAP1 | |
| 15dc | DUP3 | |
| 15dd | ADD | |
| 15de | DUP9 | |
| 15df | PUSH2 | 0x3d40 |
| 15e2 | JUMP | |
| 15e3 | JUMPDEST | |
| 15e4 | DUP1 | |
| 15e5 | PUSH2 | 0x15f3 |
| 15e8 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 15ea | DUP1 | |
| 15eb | SWAP4 | |
| 15ec | XOR | |
| 15ed | DUP6 | |
| 15ee | DUP6 | |
| 15ef | PUSH2 | 0x5f96 |
| 15f2 | JUMP | |
| 15f3 | JUMPDEST | |
| 15f4 | PUSH2 | 0x15fd |
| 15f7 | DUP6 | |
| 15f8 | DUP9 | |
| 15f9 | PUSH2 | 0x3e70 |
| 15fc | JUMP | |
| 15fd | JUMPDEST | |
| 15fe | MSTORE | |
| 15ff | DUP2 | |
| 1600 | SHR | |
| 1601 | SWAP3 | |
| 1602 | ADD | |
| 1603 | SWAP2 | |
| 1604 | PUSH2 | 0x15c6 |
| 1607 | JUMP | |
| 1608 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1609 | CALLVALUE | |
| 160a | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 160d | JUMPI | |
| 160e | PUSH0 | |
| 160f | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 1610 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 1612 | NOT | |
| 1613 | ADD | |
| 1614 | SLT | |
| 1615 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 1618 | JUMPI | |
| 1619 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 161b | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 161d | MLOAD | |
| 161e | PUSH1 | 0x05 |
| 1620 | DUP2 | |
| 1621 | MSTORE | |
| 1622 | RETURN | |
| 1623 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1624 | CALLVALUE | |
| 1625 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 1628 | JUMPI | |
| 1629 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 162b | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 162c | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 162e | NOT | |
| 162f | ADD | |
| 1630 | SLT | |
| 1631 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 1634 | JUMPI | |
| 1635 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1637 | PUSH2 | 0x166b |
| 163a | PUSH2 | 0x1641 |
| 163d | PUSH2 | 0x3a2b |
| 1640 | JUMP | |
| 1641 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1642 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1644 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1646 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1648 | SHL | |
| 1649 | SUB | |
| 164a | PUSH2 | 0x1651 |
| 164d | PUSH2 | 0x3ae7 |
| 1650 | JUMP | |
| 1651 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1652 | SWAP2 | |
| 1653 | PUSH2 | 0x165b |
| 1656 | DUP4 | |
| 1657 | PUSH2 | 0x5f46 |
| 165a | JUMP | |
| 165b | JUMPDEST | |
| 165c | AND | |
| 165d | PUSH0 | |
| 165e | MSTORE | |
| 165f | PUSH1 | 0x28 |
| 1661 | DUP4 | |
| 1662 | MSTORE | |
| 1663 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1665 | PUSH0 | |
| 1666 | KECCAK256 | |
| 1667 | PUSH2 | 0x4120 |
| 166a | JUMP | |
| 166b | JUMPDEST | |
| 166c | SWAP1 | |
| 166d | SLOAD | |
| 166e | SWAP1 | |
| 166f | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 1671 | SHL | |
| 1672 | SHR | |
| 1673 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1675 | MLOAD | |
| 1676 | SWAP1 | |
| 1677 | DUP2 | |
| 1678 | MSTORE | |
| 1679 | RETURN | |
| 167a | JUMPDEST | |
| 167b | CALLVALUE | |
| 167c | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 167f | JUMPI | |
| 1680 | PUSH0 | |
| 1681 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 1682 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 1684 | NOT | |
| 1685 | ADD | |
| 1686 | SLT | |
| 1687 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 168a | JUMPI | |
| 168b | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 168d | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 168f | MLOAD | |
| 1690 | PUSH32 | 0x152e47491922dd015e08e657ae4de24ad07106d14eb7be07faeb91afcf397446 |
| 16b1 | DUP2 | |
| 16b2 | MSTORE | |
| 16b3 | RETURN | |
| 16b4 | JUMPDEST | |
| 16b5 | CALLVALUE | |
| 16b6 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 16b9 | JUMPI | |
| 16ba | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 16bc | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 16bd | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 16bf | NOT | |
| 16c0 | ADD | |
| 16c1 | SLT | |
| 16c2 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 16c5 | JUMPI | |
| 16c6 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 16c8 | PUSH2 | 0x0785 |
| 16cb | PUSH2 | 0x16d2 |
| 16ce | PUSH2 | 0x39eb |
| 16d1 | JUMP | |
| 16d2 | JUMPDEST | |
| 16d3 | PUSH2 | 0x40d7 |
| 16d6 | JUMP | |
| 16d7 | JUMPDEST | |
| 16d8 | CALLVALUE | |
| 16d9 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 16dc | JUMPI | |
| 16dd | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 16df | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 16e0 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 16e2 | NOT | |
| 16e3 | ADD | |
| 16e4 | SLT | |
| 16e5 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 16e8 | JUMPI | |
| 16e9 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 16eb | PUSH2 | 0x16f2 |
| 16ee | PUSH2 | 0x3ad7 |
| 16f1 | JUMP | |
| 16f2 | JUMPDEST | |
| 16f3 | AND | |
| 16f4 | PUSH0 | |
| 16f5 | MSTORE | |
| 16f6 | PUSH1 | 0x26 |
| 16f8 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 16fa | MSTORE | |
| 16fb | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 16fd | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 16ff | PUSH0 | |
| 1700 | KECCAK256 | |
| 1701 | SLOAD | |
| 1702 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1704 | MLOAD | |
| 1705 | SWAP1 | |
| 1706 | DUP2 | |
| 1707 | MSTORE | |
| 1708 | RETURN | |
| 1709 | JUMPDEST | |
| 170a | CALLVALUE | |
| 170b | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 170e | JUMPI | |
| 170f | PUSH1 | 0xc0 |
| 1711 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 1712 | PUSH1 | 0x03 |
| 1714 | NOT | |
| 1715 | ADD | |
| 1716 | SLT | |
| 1717 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 171a | JUMPI | |
| 171b | PUSH2 | 0x1722 |
| 171e | PUSH2 | 0x3ad7 |
| 1721 | JUMP | |
| 1722 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1723 | PUSH2 | 0x172a |
| 1726 | PUSH2 | 0x3ae7 |
| 1729 | JUMP | |
| 172a | JUMPDEST | |
| 172b | SWAP1 | |
| 172c | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 172e | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 172f | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1731 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1733 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1735 | SHL | |
| 1736 | SUB | |
| 1737 | DUP2 | |
| 1738 | GT | |
| 1739 | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 173c | JUMPI | |
| 173d | PUSH2 | 0x174a |
| 1740 | SWAP1 | |
| 1741 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 1742 | SWAP1 | |
| 1743 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 1745 | ADD | |
| 1746 | PUSH2 | 0x39bb |
| 1749 | JUMP | |
| 174a | JUMPDEST | |
| 174b | SWAP2 | |
| 174c | SWAP1 | |
| 174d | PUSH1 | 0x64 |
| 174f | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 1750 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1752 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1754 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1756 | SHL | |
| 1757 | SUB | |
| 1758 | DUP2 | |
| 1759 | GT | |
| 175a | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 175d | JUMPI | |
| 175e | PUSH2 | 0x176b |
| 1761 | SWAP1 | |
| 1762 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 1763 | SWAP1 | |
| 1764 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 1766 | ADD | |
| 1767 | PUSH2 | 0x39bb |
| 176a | JUMP | |
| 176b | JUMPDEST | |
| 176c | SWAP5 | |
| 176d | PUSH1 | 0x84 |
| 176f | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 1770 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1772 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1774 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1776 | SHL | |
| 1777 | SUB | |
| 1778 | DUP2 | |
| 1779 | AND | |
| 177a | DUP2 | |
| 177b | SUB | |
| 177c | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 177f | JUMPI | |
| 1780 | PUSH1 | 0xa4 |
| 1782 | CALLDATALOAD | |
| 1783 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1785 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1787 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1789 | SHL | |
| 178a | SUB | |
| 178b | DUP2 | |
| 178c | GT | |
| 178d | PUSH2 | 0x0437 |
| 1790 | JUMPI | |
| 1791 | PUSH2 | 0x179e |
| 1794 | SWAP1 | |
| 1795 | CALLDATASIZE | |
| 1796 | SWAP1 | |
| 1797 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 1799 | ADD | |
| 179a | PUSH2 | 0x39bb |
| 179d | JUMP | |
| 179e | JUMPDEST | |
| 179f | SWAP2 | |
| 17a0 | PUSH2 | 0x17a8 |
| 17a3 | DUP8 | |
| 17a4 | PUSH2 | 0x5f46 |
| 17a7 | JUMP | |
| 17a8 | JUMPDEST | |
| 17a9 | PUSH2 | 0x17b2 |
| 17ac | DUP5 | |
| 17ad | DUP9 | |
| 17ae | PUSH2 | 0x6102 |
| 17b1 | JUMP | |
| 17b2 | JUMPDEST | |
| 17b3 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 17b5 | DUP8 | |
| 17b6 | AND | |
| 17b7 | SWAP3 | |
| 17b8 | PUSH1 | 0x02 |
| 17ba | DUP5 | |
| 17bb | EQ | |
| 17bc | DUP1 | |
| 17bd | ISZERO | |
| 17be | PUSH2 | 0x1975 |
| 17c1 | JUMPI | |
| 17c2 | JUMPDEST | |
| 17c3 | DUP1 | |
| 17c4 | ISZERO | |
| 17c5 | PUSH2 | 0x196b |
| 17c8 | JUMPI | |
| 17c9 | JUMPDEST | |
| 17ca | PUSH2 | 0x1958 |
| 17cd | JUMPI | |
| 17ce | PUSH1 | 0x07 |
| 17d0 | DUP5 | |
| 17d1 | EQ | |
| 17d2 | DUP1 | |
| 17d3 | ISZERO | |
| 17d4 | PUSH2 | 0x194e |
| 17d7 | JUMPI | |
| 17d8 | JUMPDEST | |
| 17d9 | PUSH2 | 0x193b |
| 17dc | JUMPI | |
| 17dd | DUP10 | |
| 17de | DUP10 | |
| 17df | SUB | |
| 17e0 | PUSH2 | 0x1924 |
| 17e3 | JUMPI | |
| 17e4 | DUP4 | |
| 17e5 | PUSH0 | |
| 17e6 | MSTORE | |
| 17e7 | PUSH0 | |
| 17e8 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 17ea | MSTORE | |
| 17eb | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 17ed | PUSH0 | |
| 17ee | KECCAK256 | |
| 17ef | SLOAD | |
| 17f0 | SWAP1 | |
| 17f1 | DUP2 | |
| 17f2 | ISZERO | |
| 17f3 | PUSH2 | 0x1911 |
| 17f6 | JUMPI | |
| 17f7 | SWAP1 | |
| 17f8 | DUP3 | |
| 17f9 | SWAP2 | |
| 17fa | DUP9 | |
| 17fb | SWAP5 | |
| 17fc | SWAP4 | |
| 17fd | DUP7 | |
| 17fe | DUP13 | |
| 17ff | DUP10 | |
| 1800 | DUP16 | |
| 1801 | DUP13 | |
| 1802 | SWAP1 | |
| 1803 | DUP5 | |
| 1804 | PUSH0 | |
| 1805 | MSTORE | |
| 1806 | PUSH1 | 0x2b |
| 1808 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 180a | MSTORE | |
| 180b | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 180d | PUSH0 | |
| 180e | KECCAK256 | |
| 180f | SLOAD | |
| 1810 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1812 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1814 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 1816 | SHL | |
| 1817 | SUB | |
| 1818 | AND | |
| 1819 | SWAP11 | |
| 181a | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 181c | MLOAD | |
| 181d | SWAP5 | |
| 181e | DUP6 | |
| 181f | SWAP5 | |
| 1820 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1822 | DUP7 | |
| 1823 | ADD | |
| 1824 | SWAP8 | |
| 1825 | DUP9 | |
| 1826 | MSTORE | |
| 1827 | PUSH1 | 0xff |
| 1829 | AND | |
| 182a | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 182c | DUP7 | |
| 182d | ADD | |
| 182e | MSTORE | |
| 182f | DUP13 | |
| 1830 | PUSH1 | 0x60 |
| 1832 | DUP7 | |
| 1833 | ADD | |
| 1834 | MSTORE | |
| 1835 | PUSH1 | 0x80 |
| 1837 | DUP6 | |
| 1838 | ADD | |
| 1839 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 183b | SWAP1 | |
| 183c | MSTORE | |
| 183d | PUSH1 | 0xc0 |
| 183f | DUP6 | |
| 1840 | ADD | |
| 1841 | SWAP1 | |
| 1842 | PUSH2 | 0x184a |
| 1845 | SWAP3 | |
| 1846 | PUSH2 | 0x40b3 |
| 1849 | JUMP | |
| 184a | JUMPDEST | |
| 184b | SWAP1 | |
| 184c | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 184e | NOT | |
| 184f | DUP5 | |
| 1850 | DUP4 | |
| 1851 | SUB | |
| 1852 | ADD | |
| 1853 | PUSH1 | 0xa0 |
| 1855 | DUP6 | |
| 1856 | ADD | |
| 1857 | MSTORE | |
| 1858 | PUSH2 | 0x1860 |
| 185b | SWAP3 | |
| 185c | PUSH2 | 0x40b3 |
| 185f | JUMP | |
| 1860 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1861 | SUB | |
| 1862 | PUSH1 | 0x1f |
| 1864 | NOT | |
| 1865 | DUP2 | |
| 1866 | ADD | |
| 1867 | DUP3 | |
| 1868 | MSTORE | |
| 1869 | PUSH2 | 0x1872 |
| 186c | SWAP1 | |
| 186d | DUP3 | |
| 186e | PUSH2 | 0x3b3c |
| 1871 | JUMP | |
| 1872 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1873 | MLOAD | |
| 1874 | SWAP1 | |
| 1875 | KECCAK256 | |
| 1876 | PUSH2 | 0x187f |
| 1879 | SWAP2 | |
| 187a | ADDRESS | |
| 187b | PUSH2 | 0x5a89 |
| 187e | JUMP | |
| 187f | JUMPDEST | |
| 1880 | DUP7 | |
| 1881 | PUSH0 | |
| 1882 | MSTORE | |
| 1883 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1885 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 1887 | MSTORE | |
| 1888 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 188a | PUSH0 | |
| 188b | KECCAK256 | |
| 188c | SLOAD | |
| 188d | SWAP2 | |
| 188e | PUSH32 | 0x000000000000000000000000a2e71fc2fb02d1ce93aa958e56cab83d26f3bfa6 |
| 18af | SWAP6 | |
| 18b0 | PUSH2 | 0x18b8 |
| 18b3 | SWAP7 | |
| 18b4 | PUSH2 | 0x5b1f |
| 18b7 | JUMP | |
| 18b8 | JUMPDEST | |
| 18b9 | POP | |
| 18ba | PUSH2 | 0x18c2 |
| 18bd | SWAP1 | |
| 18be | PUSH2 | 0x3e52 |
| 18c1 | JUMP | |
| 18c2 | JUMPDEST | |
| 18c3 | SWAP1 | |
| 18c4 | PUSH0 | |
| 18c5 | MSTORE | |
| 18c6 | PUSH1 | 0x2b |
| 18c8 | PUSH1 | 0x20 |
| 18ca | MSTORE | |
| 18cb | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 18cd | PUSH0 | |
| 18ce | KECCAK256 | |
| 18cf | SWAP1 | |
| 18d0 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 18d2 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 18d4 | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 18d6 | SHL | |
| 18d7 | SUB | |
| 18d8 | AND | |
| 18d9 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 18db | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 18dd | PUSH1 | 0x40 |
| 18df | SHL | |
| 18e0 | SUB | |
| 18e1 | NOT | |
| 18e2 | DUP3 | |
| 18e3 | SLOAD | |
| 18e4 | AND | |
| 18e5 | OR | |
| 18e6 | SWAP1 | |
| 18e7 | SSTORE | |
| 18e8 | PUSH0 | |
| 18e9 | JUMPDEST | |
| 18ea | DUP6 | |
| 18eb | DUP2 | |
| 18ec | LT | |
| 18ed | PUSH2 | 0x18fa |
| 18f0 | JUMPI | |
| 18f1 | PUSH2 | 0x0a8e |
| 18f4 | DUP7 | |
| 18f5 | DUP7 | |
| 18f6 | PUSH2 | 0x4996 |
| 18f9 | JUMP | |
| 18fa | JUMPDEST | |
| 18fb | DUP1 | |
| 18fc | PUSH2 | 0x190b |
| 18ff | PUSH2 | 0x0e09 |
| 1902 | PUSH1 | 0x01 |
| 1904 | SWAP4 | |
| 1905 | DUP10 | |
| 1906 | DUP9 | |
| 1907 | PUSH2 | 0x3e2e |
| 190a | JUMP | |
| 190b | JUMPDEST | |
| 190c | ADD | |
| 190d | PUSH2 | 0x18e9 |
| 1910 | JUMP | |
| 1911 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1912 | DUP5 | |
| 1913 | PUSH4 | 0x47c987b5 |
| 1918 | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 191a | SHL | |
| 191b | PUSH0 | |
| 191c | MSTORE | |
| 191d | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 191f | MSTORE | |
| 1920 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 1922 | PUSH0 | |
| 1923 | REVERT | |
| 1924 | JUMPDEST | |
| 1925 | DUP10 | |
| 1926 | DUP10 | |
| 1927 | PUSH4 | 0x55c5b3e3 |
| 192c | PUSH1 | 0xe1 |
| 192e | SHL | |
| 192f | PUSH0 | |
| 1930 | MSTORE | |
| 1931 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 1933 | MSTORE | |
| 1934 | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 1936 | MSTORE | |
| 1937 | PUSH1 | 0x44 |
| 1939 | PUSH0 | |
| 193a | REVERT | |
| 193b | JUMPDEST | |
| 193c | DUP4 | |
| 193d | PUSH4 | 0xc84507ef |
| 1942 | PUSH1 | 0xe0 |
| 1944 | SHL | |
| 1945 | PUSH0 | |
| 1946 | MSTORE | |
| 1947 | PUSH1 | 0x04 |
| 1949 | MSTORE | |
| 194a | PUSH1 | 0x24 |
| 194c | PUSH0 | |
| 194d | REVERT | |
| 194e | JUMPDEST | |
| 194f | POP | |
| 1950 | PUSH1 | 0x08 |
| 1952 | DUP5 |